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Abstract 
In North America, space heating, hot water, and air conditioning use more secondary energy than 
any other activity within buildings, thus emitting the majority of scope 1 and scope 2 Greenhouse 
Gases (GHG).   The Ground Source Heat Pump (GSHP) uses one-third the energy of traditional 
technologies to provide space conditioning and hot water services.   
 
While GSHP is a well-established technology, the energy savings and lower GHG emissions 
have not translated into their widespread adoption. Public policy measures and financial 
incentives adopted to promote GSHP have failed to lead to broad adoption or lower costs.  This 
thesis examines the adoption of GSHP in response to supportive policies among residential, 
institutional, and city-scale adopters. 
 
Detailed site-level and panel data permit natural experiments on the response of residential 
adopters in Canada and the US to changing incentives.  At higher scales, regulatory proceedings 
concerning the offering of Thermal Energy Services (TES) has provided a case study for analysis 
of utility models to finance GSHP for commercial and institutional clients.   
In Canada and the US, financial incentives failed to sustain the adoption of GSHP throughout or 
after the period of subsidy among residential households.  Neither did incentives lead to a 
decrease in price over time.  Free-ridership problems in Canada and an inability to make inroads 
to areas served by natural gas have stranded GSHP technology.  Further, the capital cost of 
GSHP results in a higher lifecycle cost than most alternatives. The economy-wide benefits of 
financial incentives for GSHP are limited in Canada, where most heat pumps are imported. 
 iii 
TES provide compelling innovations to bridge barriers at higher scales.  TES overcome balance 
sheet constraints on debt common to public sector organizations by financing capital equipment 
and renovations as utility payments.  TES can overcome capital constraints faced by developers 
by financing equipment inside the building lowering construction costs.  However, our case 
study of public procurement reveals TES to be a costly approach in the long run.  The insights 
from this research are translated into best practices and policy advice to improve contracting, 
increase awareness, and align incentives for greater efficiency.   
 iv 
Preface 
Parts of Chapter 1 were first published as “Improving the economics of ground source heat 
pumps through a community energy utility,” authors Thor Jensen and Hadi Dowlatabadi, at the 
American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy, in Monterey California, 2012.  I wrote 90% 
of the manuscript, with guidance on structuring the paper from Hadi Dowlatabadi.  The model 
contained in Appendix B has been completely restructured.  The authors hold copyright. 
The findings for Chapter 5 titled “Determinants of public sector green investments,” were 
presented in Montreal in April of 2013, at the 11th International Energy Agency Heat Pump 
Conference.  I developed the financial model and presentation with support from Hadi 
Dowlatabadi, and wrote the entire resultant chapter with his editorial guidance.  
The initial findings of Chapter 4 titled “Federal tax credits and residential investment in 
renewable energy” were presented by Hadi Dowlatabadi in Carnegie Mellon, April 2013.  The 
initial model findings emphasized tax credit rents and windfalls.  I shifted the focus of the 
chapter towards average price movements over time, investment based on income groups, and 
economy-wide benefits of investment.  Hadi Dowlatabadi and myself developed the technology 
framework collaboratively, and I wrote 90% of the present chapter. 
I applied for and received approval of a minimal risk ethics certificate from the UBC Research 
Ethics Board titled “Development models for community scale heating utilities (H13-01071).  
The certificate was required for a series of interviews I conducted with industry stakeholders and 
interveners during the thermal energy service regulatory proceedings.  The interviews guided 
research with no direct quotations.  All quotations are taken from publicly available 
transcriptions and reports filed as evidence with the British Columbia Utilities Commission.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Climate change and GHG reductions and energy security are an ever-growing public policy 
concern.  Therefore, the promotion of technologies that bring about energy efficiency and 
economic GHG reductions across all sectors of the economy is receiving more and more 
attention.  In Canada, as in most industrial nations, space heating and hot water provision 
dominate secondary energy use (61.8%, 19.1%, respectively) (NRCAN 2011a), making these 
services the greatest source of greenhouse gases from the built environment (NRCAN 2012a; 
NRCAN 2009).   
The most energy efficient space conditioning technology available to reduce energy consumption 
and emissions is the Ground Source Heat Pump (GSHP), using less than one third the energy of 
systems we have traditionally used to provide space heating (DOE 2012).  GSHP can use 
electricity or natural gas as input and, except for where the electricity is coal-based GSHP offers 
significant carbon savings compared to all other fuel types throughout North America (Hanova 
2008).  
Despite these advantages, GSHP systems serve only a small fraction of the market for space 
heating in the United States and Canada (0.5% and 4.6% respectively) (Thorsteinsson 2008; 
Natural Resources Canada 2012h).  Commonly identified barriers to their adoption are: higher 
capital costs (Goetzler et al. 2009), limited awareness (Huttrer 1997), and availability of low cost 
energy substitutes (Newell et al. 1999; CRM 2005).  A review of barriers to the wider adoption 
of GSHP by Tanguay (2011) revealed that these same challenges have persisted over time.    
 2 
GSHP has predominantly been adopted in the residential sector (NRCAN 2011a).  However, it 
has favorable economies of scale and can be designed for hotels, hospitals, building clusters, or 
even communities (PICS 2012).  Given GSHP’s strong returns to scale as the size and diversity 
of load increases, the dearth of larger systems suggests the existence of other barriers to adoption 
at larger scales – especially when needing to combine the demand of different customers.   
Two key questions arise: 
1. GSHP has been adopted in the residential sector, but can we be more specific about by 
whom and under what conditions?  What has been the impact of the enabling policies? 
2. There is a dearth of GSHP at higher scales, despite economies of scale; could there be 
other barriers and enablers at higher scales? 
This thesis examines the adoption of GSHP and response to supportive policies in the US and 
Canada.  These natural experiments provide empirical evidence for a number of studies in 
technology adoption at different scales by heterogeneous actors under changing economic 
regulations and political interests.   In the next five chapters I explore the adoption of GSHP 
among residential, institutional, and district-scale actors, paying close attention to the barriers 
and bridges to wider adoption of this technology. 
Chapter 2 reviews the economics of GSHP, emphasizing the advantages of moving beyond 
single developers to pursue economies of scale among larger installations.  Chapters 3 and 4 use 
econometric techniques to study residential GSHP installations with micro-level and panel data.  
Chapter 5 presents a case study of a school district renovating several buildings for GSHP via a 
Thermal Energy Services (TES) contract, evaluating the proposed cost of service contract to a 
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public sector comparator and alternative rate designs.  Chapter 6 reviews the Alternative Energy 
Service and Thermal Energy Service Regulatory proceedings, reviewing how the British 
Columbia Utilities Commission (BCUC) treats challenges of scale and coordination.   
Three appendices provide context and support for this thesis.  Appendix A contains technical 
detail describing the components and operation of GSHP.  Given the longevity of the building 
stock, it highlights key issues of building compatibility and system performance among 
renovations.  Appendix B contains an engineering-economic model to calculate the lifecycle cost 
of GSHP and a reference system served by gas and electricity.  Appendix B also contains a 
sensitivity analysis identifying parameters most likely to reduce costs, and a separate profitability 
analysis for GSHP under utility ownership. I extend the sensitivity analysis for the utility model 
under different rate designs.  Appendix C contains orders and decisions filed with the BCUC, 
which are relevant to the regulatory proceedings discussed in chapter 6. 
Lessons learned help in the design of better policies to reduce the energy intensity of and GHG 
emissions from the built environment, and the remainder of this introduction maps the thesis 
contents. 
GSHP exhibits strong returns to scale, and Chapter 2 uses the outputs from the engineering-
economic model contained in appendix B to demonstrate quantitatively the fall in unit costs as 
the size and diversity of load increases.   I then describe network economies available to GSHP 
at higher scales.  Pursuing larger more diversified loads requires approaching new classes of 
customer and its associated challenges of coordination.  I offer technical and social innovations 
for overcoming these barriers.  Technical innovations include thermal energy storage, while 
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social innovations require partnering with the municipality and perhaps third-party finance with 
utility ownership.     
In Chapter 3, I examine the largest proprietary database of residential GSHP installations in 
Canada, including detailed information on the type of heating system being replaced, housing 
type, previous fuel source, installation conditions, and price. I ask what is GSHP replacing within 
the heating stock, is it gaining market share, and what was the effect of policies designed to 
encourage its adoption. I also use observed prices to calculate the lifecycle cost of GSHP.  Most 
academic studies have assumed installed system prices in their engineering-economics lifecycle 
analyses of GSHP.  Using this unique dataset on actual prices as installed, I conduct an 
econometric analysis on key drivers of capital costs, including compatibility constraints.  
The CGC database permitted an examination of cost, but did not answer why there have been no 
learning economies, and system price have remained stable or increased over time in Canada.  
To explore this issue, I needed to compare GSHP to other renewable technologies.  This was 
made possible by examining the US Residential Energy Tax Credit claims. These data shed light 
on adoption of GSHP and other renewable technologies and their costs. 
In Chapter 4, panel data from tax returns provided by the Internal Revenue Service permit a 
comparison on residential investment behaviour among multiple renewable technologies.   I 
examine the performance of investment tax credits (ITC) in promoting residential sector 
adoption of renewable energy technologies in the United States.  The tax codes of 2005, 2008 
and 2009 changed the caps on investment credits for Solar Photovoltaic (PV), Solar Thermal 
(ST) and GSHP.    This natural experiment, created by the evolving terms of the ITC, provides 
valuable insights into residential sector responses to tax incentives. 
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The second major theme in my thesis is adoption of GSHP by institutional actors. Institutions, 
such as schools and hospitals, tend to have larger loads, occupy their own buildings, rely on 
centralized decision-making bodies, and supportive of environmental objectives.  Within BC, the 
environmental objective for Public Sector Organizations is explicit, with a Carbon Neutral 
Mandate imposed since 2009.  
In British Columbia, The Delta School Board #37 (DSB) provides an opportunity to study the 
adoption of GSHP at the institutional scale for Chapter 5.  The DSB had previously been denied 
financing for renovations by the Province, and yet were able to renovate 19 of their buildings at 
no upfront cost.  The DSB did so through a Thermal Energy Services (TES) contract, the very 
first of its kind in North America, which would be regulated as a public utility by the British 
Columbia Utilities Commission (BCUC).  The thermal plants, consisting of geothermal and 
high-efficiency natural gas equipment, are financed, owned and operated by the TES provider, 
FortisBC.   
I examine the key factors influencing decision-making by DSB regarding their space 
conditioning and water heating needs at the point at which they needed to renovate their existing 
infrastructure.  Using standard economic criteria I compare the TES contract to four 
counterfactuals including: a regulated alternative, two public procurement alternatives, and a 
‘status quo’ scheme of ongoing energy payments. I draw lessons from experiments with 
alternative methods of infrastructure provision to improve public procurement for TES.    
Although an original method of service delivery, the DSB project followed the normal pattern of 
installing independent GSHP systems for each building (foregoing potential economies of scale 
and scope).  Chapter 6 considers the regulatory proceedings of TES in British Columbia, 
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examining scenarios where multiple classes of customer are involved, customers inherit utility 
contracts signed prior to their arrival, and when the system grows by connecting multiple 
buildings over time. 
TES are defined as public utilities by the BCUC, but were previously omitted from regulatory 
oversight.  The provision of TES by FortisBC has sent ripples through the energy services 
market in British Columbia.  Other industry actors were concerned their services would 
henceforth require regulation by the British Columbia Utilities Commission (BCUC, 
Commission), and feared the entry of a large, regulated utility in what they considered to be an 
unregulated market.   The promulgation of TES prompted a regulatory review, including several 
ad hoc rulings, two regulatory proceedings spanning 2011-2014, and the development of a scaled 
regulatory framework for TES in British Columbia. 
I describe intervener arguments presented during the Alternative Energy Service and Thermal 
Energy Service Inquiries.  I then summarize the scaled regulatory framework for TES in British 
Columbia, and the relevant BCUC orders and decisions to the TES market.    I illustrate how the 
regulator chose to handle issues of scale and coordination, and how a long-term contract can be 
used to maintain a cost of service rate of return in an unregulated market.  I offer policy 
recommendations to improve transparency, encourage efficiency, and achieve a better balance in 
risk sharing among parties.    
I conclude by revisiting the key questions of this thesis, and summarizing the findings for each 
chapter.  The broader implications of how to improve the technology adoption, supplier 
responses and investments in energy efficiency through better policies are illustrated by 
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connecting the key lessons from each chapter.  I then propose future research to answer 
important questions unaddressed by this thesis.      
 
 8 
Chapter 2: The economics of GSHP at higher scales 
Outside of technical manuals, there is not a great deal of academic writing on ground-source heat 
pumps (GSHP) at higher scales.  Their technical potential of GSHP to provide space heating, air 
conditioning, and hot water with one third the energy of conventional heating systems, however, 
has been well documented for residential homes (Bayer et al. 2011; Blum et al. 2009).  The 
benefits of successful application of this technology for reducing the energy intensity of the built 
environment has been extolled by many (Huovila et al. 2007; Stern 2007).  
As with most energy efficient technology, higher capital costs are offset by in-use energy savings 
under reasonable assumptions about discounting (Frederick et al. 2002; Self et al. 2012). Yet the 
capital cost of GSHP is considered prohibitive by most developers and homeowners (Goetzler et 
al. 2009; Kantrowitz & Tanguay 2011).  They both worry that they will not be able to recover a 
sufficient return on their investment (Brown 2001; Gintis 2000).  
The economic benefits of GSHP are greatest where energy prices are high and significant 
demand for heating and cooling services is found (Self et al. 2012; Kegel et al. 2012; Hanova & 
Dowlatabadi 2007).  Most residential heat pumps are powered by electricity although recent low 
gas prices have led to the emergence of competitive gas-fired heat pumps (Garrabrant 2013).  
Low energy prices (and price expectations) depress the economic motive for heat pump based 
systems.   
Engineering-economic models are often used in feasibility studies and technology briefs to 
estimate lifecycle costs, net benefits, payback period, energy savings, marginal cost and 
abatement cost curves (Ozgener & Hepbasli 2007).  Comparisons of lifecycle costs for 
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residential GSHP identify the conditions where it is competitive with alternative heating systems, 
and where the potential for carbon savings is greatest (Hemmera 2007; CRM 2005; MRC 2007).   
There have been two recent studies on the economics of residential GSHP in Canada. Self (2012) 
compared ground-source heat pumps to air-source heat pumps, electric baseboard, and a natural 
gas furnace. For Ontario, Alberta, and Nova Scotia, Self (2012) assumed identical capital costs, 
but reflected regional differences in energy prices.  The total cost over a 20-year period was 
compared to air source heat pumps, electric baseboard heating, high and mid-range efficiencies 
for natural gas.1 In this assessment the GSHP was the least costly alternative in each location 
over a time horizon of 20 years with the exception of Ontario where the low-price of electricity 
made air source heat pumps less costly.2  This analysis was extended to Europe, where high 
electricity prices led to natural gas being the least costly alternative in Germany, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Spain, and the United Kingdom.3 
The analysis by Hanova and Dowlatabadi (2007) emphasized the value of energy savings as an 
indicator of how much more a financially motivated homeowner would be willing to pay upfront 
for the benefits of GSHP.   The amount a homeowner is willing to invest upfront increases as the 
heating load, price of energy, and the efficiency of a heat pump increase.  Further, it showed heat 
pumps to always provide carbon savings compared to electricity, fuel oil, and wood, however, 
when compared to high efficiency natural gas boilers the carbon intensity of electricity 
                                                
1!The!study!does!not!indicate!whether!there!was!any!adjustment!for!seasonal!variation!on!the!efficiency!of!air!
source!heat!pumps.!!
2!It!did!not!include!an!analysis!of!Quebec,!where!residential!electricity!prices!are!lower!than!in!Ontario.!
3!Varying!climactic!conditions!were!not!considered!for!European!cases.!
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consumed by the heat-pump must be less than 762t/GWh.4 The study also indicated that while 
GSHP demonstrates favorable economies of scale, economies of scale and scope are rarely 
exploited.    
GSHP is most prevalent among detached housing units, however, GSHP can be designed for 
hotels, hospitals, building clusters, or even communities (RETScreen 2005; OEE 2011b; PICS 
2012).    Given their novelty, the economic advantages of GSHP at these scales are rarely 
discussed, let alone demonstrated.  
The primary objective of this chapter is to introduce the economics of GSHP at higher scales that 
may be observed among building clusters or communities. I then discuss potential barriers and 
suggest technical and social innovations for overcoming them.  Further, I argue the municipality 
has an unparalleled advantage in creating community-scale GSHP, and suggest utility ownership 
as one means to overcome capital constraints faced by municipalities and developers.  
2.1 Economics of GSHP at higher scales 
Moving beyond residential detached housing to multiple buildings and or district scales may 
provide the opportunity to lower lifecycle costs.  This may be achieved by increasing the system 
load through the combination of divergent demand profiles of heating and cooling, and the 
opportunity to incorporate heat ejected from mechanical loads during their operation.  
The above economies are demonstrated quantitatively using an engineering-economic model 
described in Appendix B.  Table 2.1 shows the outputs of the model, namely, the levelized cost 
                                                
4!Renewables!are!close!to!50t/GWh,!60%!efficient!gas!turbine!~300t/GWh!and!a!typical!coal!powered!system!over!
1000t/GWh.!
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of two 500m2 buildings collocated on the same property, served either by a gas furnace with an 
electric cooling tower or a GSHP system, with and without the economies described in the 
upcoming Sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3.  Levelized costs are a useful proxy for lifecycle costs because 
they represent the constant price of heating over the lifetime of the technology, balancing capital 
and operating costs.5     
Separate systems  $/kWh 
Gas furnace with electric cooling tower 0.1203 
GSHP system 0.221 
Two interconnected  buildings with GSHP (500m2)   
Divergent demand profiles 0.188 
GSHP incorporating waste heat 0.166 
GSHP combining both network economies 0.155 
Table 2.1 Lifecycle cost of GSHP with network economies 
The sensitivity analysis in Appendix B shows the relative advantage of GSHP improves as 
demand and energy price assumptions increase or installation costs decrease.   The sensitivity 
analysis also identifies the system demand and capital costs as most influential to lifecycle costs, 
both of which are effected by the network economies.  Divergent loads increase system demand 
and incorporating waste heat may lower capital costs.  Unlike energy prices or climate, the 
network economies can be created wherever complementary loads are found.  I explain how 
these economies are realized in the next two sections.  
The reference system of using natural gas for heating and electricity for air conditioning has a 
lower levelized cost than GSHP.  This is due to the assumptions made for the engineering-
                                                
5!Levelized!costs!are!superior!to!indicators!of!investment!duration,!such!as!payback!periods,!which!do!not!consider!
the!time!value!of!money,!or!the!magnitude!of!costs.!!When!profitability!of!investment!is!the!deciding!factor!then!
either!rate!of!return!or!net!present!value!metrics!should!be!used.!!!
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economic model.  The lifecycle cost of GSHP is higher because of the relatively mild climate 
and low energy prices found in the lower mainland of British Columbia.  
2.1.1  Divergent demand profiles 
A heat pump can provide heating and cooling within the same unit, creating an opportunity for 
more favorable economies among larger systems.  If a heating dominant building is collocated 
with a cooling dominant building, then they have divergent demand profiles and GSHP can serve 
both simultaneously.  Essentially, demand for a heat pump can double so long as the two loads 
are divergent in their heating and cooling needs. 
Differences in building use patterns are an excellent opportunity to utilize divergent heating 
loads.  The space conditioning demand of residences and offices are complementary, allowing 
higher capacity utilization of any system that serves both.  The heat ejected into the ground 
during the daytime hours warms the earth, recharging the ground loop before evening use.  This 
improves energy efficiency of the system, while maintaining a higher rate of output.     
The simultaneous need for heating and cooling, offers an additional economy.  For example, 
within larger buildings demand for heating and cooling can occur simultaneously due to building 
orientation.  North facing rooms may require heating at the same time as south facing rooms 
require air conditioning.  GSHP systems can be designed to shift heat between the two sides of 
the building by having the condenser flowing to the heating side and the evaporator to the 
cooling side, greatly increasing system performance to over 500% (see Appendix A).  In other 
settings, the constant cooling load of data centres and supermarkets are an excellent pairing with 
the continuous heating load of hospitals and laboratories.   Such systems not only benefit from 
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using heat-pumps to move energy around the system, but also have need of smaller heat-
exchange fields in the ground and therefore lower capital costs. 
Long-distance transport of heat is both expensive and inefficient.  Hence, spatial concentration is 
highly desirable for GSHP. The dispersed nature of detached housing, where GSHP has been 
most prevalent, does not lend itself to economies of divergent loads or scale.  Divergent loads are 
found in mixed-use developments, where residential and commercial loads are found in close 
proximity.  Among commercial buildings, buildings with large hot water loads, such as hotels 
and hospitals, can be paired with cooling dominant retail and office space. 
2.1.2 Networking GSHP with waste heat rejection 
Mechanical loads, such as IT data centers, supermarkets and water treatment facilities, must 
ventilate heat as part of their normal operation.  The thermal energy is wasted unless a suitable 
sink can be found.  
It is possible to connect these sources of low-grade heat to a GSHP system as a substitute or 
supplement to the ground loop.  In such applications, the thermal energy is either ejected into the 
ground loop for circulation or connected directly to hot water tanks.   Thermal energy ventilated 
by a mechanical load is often 10°C or more warmer than the ground loop and can significantly 
improve the operational efficiency of GSHP systems (Lund et al. 2010).   
When the waste heat source can be relied upon, the system can rely on a smaller ground loop 
reducing capital costs. Thermal energy from mechanical systems displaces energy that would 
have been extracted from the ground permitting the installation of a smaller ground loop for the 
same amount of work. 
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2.1.3 Coordination challenges and the value of storage 
The reliability of mechanical sources of heat and the timing of divergent demand creates a 
coordination challenge.  Coordinating integrated systems may be perceived as risky.  Sizing for 
redundancy or avoiding any shared mechanical systems is the status quo (Lovins 1992).  If the 
perceived benefits of coordination do not outweigh their risks, these partnerships will not go 
forward. Two immediate challenges to coordination are proximity and timing.   
As noted earlier, mixed-use developments or dense urban areas are much more likely to contain 
the diversity of loads in close proximity to one another.  Timing may prevent coordination when 
waste heat is only available outside peak demand.  Waste heat produced by mechanical loads 
must be ejected for the system to function correctly.  If waste heat were produced primarily 
outside periods of demand, then it would be a difficult resource to rely on.  Storing this heat, 
even inefficiently (e.g., in the ground), is the only way to resolve the timing issue.  
There are three main ways to store heat. The first is to store heat in residential hot water tanks.  
This is not unlike demand side management programs where residential hot water systems are 
programmed by utilities to turn on prior to peak periods.  The second is to treat the ground loop 
as storage, where the ground is warmed up during the day to the advantage of evening heating 
loads.  The third option is to actually invest in a thermal storage facility, such as a glycol tank. 
For whichever technological storage solution, it is only as valuable as the avoided cost of 
supplying energy on demand.   If half of the waste heat is produced outside peak demand, then 
this is the amount that could be stored for later use.  The value of storage can be calculated as the 
avoided cost of producing thermal energy on demand less the price of storage and any thermal 
losses.  
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2.2 Municipal power and third party finance 
The municipality has an unassailable advantage in assisting with the creation of large-scale 
GSHP, offering social innovations to overcome challenges of load coordination.  The 
municipality may engage in active permitting, whereby zoning requirements are written to favor 
mixed-used developments.  Mixed-use developments are more likely to contain a diversity of 
loads that would benefit from connection to a community GSHP system, such as condominiums 
nearby supermarkets, hotels, data centers or even hospitals.6  
Secondly, municipalities have eminent domain within city limits allowing them to facilitate the 
installation of much less costly horizontal ground loops on public lands where building densities 
are too high to permit economic installation of ground loops among high-rises.  A significant 
fraction of all urban areas are paved and, if willing the municipality can grant easements for 
ground loops beneath pavements, roadways, playgrounds, or in property setbacks and utility 
corridors.  These relatively abundant lands may allow the installation of horizontal ground loops, 
further lowering capital costs.  Therefore, private developers willing to cooperate or partner with 
the municipality can realize great reductions in lifecycle costs (Jensen & Dowlatabadi 2012).  
The size and diversification of the municipality’s revenue streams allows them to borrow at a 
lower rate than almost any private entity.   Many municipal governments have severe fiscal 
constraints and may be unable to incur the capital costs that permit them to benefit from the 
long-term benefits of GSHP (economic and environmental).  Developers are also unlikely to 
                                                
6!The!objective!of!active!permitting!is!not!only!to!design!interconnected!GSHP,!which!puts!the!cart!before!the!
horse,!but!to!create!the!conditions!where!buildings!could!be!connected!to!a!larger!interdependent!system.!!For!
example,!electric!baseboard!installations!frustrate!future!renovations!for!energy!systems!of!any!kind,!so!requiring!
either!forced!air!or!low!temperature!hydronic!heating!systems!within!buildings!preserves!the!opportunity!for!
GSHP,!district!heating,!or!other!new!fuels!or!technologies.!!See!appendix!A.!!!
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shoulder the capital cost of a system sized beyond their need without remuneration (P. J. Hughes 
2008).  Developing GSHP at higher scales may well be ideal for Private-Public-Partnership, 
leveraging the combined powers of zoning and access by the municipality with third party 
finance.   
There are two primary methods for financing GSHP at higher scales: utility ownership and 
Energy Performance Contracting (EPC). EPC offer renovations and capital equipment to 
commercial and institutional clients in exchange for a stream on ongoing payments based on 
previous energy usage.  The company offering the EPC uses its expertise in energy services to 
extract a rent on the difference between the initial prices paid for energy and the energy 
payments following the renovation (GAO 2005a).  Ownership of the equipment is transferred at 
contract terminus. EPC contracts incorporating GSHP are common in some parts of the US 
(DOD 2007), whereas EPC contracts for GSHP in British Columbia are unknown to the author. 7      
In British Columbia, utility models for financing GSHP at higher scales are growing in 
popularity (PICS 2012).  Utilities finance, own, and operate equipment indefinitely in exchange 
for utility rates.  As if often the case with utilities, the sheer size of an investment limits the 
number of firms able to undertake the investment to monopolies or governments.  If privately 
owned, regulators intervene to limit the market power firms and oversee the rates charged. Thus, 
investment in a GSHP utility will likely occur in a regulated environment.   
                                                
7!GSHP!systems!installed!in!the!US!under!EPC!for!the!Department!of!Defense!were!concentrated!in!the!Southern,!
South!Western!and!North!Eastern!United!States!where!a!combination!of!climate!and!energy!prices!shortened!the!
payback!period!of!investment.!To!improve!the!return!on!investment,!an!EPC!can!bundle!other!improvements!with!
shorter!paybacks!together!with!GSHP,!such!as!insulation,!lighting!etc.!!!
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2.3 Conclusion 
The primary objective for this chapter was to introduce the economies available to GSHP at 
higher scales. The financial benefits for GSHP are greatest where installation conditions lead to 
lower capital costs, where energy substitutes are costly, and demand for heating and cooling 
services are high.  The ability to pair divergent loads and network externalities increase demand 
and decrease capital costs, respectively.  Unlike other difficult to manipulate parameters, such as 
energy prices, these economies can be created wherever complementary loads among buildings 
are found.   
The economies of GSHP improve as the overall system load increases with scale and diversity of 
demand meaning, from an engineering-economic perspective, GSHP is more compelling among 
larger or multi-unit buildings.  These economies are unavailable to detached housing units, 
where GSHP are most commonly found.     
Three immediate challenges to collective GSHP are coordination, timing of demand, and capital.  
I introduced both technical and social innovations as potential bridges.  Technical innovations for 
timing of demand include the storage of heat. Social innovations include the exercise of 
municipal power over land use for assisting in the coordination of loads, and third party finance 
as a means to overcoming capital constraints.  In the remaining thesis chapters, I will return to 
the barriers and bridges to the adoption of GSHP at residential, institutional, and community 
scales.  
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Chapter 3: Incentives and the adoption of GSHP among residential buildings 
in Canada 
This chapter examines the adoption of residential GSHP in Canada using the Canadian 
GeoExchange Coalition’s Database (CGC Database).  This proprietary database is the largest of 
its kind in North America, with over 15,000 CGC certified systems installed between 2007-2015.  
The sample was taken during a period of generous provincial and federal subsidies permitting a 
detailed look at the response of residential households to incentives.  
3.1  Background 
In Canada, from 2007 through 2012, generous financial incentives were available encouraging 
homeowners to adopt energy efficient improvements and technologies.  In some provinces, 
GSHP systems were eligible for $10K when provincial and federal incentives were combined.  
Table 3.1 lists the major incentive programs in Canada. 
Table 3.1 Financial incentives in Canada from 2007 onwards 
The ecoEnergy Retrofit program  (ecoEnergy) for home renovations was made available across 
Canada by Natural Resources Canada (NRCan). Homeowners that went through the energy 
Region Incentive Availability Amount Eligibility Stipulations 
Canada wide ecoEnergy  2007 - 2012 $1,750-
$4,375 
Renovations  Audit 
CGC 
Certification 
Ontario HESP 2007 - 2011 $5,000 Renovations Audit 
CGC 
Certification 
Quebec RénoClimate 2007 - 2017 $2,000-
$2,800 
New and 
Renovation 
Prior electric 
CGC 
Certification 
Saskatchewan EnergGuide 
for Houses 
2007 - 2013 $5,000 Renovation Audit 
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efficiency audits of their home, and chose to adopt a GSHP system could be eligible for $4,375, 
or $1,750 for upgrading to a newer, more efficient heat pump (Natural Resources Canada 2014).   
Three other provinces offered large incentives during the same period that could be used in 
conjunction with the ecoEnergy program.  Ontario offered the Home Energy Savings Program 
(HESP) and Saskatchewan offered the EnerGuide for Houses program through SaskEnergy 
(Sullivan 2011; SaskEnergy 2011).8  In both cases, the incentive was available only for 
renovations, and homeowners willing to undergo an energy audit were eligible for $5,000 on top 
of the federal ecoEnergy incentive.   
Quebec offered ecoRenov program for GSHP for which new and renovated homes were eligible 
(VIGeothermal 2013).  The primary motivation in Quebec was demand side management, so the 
renovation subsidy was only available to homeowners that had previously used electricity for 
heating or air conditioning.   
Given the inherent promise of GSHP and a chequered early history with GSHP installations, the 
need for a professional training and certification program was seized by a group of industry 
advocates. They formed the Canadian GeoExchange Coalition (CGC) to try and bring about 
transformative change to the GHP industry.  The CGC is a network of industry professionals 
dedicated to expanding the market for GSHP and reducing greenhouse gases within the built 
environment.  The CGC facilitates industry development by working with educators to offer 
training and accreditation programs to installers, and working to develop trust among customers 
and contractors (CGC 2015b).   
                                                
8!Given!the!carbon!intensity!of!electricity!in!Saskatchewan!and!Alberta,!switching!from!natural!gas!to!GSHP!would!
not!result!in!carbon!savings.!
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How then, did the incentive programs affect the adoption of GSHP among residential 
homeowners in Canada?  Is the share of GSHP growing, what is it replacing, and are 
impediments to its growth being overcome?  The answers to these questions test the persistence 
of commonly identified barriers to GSHP, and the efficacy of financial incentives as policy tools 
for changing the energy intensity of the built environment.  To answer these questions I use the 
CGC dataset containing over 15,479 CGC-certified systems installed between 2007-2014 (CGC 
2015a).  
Using the CGC dataset to interpret the wider adoption patterns in Canada has two countervailing 
sources of bias.  It underestimates the level of GSHP adoption by only considering systems 
certified by CGC and overestimates the market dynamics by focusing on a period of strong 
financial subsidies for its adoption.  The dataset can, however, be used to provide valuable 
information on the characteristics of homes persuaded to adopted GSHP, such as fuel switching.   
Certain incentive programs requiring CGC certification enforce the likelihood of the CGC 
database being indicative of actual residential adoption in those areas.  To be eligible for 
financial assistance CGC certification was required by the federal ecoEnergy incentive, and 
provincial incentives in Ontario (HESP), and Quebec (Rénoclimat) (VIGeothermal 2013; Natural 
Resources Canada 2014).  A homeowner that did not select a CGC-certified installer would 
sacrifice between $5-10K in these areas.  
The CGC dataset itself is the largest proprietary dataset of residential GSHP in North America, 
and the only source for site level detail and pricing information known to the author.  This 
presents a unique opportunity to observe the adoption of GSHP in response to financial 
incentives. First, I trace the path of renovations through the building stock showing what types of 
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systems are most often being replaced, to answer whether GHSP is blocked by compatibility 
constraints and fuel substitutes. I then compare the rate of adoption to the growth of the 
residential building stock to estimate whether the financial incentives led to an increase in market 
share. I use ordinary least squares to examine the determinants of price for GSHP, and conduct a 
lifecycle analysis using actual capital cost estimates.  I conclude with a discussion of whether 
lack of awareness, a recurring explanation in previous reviews of barriers to GSHP adoption 
(CGC 2015b), is stifling its adoption in Canada during the period of study.       
3.2 Path of adoption 
To assess the potential of GSHP, I use the CGC Dataset to trace its adoption through the building 
stock.  Information on the types of heating systems, and possible fuel switching, allows us to 
assess whether GSHP is gaining ground on the dominant heating system types and fuels, or 
occupying a small niche.  Furthermore, I examine whether the returns to scale of GSHP lead it to 
be more prevalent among buildings with larger heating loads.    
3.2.1  Compatibility 
Whether GSHP is an effective technology for mitigating climate change is dependent on how 
quickly, and how widely it is adopted within the building stock.  The process of a technology 
spreading through a population is known as diffusion (Rogers 2004).  There are two means by 
which GSHP can diffuse through the building stock; when new dwellings are built and when 
existing buildings are renovated.  Site requirements dictate whether GSHP can be installed.  
Renovations for GSHP are more challenging, considering the previous heating system can 
frustrate or even block a renovation.  This technological lock in makes it difficult to reduce the 
energy intensity of the building stock (Arthur 1989).     
 22 
Buildings outlast their original heating system by many decades.  Most buildings are served by 
several generations of heating systems each typically lasting 15 to 25 years.  Within the CGC 
dataset, 91% of all systems were installed through a renovation (CGC 2015a).  This is why 
compatibility with space conditioning systems in existing buildings is critical for GSHP’s 
potential contribution to climate change mitigation and adaptation (see Appendix A for a 
discussion of heating systems and compatibility).   
In Canada, the most common type of heating system is a natural gas furnace connected to forced-
air distribution system (Table 3.2).  The second most common heating type is electric baseboard, 
followed by boilers with radiators, heating stoves, electric radiant heating, and other types, 
including GSHP (NRCAN 2011a).  
As shown in Table 3.2, GSHP is readily compatible with most residential buildings in Canada, 
and only blocked by electric baseboard among 16.6% of detached homes.  This leaves more than 
80% of the building stock suitable for conversion to GSHP.  Table 3.2 also shows the heating 
system types renovated for GSHP from the CGC Dataset.   Most systems were installed in homes 
that would have required minimal adjustment inside of the building, such homes with furnaces or 
heat pumps.  None of the renovations for GSHP were in homes previously heated by electric 
baseboard.   
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System Type Canada (%) GSHP Renovations (%) 
Furnace  66 37 
Electric baseboard 17 0 
Boiler  6 13 
Heating stove 4 1 
Electric radiant heating 2 15 
Heat pump 3 25 
Other* 1 -  
NA 1 9 
Source: NRCan (2011), CGC Dataset (2015) 
Table 3.2 A comparison of heating systems in Canada to the share of homes that renovated for 
GSHP in the CGC dataset 
A substantial number of buildings converted from electrical plinth and boilers to GSHP.  These 
types of system can require some additional work inside the building. The CGC dataset does not 
describe the extent of work inside of the building.  However, 95% of the buildings in the CGC 
dataset used forced air.  This means it is likely boilers were connected to water-to-air fan coils 
for distributing heat through a forced air system, which is compatible with GSHP.  I will now 
consider other factors, such as fuel types, as further constraints to the adoption of GSHP. 
3.2.2 Availability of fuel substitutes 
Renovating for GSHP is most worthwhile when energy costs are high.  The availability of low-
cost fuel alternatives, such as natural gas, reduces the value of energy savings 
Fuel Type Canada fuel mix (%) GSHP conversions (%) 
Natural Gas 50 6 
Electricity 36 43 
Heating Oil 8 40 
Wood 4 2 
Other/Propane 2 9 
Source: NRCan (2012), Table 27: Heating system stock by building type and heating system type. 
Table 3.3 A comparison of energy sources used for heating in Canada to the share of homes with 
that fuel type that renovated for GSHP in the CGC dataset 
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Electricity is the only energy category where the fraction of renovations for GSHP (42.8%) 
closely resembles the fraction of Canadians using that fuel type (36.1%).  There is a clear 
economic incentive for replacing electricity with GSHP as it provides energy savings and 
doubles as demand side management.  In Canada, Electricity is more common than natural gas 
for heating in Quebec (79.9%), New Brunswick (59.9%), and Newfoundland and Labrador 
(71%) (NRCAN 2012a).9    
Most homeowners adopting GSHP in Quebec and New Brunswick heated their homes with 
electricity (see Table 3.4).  In Ontario, natural gas is dominant, and homeowners renovated away 
from fuel oil most of the time.  The pattern of GSHP displacing electricity in regions where 
electric heat is most common and fuel oil in all other provinces holds throughout the dataset.  
Alberta is the only region where homeowners renovated away from natural gas more often than 
any other fuel type (29 out of 38 installations).  Alberta is exceptional for having less than 1% of 
homes heated with fuel oil and 94% of homes heated with natural gas (ibid). 
 (%) Ontario Quebec New Brunswick 
  Fuel mix 
% 
GSHP Reno 
% 
Fuel 
mix % 
GSHP Reno 
% 
Fuel mix 
% 
GSHP Reno 
% 
Electricity 17 38 80 67 60 52 
Natural Gas 73 5 4 1 4 1 
Heating Oil 7 42 9 29 13 32 
Other/Propane 2 13 0 2 3 1 
Wood 1 2 7 1 20 14 
Source: NRCan (2012) Heating system stock by building type and heating system type. 
Table 3.4 A comparison of energy sources used for heating by province to the share of homes with 
that fuel type renovating for GSHP   
                                                
9!Fuel!oil!is!more!common!in!Prince!Edward!Island!and!Nova!Scotia!(76%!and!54%!respectively).!
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3.2.3 Compatibility and fuel type 
The market share of GSHP is currently too small for its growth to be held back by compatibility 
constraints.  Over half of all buildings in Canada are served by forced-air furnaces, which can 
easily be substituted for GSHP (see Appendix A).   Homeowners rarely switched away from 
furnaces with electricity or natural gas as fuel (6% and 4% of GSHP renovations, respectively). 
Grouping renovations based on previous fuel source and heating system is a telling indicator of 
residential motivations for adopting GSHP.  Electricity and fuel oil were the most common fuels 
during a renovation, combining for almost 80% of all renovations.  Electricity is one of the most 
common energy sources for heating in Canada, which appears conducive for the long-term 
diffusion of GSHP.  Table 3.5 groups GSHP renovations from the CGC dataset among homes 
heated with electricity by their previous heating system.   
 Heating system No. GSHP Share GSHP 
(%) 
Heat Pump* 2313 40 
Electrical Plinth (convector) 2018 35 
Furnace 965 17 
Boiler  111 2 
Wood stove (fireplace)** 11 0 
NA 361 6 
* Water 1581, Ground 131, Air Source 601 
**Wood stove with electric heating 
Table 3.5 The most common heating systems found among buildings adopting GSHP that had 
previously used electricity as a heating source  
Table 3.5 shows most of the renovations for electricity was from homeowners replacing heat 
pumps.  Thus where electricity was the existing energy source, 40% of GSHP installations were 
free-riders of the government subsidies.  These installations did not increase awareness about 
GSHP nor increase their market share.  They may have conferred private benefits arising from 
the need to replace older units and benefit from incrementally higher efficiency of newer units. 
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Customers who switched from an electric plinth constituted 35% of GSHP adoptions where there 
is a technology switch. A closer examination of electric plinth reveals the motivation for a GSHP 
renovation.  Table 3.6 groups the electrical plinth renovations based on whether or not they had 
air conditioning in their homes.  Approximately 88% of homeowners switching from electrical 
plinth to GSHP gained air conditioning. 
Air Conditioning No. GHSP Share (%) 
None 1774 88 
Yes 84 4 
NA 160 8 
Table 3.6 The share of air conditioning among homes renovating for GSHP, which were previously heated by 
an electric plinth heating system 
The tendency to renovate for GSHP and gain air conditioning is consistent throughout the 
sample.  Of the 5,813 buildings previously served by electricity, 35% were heat pump 
replacements.  Of the remaining 3,793, only 7% had previously used air-conditioning, 73% 
reported no air conditioning and 20% did not report.    
The preference for air conditioning with GSHP aligns with a growing trend towards air 
conditioning among residential buildings in Canada. In 1990, only 22% of all floor space was 
air-conditioning compared to 46% in 2011 (NRCAN 2012d; NRCAN 2012e). Air conditioning 
increases comfort, along with summer space conditioning costs.  This indicates homeowners 
were considering comfort at least as much as energy savings when renovating their homes away 
from electricity.  
3.2.4 Site conditions 
Space limitations outside of the building constrain GSHP among new and existing buildings 
alike.  Vertical ground loops are costlier, but can be installed compactly in most locations, 
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whereas horizontal ground loops are less costly, but require access to land far larger than the 
building footprint.  Pond and open loop systems are less costly still, but dependent on the 
availability of water features (see Appendix A).   
Where economics drive decision making, less costly ground loop types should be more 
prevalent.  Rural areas have more space for the installation of ground loops than urban, and Table 
3.7 ranks ground loops based on their prevalence in rural or urban areas.  Rural areas were 
identified as such using their postal code.10 
Rural Urban 
Loop  No. Percent % Loop  No. Percent % 
Horizontal 5,302 62 Vertical 2,886 42 
Vertical 1,645 19 Horizontal 2,704 39 
Open 1,051 12 Open 870 13 
Pond 540 6 Pond 352 5 
Diagonal 22 1 Diagonal 54 1 
Total 8,560  Total 6,866  
Table 3.7 A comparison of the GSHP systems types11 found in rural and urban areas 
The most common type of loop in the CGC dataset is horizontal (8006), followed by vertical 
(4531), open (1921), pond (892), and diagonal loops (76). In rural areas horizontal GCHE are 
five times more common than vertical loops. Vertical GCHE were most common in urban areas, 
followed closely by horizontal GCHE.  More often than not, homeowners elected for less costly 
system types wherever site conditions permitted. 
It appears GSHP is more likely to be installed by homeowners in rural locations.  Compared to 
the entire population of Canada, only 17% (5.6M) of Canadians live in rural areas, whereas, over 
                                                
10!A!zero!in!the!second!digit!placeholder!of!the!FSA!denotes!a!rural!location,!any!other!number!is!urban.!
11!Vertical,!horizontal!and!diaganol!GSHP!are!based!on!geothermal!energy,!whereas!open!and!pond!loops!require!
and!aquifer!or!other!water!source.!
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55% of the CGC dataset reports system installations in a rural setting.  Closer inspection reveals 
costlier fuel types such as fuel oil, wood, and propane have also been more prevalent in these 
areas where natural gas distribution networks have been less profitable due to low load density. 
3.2.5 Returns to scale 
From an energy-economics perspective, GSHP should be most compelling in larger homes and 
multi-unit housing where demand for energy services would yield higher returns to investment 
(see Appendix B). Ideally, comparing the size and heating load of the CGC dataset to a 
representative population of buildings in Canada could test this, but no such dataset is available.   
As a substitute, homes with and without an incentive can be compared.  The economics of 
thermal technologies improves with scale so one should expect to see renewable thermal 
technologies found among larger buildings first.12  Incentives reduce the capital cost making heat 
pumps compelling where they may not have been before, such as in smaller homes.   
In the CGC dataset, size is measured using area (sq-ft), total cost ($), and design heat load (Btu).  
Design heat load measures building heat loss, including considerations for climate and 
insulation.  
Over 90% of the installations reflected in the CGC database occurs during a period of subsidy so 
t-tests were used to compare the characteristics of the sample with and without an incentive.  
                                                
12!Income!is!likely!also!a!factor.!!If!persons!with!higher!income!occupy!larger!homes,!then!the!capital!cost!barrier!to!
GSHP!may!be!less!constraining.!
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Missing values were replaced with the sample mean, following the exclusion of outliers (e.g., 
buildings areas greater than 10,000 sq-ft).13 
(x1000) Without Incentive With Incentive P-value 
Area (ft sq) 2.597 1.943 0.00 
Total cost ($) 34.556 24.958 0.00 
Design heat load (Btu) 55.549 52.748 0.01 
Table 3.8 A comparison of the primary indicators of system size reported in the CGC dataset, taken 
during and after the availability of the federal financial incentive  
Table 3.8 confirms the area, total cost, and design heat load were all smaller during periods of 
subsidy, with statistical significance at the 1% level.  This may indicate that homes adopting 
GSHP tend to be larger as the technology exhibits returns to scale, and the presence of financial 
incentives led to smaller homes, or homes on the edge of profitability, more willing to consider 
adopting the technology.   
3.3 Growth of GSHP 
In North America, industry advocates claim the past decade has seen rapid growth for GSHP 
driven by the availability of financial incentives (CGC 2012a; Groff 2014; P. J. Hughes 2008).  
An industry survey of GSHP installations for both residential and commercial systems indicated 
the market for GSHP in Canada grew by 40% in 2005, and 60% annually from 2006-2008. At 
the peak in 2009, there were almost 16,000 GSHP systems shipped, although this estimate did 
not distinguish between residential and commercial systems (CGC 2012b). 
Did the financial incentive lead to an increase in the share of homes heated by GSHP? Finding 
estimates to confirm changes in the rate of adoption for GSHP is difficult.  There is no reliable, 
comprehensive estimate for GSHP in Canada, and NRCAN does not distinguish between GSHP 
                                                
13!Careful!review!of!the!database!suggests!some!confusion!between!building!area!and!building!design!heat!load.!
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and Air Source Heat Pumps (ASHP) in its annual reporting (NRCAN 2012g).14  The 2007 and 
2011 National Household Surveys do distinguish between GSHP and Air Source Heat Pumps 
(ASHP).  In 2011, responding to the NHS survey became optional lowering the quality of data 
(see Table 3.9) (NRCAN 2007; NRCAN 2011a).  For this reason, I estimate the share of GSHP 
among detached housing units using the 2007 survey. 
 (000’s) 2007 2011 
Detached housing units 7,630 7,950 
Heat Pumps 1,123 564 
ASHP 460 413 
GSHP 104 93b 
Don't know 200 U 
Not stated 358 U 
Share of GSHP (%) 1.4% 1.1% 
bUse estimate with caution, U refers to unreliable data 
Table 3.9 Best estimates for the share of heat pumps among detached housing units in Canada as 
reported among the National Household Survey15 in 2007 and 2011 
The CGC dataset offers a partial sample for GSHP adoption.  However, I can use this estimate to 
establish a floor on total adoptions and compare it to the number of systems that must be 
installed annually for the share of GSHP to be growing. 
If the building stock were not constantly growing through new construction, the market share of 
GSHP would increase with every home renovation that substituted GSHP for another system.  
For GSHP to increase its share, the total number of GSHP systems (renovations and new 
construction) must be greater than its current cumulative share.  Otherwise the share of GSHP is 
eroded by the addition of other heating system types.  
                                                
14!The!annual!report!no!longer!surveys!for!heat!pumps,!but!instead!imputes!an!estimate!for!heat!pumps!by!
subtracting!other!heating!system!types.!
15!The!year!2007!was!the!last!year!the!National!Household!Survey!was!part!of!a!mandatory!census,!and!therefore!
was!better!estimates!than!the!2011!survey.!
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The primary source for data on new construction activity is the change in detached housing from 
Statistics Canada, calculated as the year over year change from the detached housing survey of 
energy use (Natural Resources Canada 2012f; Natural Resources Canada 2012g). 16   To increase 
the share of GSHP, the total number of GSHP adopted divided by new construction each year 
must exceed its cumulative total or lose ground to other heating types.  The best estimate of pre-
incentive GSHP adoptions is the 2007 NHS survey, with 104K systems.  In 2007, there were 
around 7.63M detached housing units Canada wide, so approximately 1.3% of buildings were 
served with GSHP.  
As shown in Table 3.10, the numbers of CGC installations in Canada and in Quebec are 
compared to the rate of new construction. GSHP is starting with a very small base of installed 
units, so to maintain or exceed their current share only 1.2K GSHP systems need be installed 
each year.  As shown in Table 3.10, the fraction of CGC certified buildings exceeds this amount 
for almost every year.  Even using the limited sample of the CGC database, the share of GSHP 
was increasing for a time.  
                                                
16!The!CGC!database!is!a!residential!certification!program,!and!is!predominantly!populated!by!detached!housing.!!
The!database!distinguishes!among!building!types,!including:!bungalow,!chalet,!cottage,!farm!house,!singleafamily!
home,!town!house,!row!house,!apartment!bloc,!and!condominium.!!Most!of!these!categories!qualify!as!detached!
housing!with!the!exception!of!apartments,!and!the!attached!housing!groups!of!row!housing,!condominiums,!and!
town!housing.!!Approximately!84%!of!the!installations!in!the!CGC!sample!are!identified!as!single!detached!houses,!
1%!are!categorized!as!attached!housing!and!apartments,!and!15%!are!identified!as!other!or!were!unlabeled.!
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Canada 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
∆ Detached Housing 74,900 66,000 62,100 54,200 53,900 - 
CGC Installations 3,469 4,336 2,811 1,841 401 39 
Fraction of GSHP 4.6% 6.6% 4.5% 3.4% 0.7% - 
Quebec            
∆ Detached Housing 17,100 15,000 16,900 13,800 14,100 - 
CGC Installations 454 521 399 410 484 86 
Fraction of GSHP 2.7% 3.5% 2.4% 3.0% 3.4% - 
The 2007 NHS Survey reported GSHP to be 1.4% of all detached housing units in Canada, there was no 
reliable estimate for GSHP in Quebec contained in the survey (NRCAN 2007).  
Table 3.10 Trends in new detached-house construction by year for Canada17 and Quebec18, and the 
number of GSHP installations certified by CGC 
While the subsidy from the federal government expired in 2011, the provincial incentive in 
Quebec remains valid until 2017.  It appears as through the subsidy for renovations led to a 
short-lived increase in adoptions, but the appetite was limited.  In Quebec (and Canada although 
the CGC sample may not be representative) the number of CGC-certified systems has declined 
prior to the conclusion of incentive programs (Raymond et al. 2015).  
3.4 The cost of GSHP in Canada 
Like other energy-efficient technologies, the economic incentive to invest the higher capital cost 
of a GSHP system is the savings it offers in lower operating costs over time.  The energy savings 
give the adoption an investment quality.  Most academic engineering-economic studies of 
residential GSHP have extolled its virtues without access to empirical data on cost of installed 
systems (see Table 3.11). 
                                                
17!!The!2007!NHS!Survey!reported!GSHP!to!1.4%!of!all!detached!housing!units!in!Canada,!there!was!no!reliable!
estimate!for!GSHP!in!Quebec!contained!in!the!survey!(NRCAN!2007)!
18!GSHP!installations!in!new!new!were!offered!financial!incentives!in!Quebec,!but!not!the!rest!of!Canada!
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Source Country 2008 USD 
Goetzler (2009)  US 9,000-15000 
Self (2012) CAD 8,900 
Long (1993)  US 10,900 
IRS Credit Claims (Ch. 3) US 8,300-17,000 
Heat pump replacement19  CGC Dataset 13,000 
Closed vertical renovation CGC Dataset 28,000 
Closed horizontal renovation CGC Dataset 24,000 
New closed vertical CGC Dataset 38,000 
Table 3.11 Capital cost estimates for GSHP from the literature20 and CGC dataset 
The observed prices in the CGC dataset are much higher than reported in the literature.  In this 
section I use empirical data on costs to calculate a homeowners willingness to pay for GSHP in 
Ontario (where most of the installations occurred), as well as the homeowners implicit discount 
rate compared other heating alternatives.  I then develop an evidence-based model for estimating 
capital cost, under different installation conditions.    
Using an approach similar to Hanova (2008), I use NRCAN energy intensity estimates (2012a)  
for calculating residential energy demand.  Table 3.12 shows the total demand for a residential 
building in Ontario calculated by multiplying the energy intensity of the buildings by its area.  
Energy intensity includes appliance loads and lighting, so I separate space heating and hot water 
requirements by multiplying total energy demand by the share of energy devoted to these 
services.  A home adopting GSHP would also gain air conditioning services so I assume a re-
bound effect in energy use for three months for cooling among homes adopting GSHP. 
  
                                                
19!The!cost!of!a!heat!pump,!inclusive!of!installation!labour,!was!calculated!as!the!price!paid!by!homeowners!
replacing!heat!pumps!in!water!and!groundabased!GSHP!systems.!!!
20!Where!per!ton!estimates!were!offered,!I!assume!a!3ton!system,!the!median!system!size!of!CGC!dataset.!
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 Region Area Energy use Space heating Water heating Air conditioning 
Ontario 200 m2 0.68 GJ/m2 85GJ 30 GJ 21 GJ 
Table 3.12 Demand for space heating and hot water for a detached housing unit 
The efficiency of the system determines that actual energy required.  GSHP is assumed to have a 
Coefficient of Performance (COP) of 4 (400% efficient), which holds constant for heating and 
cooling.  I assume the GSHP system is able meet 75% of energy demand, with the remainder 
served with a 100% efficient auxiliary unit.   The alternative electric heating system is 100% 
efficient, while fuel oil, propane, and natural gas systems are 95% efficient.   
For operating costs, I assume energy prices from 2009 (the year with the greatest number of 
installations in Ontario).  Most homeowners in Ontario use Time-of-use pricing that increases 
during peak hours (Ontario Energy Board 2015a).  I estimate demand profiles based on the 
sample bill supplied, which shows ¾ of demand off-peak.  Natural gas rates are more 
challenging, considering third-party vendors can sell natural gas under a variety of pricing 
schemes bundling charges together.  Here I used rates and sample bills from Enbridge in Ontario 
(Ontario Energy Board 2015b), and a sales tax including HST is included.  Propane and fuel oil 
prices include a fixed fee of $200 per year for re-filling fuel tanks.  The capital cost for GSHP is 
$28,000 (median price of a vertical GSHP renovation), and $10,000 for natural gas, fuel oil, and 
propane heating sytstems.  The capital cost of electric heating is $5,000.   
Table 3.13 shows the fuel mix for heating in Ontario compared to the proportion of homes with 
that fuel type that switched to GSHP.  Next to each fuel type it shows the difference in costs 
between GSHP and each alternative over 15 years including the cost of additional air 
conditioning.  The last two columns calculate the implicit discount rate with and without the 
combined provincial and federal rebates totalling $10,000.   
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 Fuel mix for heating 
Difference compared to 
GSHP over 15 years 
Implicit discount rate for 
GSHP over 15 years 
 Ontario GSHP Reno 
Premium/ 
Discount 
AC 
Rebound $28K CAPEX 
$10K 
rebate 
Natural gas 73% 5% -17,000 -2,200 -27% -20% 
Electricity 17% 38% -3,000 -2,200 -2% 6% 
Fuel Oil 7% 42% 14,300 -2,200 9% 26% 
Propane 1% 13% 16,800 -2,200 10% 28% 
Wood 2% 2% - - - - 
Table 3.13 The difference in lifecycle cost between GSHP and the implicit discount rate with and 
without $10,000 incentive over 15 years 
Compared to electricity or natural gas, a homeowner would pay between $5,000-$19,000 more 
for GSHP.  These homeowners adopting GSHP either had very low, or negative, discount rates, 
or were willing to pay a premium for the green attributes or air conditioning features of the 
technology.  In stark comparison, the costly fuel types of fuel oil and propane permit 
homeowners to adopt GSHP and still save money with the rebound effect of air conditioning.  
These homes could have discount rates as high as 9-28% depending on whether the $10,000 
rebate was available.   
When comparing to the prices observed in the US, it appears Canadian installers are pursuing a 
pricing strategy that makes GSHP compelling only to homeowners served by costly fuel types or 
those willing pay a premium for the green attributes.  This strategy may not succeed in the long 
run considering the homeowners with these attributes are in limited supply, and once this group 
has been exhausted, the growth possibilities for high-priced GSHP are limited.      
3.4.1 Drivers of capital costs 
The CGC dataset provides a valuable opportunity to examine the relationship between system 
cost, site, and system characteristics.  This includes issues of backwards compatibility with the 
previous heating system, the importance of site conditions on the cost of the ground loop, and 
 36 
homeowners’ willingness to pay when switching from costlier fuels.   The variables and their 
parameters are described below, followed by an ordinary least squares measurement of their 
relationship to total system costs. 
The CGC dataset contains indicators for size, such as building area (sq-ft) and whether the 
system contains any additional loads, such as adjacent buildings, pools, or saunas. The fraction 
of total heating met by the ground loop is also included.  Ground loops can be sized to meet 
anything from 60-100% of the peak demand – depending on the customers’ willingness to use an 
auxiliary unit to meet peak heating a small fraction of the time. Under typical conditions, a 
ground loop capable of serving 70% of the demand would be capable of meeting >90% of all 
demand (see Appendix A).21 
Compatibility constraints outside the building are described by the ground loop and soil 
conditions.  There is a dummy variable for closed pond, open loop, horizontal, vertical, and 
diagonal ground loops.  Beneficial soil conditions, such as conductivity or porosity, are indicated 
with a dummy variable identifying if soil was described as damp or contained clay.      
For compatibility constraints inside the building, I include dummy variables for the previous 
heating system type including: forced air, boiler, stoves, electric plinth, and heat pumps.   I also 
include a dummy variable for new or existing buildings, as a new building may require more 
materials inside the building. 
                                                
21!Given!the!prevalence!of!GSHP!systems!in!rural!areas,!customer!choice!about!the!loop!size!is!also!informed!by!the!
reliability!of!electricity!supply!in!their!location!and!availability!of!secondary!heating!(such!as!wood!fireplaces).!
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A dummy variable is used for each previous fuel type to test whether homeowners are willing to 
pay more for GSHP in areas where fuel substitutes are costly.  Dummy variables are present for 
wood, fuel oil, propane, natural gas and electricity.   
Other factors that might increase costs include the heat pump characteristics, such as the 
efficiency of the heat pump.  I also included dummy variables for add-ons such as 
desuperheaters, thermostats, and insulation. 
3.4.2 Data and results 
As shown in Table 3.14, the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model was statically significant, 
explaining 40% of variance with 9,070 observations.  Almost all of the parameters selected were 
significant at the 1% level, and at least one variable from each of the above groups was found 
statistically significant.   
The model essentially calculates the implicit price, or effect on price, for certain features of 
GSHP system.  It illustrates how conditions favouring economic installations and compatibility 
concerns can greatly affect system costs. Persons with access to water sources, space for 
trenching, and minimal work requirements with the building’s inner mechanics, clearly benefit.   
Added features, such as auxiliary heaters or desuperheaters increase investment upfront, but will 
reduce operating costs. 
All of the five variables related to system sizing were all found to have significant, positive 
relationships with total costs, and so were all of the variables describing site conditions. The 
dummy variable for new construction increases price by $16.5K, compared to a renovation. This 
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large price step fits the dataset, considering mean price of a new building is greater than a 
renovation in the CGC dataset ($37.7K and $24K on average, respectively).   
On average, every loop type was costlier than an open loop, which was the reference for 
comparison.  The availability of space for horizontal loops or nearby water features can result in 
significant savings.  Vertical or diagonal loops come at a premium of $5-$3K more than 
horizontal loops while having favourable soil characteristics decreased costs by about $800.   
The prior heating system is a major determinant of compatibility and of cost.  The reference 
system was a boiler, which operates at a higher system temperature than GSHP so would require 
some additional work within the building.  Renovations among furnaces, air source, ground, and 
water heat pumps were all less costly considering they require the least amount of work inside or 
outside of the building.  
Of the key energy variables, electricity was the reference fuel and neither wood nor fuel oil was 
found to have statistically different price from electricity.  Only propane was found to be costlier 
on average than electricity.  
Among variables describing the technology and additional work, the heat pump’s coefficient of 
performance did have a statistically significant effect on prices.  
In general, persons with access to water, space for trenching, and minimal inner-building work 
requirements can realize substantial cost reductions.  Conversely, persons without these 
characteristics will find the capital cost of GSHP to markedly increase along with the payback 
period of investment.  
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 Coefficients Estimate Std. Error Sign. 
Size     
 Design Heat Load 
(btu) 
0.2 0 ***  
 Area (sqft) 0.9 0.1 ***  
 Load Factor (%) 3626.5 523.9 *** 
 Domestic Hot Water 636.4 523.9 ***  
 Pool Water 6337.4 741.4 ***  
 Adjacent Building 33326.8 1171.5 *** 
Site Conditions     
  Loop Type     
 Vertical 10492.8 359.5 *** 
 Horizontal 5876 357.9 *** 
 Diagonal 9601.6 1566.6 *** 
 Pond 5189.6 421.1 *** 
 New Construction 16553 3602.4 *** 
 Good Soil 1229.4 198.3 *** 
Housing Characteristics    
  Heating Before    
 Hydronic Heating 825.3 535.2  
 Electric Plinth 553.6 361.6  
 Stove (fireplace) -1654 956 * 
 Furnace -901.2 251.7 *** 
 Heat Pump - Air -1664.3 330.3 *** 
 Heat Pump - Ground -9813.6 788.6 *** 
 Heat Pump - Water -9324.1 379.7 *** 
Energy     
 Fuel Before    
 Fuel Oil (mazout) 520 262.2 ** 
 Fuel Oil & Wood 316.5 668.5  
 Fuel Oil & 
Electricity 
365.7 855.5  
 Wood 65.4 732.9  
 Wood Pellets 554.6 1230.5  
 Propane 1185.5 334.9 *** 
 Natural Gas 815.8 368.9 ** 
System Characteristics    
 Performance 
Coefficient 
1165 251.6 *** 
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 Coefficients Estimate Std. Error Sign. 
Other Work    
 Auxilliary Heater 515.6 209.9  
 Desuperheater 1019.4 256.3 ** 
 Antivibration 77.3 336.6 *** 
 Insulation 422.8 161.8  
 PumpingKit 473.3 230.6 *** 
 Filter -384.8 328.8 ** 
 Thermostat 885 270.7  
(Intercept)  -2624.8 1480.2 *** 
    * 
 R2 0.402   
 Adj. R2 0.4   
 n 9070   
 Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1   
  
  
Table 3.14 The relationship between independent variables and total cost  
Comparison of pricing behaviour with another dataset of GSHP installations outside of Canada 
could yield new insights on drivers of costs.  As indicated earlier, the cost of GSHP is higher in 
Canada than in the US despite the same capital equipment, most of which is imported from the 
US.   If installers are engaging in strategic behaviour by increasing prices in areas where 
competition is limited or when incentives are available, comparing this dataset with the US could 
identify such opportunistic pricing behaviour.  Alternatively, this could be analyzed within the 
CGC dataset through a cross-sectional analysis comparing the price of GSHP in areas with 
multiple installations compared to underserved regions. 
One of the potential advantages of a financial stimulus is a decrease in prices, as industry actors 
learn by doing (see Chapter 4).  In Table 3.15, I have divided the cost of GSHP by the size of the 
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heat pump in refrigeration tons to calculate the price per ton (PPT) of GSHP for the years 2006-
2014, distinguishing between horizontal and vertical loops.  For vertical loops, the median PPT 
of GSHP increased steadily, with a slight plateau in 2011.  Among horizontal loops, the price did 
decrease slightly, but rebounded in 2013.  Future research comparing the pricing strategies of 
installers in response to financial incentives might explain this trend.  
Vertical 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
No. 2 120 856 1,081 670 575 374 63 3 
Median 9,352 11,315 9,258 9,702 9,922 9,651 11,219 11,921 13,645 
Mean 9,352 12,184 9,701 10,182 10,281 10,275 11,751 12,179 13,254 
Horizontal 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
No. 4 39 1715 2182 1384 905 232 27 1 
Median 8,392 7,075 6,729 6,865 6,750 6,789 6,607 7,778 6,250 
Mean 7,858 8,260 7,091 7,281 7,174 7,111 7,146 8,420 6,250 
Median 
Difference 
960 4,240 2,529 2,837 3,172 2,862 4,612 4,143 7,395 
Table 3.15 The price per ton of GSHP over time 
3.5 Awareness 
Lack of awareness is a commonly identified barrier to broad adoption of GSHP (Kantrowitz & 
Tanguay 2011; P. J. Hughes 2008; CGC 2015b).  The awareness barrier can refer to both 
negative perceptions of GSHP among developers and the lack of awareness about benefits and 
long-run savings among potential end users.  The CGC dataset does not measure awareness from 
either perspective, however, it does provide insight into the awareness barrier.   
Federal and provincial incentives were clearly an important motivator for adopting GSHP, 
however, incentives for GSHP adoption did not lead to growth among ineligible homeowners. 
The federal incentive, and most other provincial incentives, was only available for building 
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renovations. There were 14,075 installations for GSHP as a retrofit technology and only 1,372 
among new construction.  The only province offering an incentive for new construction was 
Quebec, which is where over 1,085 (79%) of new homes adopting GSHP were located.   
The scarcity of new construction is a worrying indicator of the struggles for GSHP gaining 
market share. If awareness is a major barrier to GSHP then the increase in renovation activity 
should have led to some spillover in new construction outside of Quebec. 
It is also possible that different persons are responsible for making decisions during renovation 
and new construction activity.  If the majority of homes are not commissioned by homeowners 
but built for sale by developers, then it may be the developers who are unwilling to invest in 
GSHP.  Absent a market capitalizing the benefits of energy efficiency upfront in the sales price, 
developers must absorb this higher cost.  Unfortunately, the Canadian Housing Mortgage 
Corporation does not track whether homes are built for sale or commissioned by homeowners, 
which could explain the gap between new construction and renovation. 
As shown in Chapter-section 3.4, the capital cost of GSHP is greater than most techno-economic 
models assume.  The awareness barrier pertaining to the technology’s long-term economic 
benefits may be overstated among residential homeowners in Canada.  For homeowners with 
access to natural gas, increased awareness on the financial considerations of GSHP could harm 
or hinder its adoption. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
In Canada, GSHP was supported by federal incentives from 2007-2012.  To assess the efficacy 
of financial incentives on residential investment behaviour, I used site level data from the CGC 
dataset.  
The market share of GSHP is currently too small to be frustrated by compatibility constraints, 
however, homeowners rarely switched away from furnaces with electricity or natural gas as fuel 
(~6% and 4% of GSHP renovations, respectively). Homes heated by electricity and renovated for 
GSHP were most often already served with heat pumps, making these installations free-riders on 
the subsidy. Air conditioning may have motivated technology changers from electrical plinth, 
with 88% of home renovators gaining this service.  
Other economic considerations influenced the adoption of GSHP.  GSHP tends to diffuse more 
readily in rural areas, where space for less costly ground loops is abundant and natural gas is 
rare.  GSHP exhibits returns to scale, and absent financial incentives, I found the homes adopting 
GSHP are on average larger, with larger design-heating loads.   
Using the NHS 2007 survey, I estimated the share of GSHP in Canada to be small 
(approximately 100K units or 1.3% of detached housing).   For the share of GSHP to increase 
total adoption needs only exceed 1.4% of new construction meaning GSHP was growing, albeit 
from a small base.  The financial incentives in Canada gave GSHP a temporary edge, but 
declined after 2009, and plummeted once incentives were removed.  
Most engineering-economic studies of GSHP assume capital costs.  The capital costs revealed by 
the CGC dataset are much higher than estimates published in other peer-reviewed articles.  I 
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recalculated the lifecycle cost of GSHP using capital cost estimates from the CGC data.  The 
capital cost of GSHP was the most costly alternative over 20 years, with the exception of electric 
baseboard in Ontario. I then used ordinary lease squares to model the effect different factors had 
on the price of GSHP.  In short, GSHP is a high-price durable good, with a capital cost greatly 
influenced and compatibility with the previous heating system and site conditions.  Further, the 
price per ton of GSHP did not achieve any sizeable reductions in cost during the incentive 
period.  
Although this was not directly addressed in the CGC dataset, there are at least two reasons 
awareness may not be the barrier it seems.  The widespread availability of incentives for 
renovations did not lead to an increase among ineligible homeowners.  If awareness was a 
primary concern some spillover should have been observed in the market for new homes outside 
of Quebec.  Secondly, the long-term economic benefits that ought to encourage adoptions are 
overstated in Canada.  GSHP is costlier than other conservation measures. Thus, homeowners 
with better information concerning prices might be discouraged to invest in GSHP.   
The financial incentives were unable to sustain the adoption of GSHP beyond the incentive 
period, and neither were the incentives able to persuade homeowners served by natural gas or 
central heating (furnaces) with electricity to convert in meaningful proportions.  Instead the 
incentive likely accelerated future adoptions while incentives were available, leading to a drop 
after these households had been removed from the market.  Designers of public policy should 
consider the limited traction of GSHP when offering incentives.  
The dataset provides many other opportunities for future research.  For instance, I did not order 
the importance of these factors on decision-making when tracing the path of adoption for GSHP. 
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A logistic regression, in conjunction with a comparator dataset, could identify the most important 
factors for adopting GSHP.   
The differences in price between Canadian and American prices are great despite often using the 
same capital equipment.  Considering the capital equipment is sold on either side of the border 
the differences in price must be due to another factor, and a close investigation of installer 
behaviour could illuminate these differences. 
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Chapter 4: Federal tax credits and residential investment in renewable energy 
Tax incentives are a popular mechanism for encouraging private investments in specified target 
areas.  The focus of this paper is to explore the performance of investment tax credits (ITC) in 
promoting residential sector adoption of renewable energy technologies.  The tax codes of 2005, 
2008 and 2009 changed the caps on investment credits.  Tax return data is used to analyze 
investment patterns in: Solar Photovoltaic (PV), Solar Thermal (ST) and Ground Source Heat 
Pumps (GSHP) in the residential sector.  The natural experiment created by the evolving terms of 
the ITC provides valuable insights into residential sector responses to tax incentives.    
Investment patterns are also examined across income groups, revealing a bias towards wealthier 
households.   Key factors determining the economic multipliers associated with renewable 
energy investment are demonstrated.   
4.1 Changing economic regimes 
Governments have often used Investment Tax Credits (ITC) to shape investment patterns.  In the 
US, Federal and state tax credits for renewable energy conservation improvements and 
renewable technologies have been used since the 1970s. 
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 established the current Residential Energy Conservation Tax 
Credit.  The tax credit was introduced during a period of economic prosperity, and its impetus 
was to address the joint concerns of climate change and energy security through stimulation of 
the domestic market for private investment in energy efficiency and renewable technologies.  
The bulk of private investments were expended on energy efficiency measures (95% of  $8.3B in 
2005).  Yet in the 2005-2008 period, there was substantial investment in renewable technologies 
eligible for the ITC: solar photovoltaic, solar thermal, and fuel cells.  The ITC, as originally 
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conceived supported energy efficiency measures to the end of 2007 and renewable energy 
technologies until the end of 2008.   
However, the second half of 2008 witnessed the onset of a severe economic recession 
unprecedented since the Great Depression.  In response, the federal government passed The 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) on October 3, 2008.  The EESA was an omnibus 
bill with many components from the Troubled Assets Relief Program to the Energy 
Improvement and Extension Act.  
The Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008 (EIEA 2008) amended the tax credit for 
energy efficiency improvements and renewable energy technologies.  To stimulate private 
investment, the Energy Improvement and Extension act would renew the tax credit for some 
technologies another eight years and expand the list of eligible renewable technologies to include 
any small wind and geothermal systems installed as of January 1, 2008.  This was a substantial 
increase in incentives for geothermal, which had previously been eligible for $300 credit as an 
energy efficient technology (EIA 2014). 
The subprime crisis deepened, and a much larger stimulus package was enacted through the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act of 2009; ARRA).   The 
ARRA containing provisions for business, households, and for strategic investments in 
education, health care, and clean energy (Aldy 2011). 
Greater changes to the tax credit for renewable energy technologies under the ARRA of 2009 
were foreshadowed by the EIEA of 2008. Under the EIEA of 2008, all renewable technologies 
were eligible for a tax credit equal to 30% of initial costs but capped at $2,000 ($4,000 for wind).  
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The EIEA of 2008 also announced that beginning in 2009, the $2,000 ceiling on the tax credit 
would be lifted for PV.  However, less than four months later the ARRA of 2009 would remove 
the $2,000 ceiling for all renewable technology.  For the first time, there would be no ceiling on 
the tax credit.   
Effectively, the Residential Renewable Energy Tax Credit straddles two economic regimes.  One 
during a period of prosperity where incentives were offered to the adoption of renewable 
technologies, and the other during a crisis where incentivizing green technologies could 
stimulate job growth and economic recovery.  This chapter illustrates how the changing 
incentives affected investments among different renewable technologies. 
These changing economic regimes facilitate a natural experiment on residential investment in 
renewable technology using panel data from IRS Form 5695 through 2008-2012.   Of the five 
technologies eligible for the ITC, three of the technologies had sufficient adoptions to warrant 
examination: solar photovoltaic (PV), solar thermal (ST), and Ground Source Heat Pump 
(GSHP).22  These three technologies can be characterized along two dimensions: energy form 
(electric cf. thermal) and installation type (modular cf. site-specific). 
4.2 Review 
The first federal tax credit directed at residential investment in energy efficiency, the Residential 
Energy Conservation Tax Credit of 1977-1986, was motivated by the energy crisis of the 
                                                
22!There!was!insufficient!uptake!to!study:!fuel!cells!and!small!wind.!
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1970s.23  Under these ITC regimes, there was very little investment in renewable energy.  
Therefore, the focus of early academic studies was conservation investment.  
Initially, tax credits appeared to be largely ineffective for influencing investment in energy 
conservation at the residential scale.  Pitts & Wittenback (1981) surveyed 146 homeowners 
having recently made conservation improvements.  Only 37% of respondents correctly 
understood how the tax credit worked, and 18% of those eligible for a tax credit did not claim 
one.  Chester & Carpenter (1984) found similar results with a much larger survey with IRS Form 
8369 voluntary responses.  Even though 87% of respondents were aware of the federal tax credit, 
95% of respondents reported they would have made the investment in energy conservation with 
or without the ITC.  Therefore, the ITC was seen as a policy tool prone to free-rider behaviour, 
and less effective than other policies for influencing behaviour. 
Using a sample of 2,911 households from the 1982 Residential Energy Consumption Survey, 
Walsh (1989) was unable to find any positive significant relationship between the federal and 
state tax credits and qualitative measures of energy conservation improvement. 
However, Hassett and Metcalf (1995) observed positive and statistically significant relationships 
and energy conservation improvements after correcting for heterogeneous preferences for 
conservation at the state level. Using panel data on 37,659 individual tax returns from the 
University of Michigan Tax Research database from 1979-1981, they reported a 10% increase in 
state and federal tax credits would increase the probability of investment in conservation 
                                                
23!Eligible!taxpayers!could!file!Form!5695,!and!be!eligible!to!deduct!15%!initial!costs!for!investing!in!energy!
conservation!capital,!and!40%!for!renewable!energy!technologies.!!The!conservation!improvements!included!
insulation,!storm!window,!weather!stripping!and!other!efficiency!improvements.!!The!renewable!technologies!
were!solar!photovoltaic,!solar!thermal,!and!geothermal.!!The!tax!credit!also!came!with!a!ceiling!on!the!deductible!
amount!of!$300!for!energy!conservation!and!$4,000!for!renewable!energy.!!!
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improvements by 25%.  Long (1993) also found tax credits to be positive and highly significant 
for energy conservation investments with a sample of 6,364 households from the Internal 
Revenue Services’ Tax Model File for 1981, which indicated whether respondents had filed IRS 
Form 5696. 
In further contrast to energy conservation improvements, tax credits were unambiguously 
important for shaping residential investment in renewable energy.  Both initial and follow-up 
surveys found the importance of the tax credit to increase with more costly purchases, such as 
solar space and hot water heaters (Carpenter & Durham 1985; Carpenter & S Theodore Chester 
1984; Petersen 1985).   
The current experiment with federal investment tax credits and renewable energy is well 
underway.  Special interest groups have followed closely the evolution of the ITC, and its 
implications for the cost of adopting individual technologies (Bolinger 2014; Bolinger et al. 
2008; P. J. Hughes 2008).  Much attention in the policy arena has focused on the amount and 
partitioning of investment (Gold & Nadel 2011a; Gold & Nadel 2011b), and the efficacy of ITC 
incentives compared to other approaches (Metcalf 2008; Metcalf 2009).  However, no studies on 
either the first or current federal tax credit have differentiated among the individual renewable 
energy technologies using the panel data available on Form 5695. 
4.3  Renewable technology characteristics 
In which I anticipate different responses to changing financial incentives for residential 
renewable technology investments.  These expectations are informed by whether the technology 
produces electricity or thermal energy and its modularity.  I also reflect on each technologies 
price trends over time and its average initial price.  
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4.3.1 Marginal investments and sizing criteria 
The marginal investment for homeowners considering a renewable technology is the installation 
lying on the border of profitability.  Prior to subsidy, one should expect the majority of 
renewable technologies to be installed in areas where they are most profitable (inframarginal).  
Likewise one should expect fewer marginal installations, or renewable installations bordering on 
profitability.   
A targeted fiscal incentive will increase marginal investments in renewable energy technology, 
but may have a substantial number of claims filed for inframarginal investments, resulting in 
free-ridership.  This free-ridership problem is known as additionality, when inframarginal 
investments absorb government credits on projects that are already profitable without subsidy 
(Aldy 2011). 
As shown in Table 4.1, the marginal installation is larger or smaller depending on whether the 
renewable technology produces electricity or thermal energy.  In short, the marginal installation 
for renewable technologies producing electricity is larger, but smaller for technologies producing 
renewable thermal energy. 
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Pricing Characteristics 
Fixed Variable 
Modular Solar PV 
Solar 
Thermal 
A large fraction of system cost.   
Rapid rates of technical change. 
Global suppliers compete on 
price.  
A small fraction of total system 
cost.   
Low rates of technical change.  
Local suppliers face little 
competition 
Custom GSHP A small fraction of system 
costs. 
Low rates of technical change.  
Global suppliers compete on 
price.  
A large fraction of total system 
cost. 
Low rates of technical change. 
Local suppliers face little 
competition. 
Table 4.1 Renewable energy technology characteristics 
All of the technologies covered by the ITC can de described as renewable, but they utilize 
different sources of energy and provide different outputs.  Both solar PV and ST technologies 
rely on solar radiation, but the former produces electricity and the latter hot water.  GSHP 
provides thermal energy by using electricity (or gas) to energize a heat-pump moving energy 
between the earth and the home.   
Electricity and thermal energy offer different utilities to the homeowner.  Electricity can be 
transmitted over great distances and where net metering or feed-in tariffs are available returning 
additional electricity to the grid can generate revenue and kudos to the investor.  This investment 
quality differentiates renewable electricity from renewable thermal energy.  By comparison, the 
US lacks thermal energy grids through which one could transmit energy captured in excess of 
on-site demand for financial remuneration. The value of thermal energy is not what is sold, but 
what is saved.  The ability to sell electricity back to the grid differentiates renewable electricity 
from renewable thermal energy, resulting in different sizing criteria.    
Electrical systems can be sized to meet all or a fraction of household needs, depending on the 
homeowners preferences or affordability of the technology.  A homeowner can try the 
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technology, installing one or many solar PV modules at a time.  If a homeowner can install a 
larger solar PV system returning more electricity to the grid for the same price or less, it makes 
sense to do so.   It follows that the marginal installation for renewable electricity following a 
decrease in price is larger.   
By contrast, residential thermal systems are sized based on the needs of the dwelling.  Building a 
larger GSHP system or installing an extra ST system that could produce more than what is 
needed result in excess thermal energy.  Increasing the size of a system beyond what is required 
will only increase costs, and so thermal energy systems are most valuable when they can displace 
the greatest amount of on-site energy.  One should therefore expect GSHP systems to be more 
prevalent where demand is highest, such as in large homes and climates with hot summers and 
cold winters.  It follows that the marginal installation for renewable thermal systems following a 
decrease in price is in an area where demand is lower, making the marginal installation smaller.      
However, removing the ITC ceiling allows its value to increase in a straight line with the size of 
investment, and as the ITC value increases the homeowner cost net of taxes will fall, and one 
could observe an increase in the average size of all renewable technologies.  If the majority of 
solar installations for solar PV are larger, it can be assumed they are on average marginal 
installations.  However, larger installations of ST and geothermal technologies are likely 
inframarginal.  Limitations on inferences based on average prices and size are discussed in the 
next section. 
4.3.2 Differentiating module based and custom built technology 
Making inferences based on observed investment patterns in residential renewable energy is 
more difficult for some technologies than others, depending on their custom-built or module 
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nature.   ST and solar PV are module based, whereas GSHP is characterized as custom built. 
Table 4.2 groups the technologies based on whether they are characterized as module-based or 
custom built by nature, and the implications for their pricing environments. 
 Type of renewable energy 
Sizing criteria Marginal installation 
Electric Solar PV 
 
Upper bound of investment 
is defined by opportunity to 
export power and investor 
budget.  
Larger, given that more 
electricity can be exported for 
the same level of investment. 
Thermal GSHP 
Solar Thermal 
Upper bound on sizing is 
defined by own demand. 
Smaller, given that the 
marginal installations are 
located in areas with lower 
demand. 
Table 4.2 Type of renewable energy and sizing criteria 
The fixed-cost components of modular systems make up a greater fraction of their total cost.  
Fixed costs include hard costs like capital equipment, but also soft costs such as overhead, permit 
fees, financing and profit.  These costs are typically based either on unit costs (modules), or 
spread evenly over multiple installations (overhead, etc.).  These characteristics are conducive to 
market transparency, and readily comparable pricing information facilitates competition among 
installers who can innovate in service delivery.  Furthermore, competition among global 
manufacturers has driven down prices of capital equipment due to manufacturing experience and 
technical progress.   
The variable component of the initial installation for module-based renewable technologies 
makes up a smaller fraction of the total costs.24  Prices will vary among installers and local 
                                                
24!Variable!cost!referring!to!the!discretionary!cost,!as!opposed!to!the!fixed!cost!components.!!Variable!cost!is!not!to!
be!confused!with!operating!cost.!
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conditions, but given how installation or variable costs make up a relatively low fraction of their 
total investment, competition can reduce any adverse price effects in the long run.  
In contrast, GSHP is custom built by nature, with their capital equipment or fixed costs making 
up a lower fraction of their total costs.  The greater share of costs lies in the installation of the 
ground loop, which can be upwards of one third to half of total costs.  The price of the ground 
loop can vary widely depending on the availability of space, and heat reservoir (water, or 
ground) (see Appendix A).  This leads to high variability in geothermal system pricing 
depending on site conditions.  These conditions increase the value of local knowledge, limit 
competition amongst installers, and where pricing information is incompatible increase the threat 
of local capture by installers.   
When making inferences based on average prices charged, module technologies are likely to be 
indicative of the size of installation charged.  These can be confirmed by average installed prices 
over time via price trends, for example.   The prices for custom-built technologies are more 
heavily weighted towards installation, and may be indicative of size, higher installation costs, or 
even capture by local contractors. 
4.3.3 Price trends and homeowner cost net of taxes 
Renewable technologies for residential applications are high-priced durable goods.  Their high 
initial costs are offset over time through energy savings or avoided utility bills through net 
metering programs.  However, in the absence of assumed high future energy prices, many such 
investments do not have compelling private economics benefits. Yet from a personal perspective, 
their adoption confers significant non-economic benefits, such as: demonstrating socially 
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responsibility, achieving greater energy independence and working to reduce GHG emissions 
(Roe et al. 2000). 
Homeowners considering adopting solar PV, ST, and GSHP faced very different pricing 
environments.  Three primary factors have shaped the price trends for the renewable 
technologies examined here.  Service innovations have reduced the cost homeowners face and 
increased the attractiveness of the technology.  Technical progress has increased the efficiency 
and performance of solar energy systems, both for thermal and electrical energy production.  
Manufacturer learning curves (and offshore manufacturing) have driven down the cost of the 
component parts of modular systems (DOE 2012; Barbose et al. 2013).  These trends do not 
apply equally to the three technologies in this study. 
Homeowners considering purchasing PV were faced with rapidly falling prices.  Policies, such as 
net metering and feed-in-tariffs, have further incentivized investment in certain states.  
Manufacturing learning and research and development have led to declining photovoltaic cell 
costs from $5/W in the 1990s to $1/W in 2012 (EIA 2012b).  The cost of installing a system, 
inclusive of service and installation costs, has also halved since the 1990s (Barbose et al. 2013).  
Third party ownership, another service innovation reducing the initial outlay of capital, has 
grown to ~70% of solar PV installations in recent years (Margolis et al. 2013).25    
ST panel prices have been dropping due to manufacturing experience but the component parts 
are relatively simple, and prices have largely stabilized within the past decade (EIA 2012a).   
                                                
25!In!this!case!the!homeowner!leases!back!the!solar!panel!over!time,!and!the!installer!loans!back!the!value!of!the!
tax!credit!by!reducing!their!lease!payments.!!!!!
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There have not been any widespread service innovations for ST, such as third party financing or 
net metering schemes.   
GSHP is a mature technology that has not benefited from either technological progress or 
learning through production leading to manufacturing cost declines.  The installed price per 
refrigeration ton has shown fairly consistent prices on average over time.  The average price per 
ton in 2008 USD from three different sources is set on the left, and to the right the average 
amount claimed for the Federal ITC in 1981 and 2008 are shown in Table 4.3. 
 $/ton Average Reported Cost IRS 
Sources* 1 ton 2 ton 3 ton 1981 2008 
EIA 3,000 6,000 9,000 $10,923 $8,276 
Kavanaugh 4,236 8,472 12,708   
Rafferty 4,400 8,800 13,200   
*(Defense 2007)  
Table 4.3 Price per ton of GSHP in 2008 USD 
All things held equal, a decrease in the price of adopting the technology should lead to an 
increase in the number of installations.  The federal ITC is designed to reduce the investment 
cost, whereby eligible homeowners can later claim back a fraction of the initial cost from their 
federal taxes.  In this way, the total investment cost to the homeowner includes both a 
consideration for payments made for the technology itself and for taxes payable to the federal 
government.   This is why household cost net of taxes represents the actual homeowner cost 
when adopting a renewable technology. 
Removing the ITC ceiling lowers the homeowner cost net of taxes for renewable technology 
installations costing greater than $6000.  The average initial price for installing PV and GT 
technologies is great enough for a 30% ITC to be limited by the $2,000 ceiling, however, the 
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average initial cost of ST is below $6,000 (~$5K in 2008). Removing the ITC ceiling leads to an 
increase in incentives for PV and GSHP yet provides no additional economic incentives for ST.    
4.4 Data 
Taxpayers claiming the Residential Renewable Energy Tax Credit (ITC) must fill out Form 
5695.  Panel data for estimated line items on income tax returns, including Form 5695, are 
available on the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) website (IRS 2014).  These are records of the 
number of taxpayers who claimed the credit, and so are conservative estimates of the actual 
investment in conservation and renewable technologies. 
Pooled estimates on the number and total initial cost of installed PV, ST, and fuel cell 
technologies are available from 2006-2011.   Data on GSHP and small wind installations are 
available beginning in 2008.  Energy conservation improvements, such as storm windows and 
insulation, are also available during this period, with the exception of 2008 when the ITC for 
energy conservation was allowed to expire.   
Renewable energy installations are a fraction of total items claimed on Form 5695, by both 
number and value.  In 2009, there were ~14B credits claimed for energy conservation 
improvements worth ~25,000M.  By comparison there were only ~212K renewable technology 
investments worth ~$2.5B (see Figure 4.1). 
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Figure 4.1 Total investment in energy conservation and renewable energy technologies 
Unfortunately, Form 5695 does not indicate the average size of installation in terms kilowatts or 
refrigeration tons, and no median estimates are available.  Micro-data on the size or geographic 
location of renewable energy installations is unavailable.  Inferences on size are based on the 
average initial price and technology characteristics.   
The primary observations calculated annually for each technology are the total investment value, 
number of adoptions, average initial price, and homeowner cost net of taxes.  Dividing the initial 
cost of the technology by the number of installations yields the average initial price across the 
population of installations.  The homeowner cost is calculated by subtracting the value of the 
ITC from average initial price.  The average cost to the homeowner is calculated by subtracting 
the value of the tax credit from the initial price.  The tax credit is equal to the lower of $2,000 or 
30% of average initial price from 2006-2008, and 30% from 2009 onwards.  ST is the exception, 
with the subsidy equal to 30% of initial costs without exceeding $2,000. 
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4.5 Observations of residential investment in renewable energy 
The observations of residential renewable energy investment span two economic regimes, 
wherein the ITC was due to expire but was instead increased and expanded to include new 
technologies.  The change in incentives clearly affected the overall investment patterns, however, 
there were some counterintuitive movements by PV and ST in 2008.  
The year 2008 demonstrated a sharp increase in terms of the number of renewable energy 
technology installations compared to previous years.  The average initial price claimed for these 
investments were also, on average, lower than previous years.  This was also the first year for 
GSHP to be included on the renewable ITC ticket.26  
The spike in adoptions by persons interested in capitalizing on the tax credit coincides with a dip 
in reported average initial prices.  This creates a V-formation for average initial prices for PV 
and ST observed in the next section (see Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3).   
The parallel movements of PV and ST are perhaps explained by the uncertainty surrounding 
renewal of the ITC in 2008.   The pronounced increase of installations in 2008 may have been 
due to homeowners and marketers anticipating the sunset of the ITC, rushing to benefit prior to 
expiration.   For PV and ST this may also explain the slight dip in adoptions for 2009, if in a rush 
to claim the ITC prior to expiration a large number of potential adopters were removed from the 
market. 
                                                
26!GSHP!was!previously!considered!energy!efficient!technology!eligible!for!a!$300!tax!incentive.!
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The rush to benefit from the ITC prior to its expiration led to many small installations by 
laggards wanting to test the technology, or renovate their system, while the ITC was available.27  
The consequence for this study is a need to focus on the greater price trends prior to and before 
2008 for PV and ST. 
4.5.1 Solar photovoltaic (PV) 
There was an immediate financial benefit when the ITC ceiling was removed in 2009.  The 
average installed cost of PV is greater than $6K, therefore the amount the homeowner can deduct 
from taxes increased on average.  As expected, there was an increase in total PV residential 
investment and number of PV adoptions in the years following removal of the ITC ceiling.  As 
shown Table 4.4 there are almost 4X as many installations in 2010 as 2006.       
Solar PV 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Number 25,854 33,822 92,052 78,329 101,932 105,554 
Value ($000) 285,077 379,031 497,185 1,095,004 1,471,535 1,488,515 
Table 4.4 Number and total investment in solar photovoltaic 
The average initial price increased with average initial prices resting around ~$12,000 prior to 
the removal of the ITC, and increased to ~$14,000 afterwards, and remained at this level.28   
Consistent with a technology producing renewable electricity, this is likely indicative of an 
increase in marginal investments.  There is no hard cap on the benefits for returning electricity to 
the grid, and given its modular characteristics, larger prices are on average indicative of larger 
(marginal) installations. 
                                                
27!It!is!possible!to!install!small!PV!systems!and!expand!them!over!time!due!to!their!module!nature.!
28!During!this!period!the!module!and!nonamodule!costs!of!installing!residential!solar!photovoltaic!systems!were!still!
falling.!!!
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Figure 4.2 Solar PV investment observations 
Even though homeowners could claim back a greater proportion of their investment, the price 
and homeowner cost net of taxes did not continue to climb.  Figure 4.2 shows initial prices 
increasing by almost the same amount as the deductible tax credit at ~$2,000 in 2007 and then 
~$4,000 in 2010.  This increase was approximately equal to the change in value of the ITC, 
meaning the homeowner cost net of taxes remained relatively flat at ~$10,000 (excluding 2008).  
Homeowners were willing to go-out-of-pocket ~$10,000 for PV meaning their willingness to pay 
for PV was unaffected.    Effectively, homeowners treated PV as a fixed budget decision and 
used the ITC to expand the capacity of the system increasing their return on investment. 
4.5.2 Solar thermal (ST) 
There should not have been any financial benefit for ST resulting from the ITC ceiling removal.  
The average cost of an ITC installed was less than $6,000, so only a minority of installations 
could claim an ITC exceeding $2000.  Furthermore, the financial benefits for ST are capped, so 
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these systems are sized to meet domestic demand only.  If only economic factors were 
considered, then there should not have been a marked change in total investment, number of 
adoptions, or size (price) of ST.  
The average price and homeowner cost net of taxes was, as one might expect, relatively flat in 
the years before and after the ITC ceiling was removed.  ST is a modular technology scaled 
based on need, and if average initial prices are indicative of average system size in the short run, 
homeowners did not increase the size of their systems.29  
 
Figure 4.3 Solar thermal investment observations 
There was a marked increase in total ST investment and rate of adoptions following 2009, with 
the number and total value of ST investment doubling in the years following the removal of the 
                                                
29!In!this!way!they!act!as!a!control!for!geothermal!technologies,!the!only!other!technology!scaled!based!on!need.!!!!
It!should!be!noted!that!the!ITC!for!solar!thermal!is!for!residential!hot!water!only,!and!does!not!include!swimming!
pools.!!'
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ITC.  There was no change in financial incentives, meaning the observed effect was due to a 
change in a non-economic lever.30   
Solar 
Thermal 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Number 24,357 26,211 61,339 42,380 53,637 57,467 
Value 
($000) 
107,148 107,671 221,267 211,900 220,881 275,426 
 Table 4.5 Number and total investment in solar thermal 
The observed positive effect could have resulted from a change in social or environmental 
factors, or perhaps from an increase in publicity associated with the Recovery Act of 2009.  
Whichever non-economic lever induced a change among consumers, installers, and marketers, it 
had a positive spillover effect for investment in ST. 
4.5.3 Ground source heat pumps (GSHP) 
Removing the ITC ceiling resulted in some counter-intuitive movements for residential 
investment behaviour in GSHP.  Removing the ITC ceiling increased the financial incentives for 
homeowners adopting GSHP yet, while the aggregate investment did significantly increase, the 
number of adoptions declined from 2009 onwards.   
Geothermal 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Number   58,502 77,238 72,958 70,673 
Value ($000)   484,154 1,097,334 920,180 1,215,451 
Table 4.6 Number and total investment in GSHP 
It has been suggested the decline in installations was due to a decline in single housing starts 
                                                
30!The!price!trend!for!residential!ST!is!relatively!flat,!and!it!is!modular!in!nature!offering!limited!discretion!for!
installers!when!setting!prices.!
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(Groff 2014).  The decline in geothermal installations does not, however, run parallel with the 
decline.  The market for single housing starts declined sharply in 2006, and continued to decline 
in 2008.  Single housing starts begin recovering from 2009 onwards; therefore the number of 
GSHP installations was falling during a recovery period for single housing starts (US Census 
Bureau 2015). 
The average initial price more than doubled from ~$8,000 in 2008 to ~$17,000 in 2011.  The 
government would have also increased their expenditures, with the value of the ITC increasing 
from $2K to ~$5K on average per installation.  Even with increase in ITC value, the average 
homeowner cost net of taxes jumped from ~$6,000 to ~$12,000. 
 
Figure 4.4 GSHP investment observations 
GSHP have scale dependent returns, and one should expect rational investors to invest in larger 
systems more often than smaller (marginal) systems.  This is supported by the available data on 
heat pump shipments showing the majority of systems being located in areas where loads would 
be higher and systems larger.  Namely, in the Southern (cooling) Midwestern (heating) and 
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Northeastern (heating and cooling) United States (EIA 2008).  Similar patterns are reported by 
the Department of Defense choosing to install GSHP in regions where climactic conditions 
shorten payback periods (DOD 2007).    
If the subsidy were encouraging an increase in marginal installations, the average initial price 
would have remained flat or fall.  The increase in average prices observed during a period of 
falling demand was likely due to an increase in inframarginal installations, which continued to 
increase in scale with the higher-powered incentives. 31   
The custom-built nature of GSHP presents a challenge for interpreting GSHP price movements 
as indicative of larger (inframarginal) or smaller (marginal).  A larger system could be indicative 
inframarginal installations, but it could also indicate local capture by installers.  Installers could 
have extracted a rent on the tax credit given GSHP’s custom built characteristics, the 
discretionary nature in pricing system installation, and overall difficulty in comparing prices 
among installations.   
Reconciling the degree to which system sizes or installations costs were responsible for 
increasing prices requires micro-data.  Absent accessible US data, several conjectures are offered 
below that might explain the increase in prices, the first two of which can be eliminated.  
• There could have been a lack of awareness prior to the introduction of the 
investment tax credit.  If people were unaware of geothermal technologies before 
the tax credit, the earlier population may not have been indicative of what an 
average geothermal installation should cost.  Data on heat pump shipments from 
                                                
31!An!increase!in!condominiums!or!multiaunit!buildings!should!not!affect!this.!!In!these!situations,!the!investment!
tax!credit!passed!down!to!individual!tenants!by!dividing!the!initial!price!equally!among!future!occupants!who!all!
claim!a!share!of!the!tax!credit!for!each!household.!
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the EIA prior to the ITC shows steadily increasing numbers making a lack of 
awareness seem unlikely (EIA 2012).32 
• A change in prices could have resulted from an increase in a non-mechanical 
component, namely, competition for resources in the labour market for drillers.  
This is unlikely given how the increase in average prices for GSHP were 
coincident with an abundance of availability in the driller labour market, following 
the swift drop in the price of crude (Baker Hughes 2009).        
• The tax credit may have enabled geothermal installations in more difficult to drill 
areas, such as homes situated on bedrock or where vertical installations were the 
only option.  These installations may have become affordable following an 
increase in the value of the tax credit.    
• It could be only wealthy homeowners were able to sustain greater levels of 
investment during the economic crisis, as observed in the average initial 
investment patterns by income group (see Figure 4.5).  Here inframarginal 
installations would be dominant, as larger homes benefit from the ITC to further 
improve the return on already profitable systems.  
4.6 Investments by income bracket 
An interesting population bias arises due to the differences in cost between energy conservation 
and renewable energy technology.  The cost of entry for energy conservation improvements is 
low with almost any household able to afford some conservation improvements.  Renewable 
investments require someone to have the means afford, and favorable attitude towards, 
renewable technology.  Previous studies on ITC found claimants were wealthier, held higher 
degrees, and were better informed on the how the tax credit worked (Walsh 1989; Long 1993). 
                                                
32!This!includes!both!include!geothermal!and!water!source!heat!pumps.!!
!
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Figure 4.5 shows the average initial investment for four income groups.  There is very little 
difference among income groups until 2008, when the ITC for energy conservation expired. In 
2008, the income groups become clearly stratified with higher income groups claiming greater 
amounts than lower income groups.  The average amount claimed increases steadily by income 
bracket, with taxpayers earning between $50-100K claiming twice the amount as persons earning 
between $0-50K.  Higher income groups are also able to sustain higher levels of investment 
compared to lower income groups. 
 
Figure 4.5 Amount claimed on average by individuals in each income group 
Table 4.7 shows the number, value, and average amount claimed for different income brackets 
from 2006-2011.  It is tempting to draw inferences on the type of renewable technology adopted 
by households in each income bracket however, it is difficult to distinguish among renewable 
technologies based on income groups for two reasons.  Renewable technology represents a small 
fraction of the total claims, making renewable energy claims indistinguishable from the greater 
majority of energy conservation improvements (see Figure 4.1).   
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Furthermore, the only year when renewable claims were distinguishable based on income group 
was 2008, and this year exhibited some anomalous behavior making inferences on specific 
renewable energy investments for different income groups difficult (described in the previous 
section under aggregate investment patterns).  Closer inspection on the average tax credit 
claimed by income groups in 2008 reveals very few, if any, of the income groups were claiming 
the full $2,000 credit.  This year contained many small PV, ST, installations and perhaps even 
GSHP renovations. 
Number 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
$0-50k/yr 1,096,610 1,073,880 63,440 1,638,033 1,875,799 975,476 
$50-100k/yr 1,930,723 1,922,026 92,835 2,841,261 2,912,926 1,470,304 
$100-200k/yr 1,054,189 1,054,235 48,684 1,781,932 1,855,059 941,193 
Above $200k 262,665 276,258 20,775 450,400 512,011 255,581 
Total 3,247,577 3,252,519 162,294 5,073,593 5,279,996 2,667,078 
      
Value ($000) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
$0-50k/yr 221,332 228,412 42,590 1,019,061 1,168,750 303,728 
$50-100k/yr 432,238 424,990 92,134 2,362,646 2,408,341 507,407 
$100-200k/yr 266,052 270,179 57,214 1,771,641 1,817,940 491,084 
Above $200k 80,529 83,996 24,749 669,333 777,859 371,618 
       
Av Amt ($) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
$0-50k/yr 202 213 671 622 623 311 
$50-100k/yr 224 221 992 832 827 345 
$100-200k/yr 252 256 1,175 994 980 522 
Above $200k 307 304 1,191 1,486 1,519 1,454 
Table 4.7 Number, value, and average amount claimed by income bracket 
4.7 Estimating the benefits of renewable energy investment 
For energy conservation improvements, residential tax credits assist with overcoming the capital-
cost barrier.  Energy conservation requires high up-front investments to reduce energy 
expenditures in the long run.  The “lower than optimal” level of such investments in the 
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residential sector has been well studied (Jaffe & Stavins 1994). Economists have described the 
observation in terms of high implicit personal discount rates.  Psychologists and sociologists 
have described it in terms of the cost of decision-making and social norms (For a review see 
Wilson & Dowlatabadi 2007).   
Similar to the overcoming the capital cost barrier for energy conservation, tax credits also lower 
the price of technologies producing renewable energy.  This may in the long run reduce harmful 
externalities associated with more carbon-intensive substitutes.33   Lower prices make renewable 
technologies comparatively attractive yet lowers the price of energy overall and may encourage 
further energy consumption (Metcalf 2008; Metcalf 2007).   
The adoption of renewable technology has other far-reaching societal benefits.  Social benefits 
such as creating a market for emerging new technologies, increasing local investment in trades 
and manufacturing, or reducing the price of renewable technologies over time as industry actors 
learn by doing. 34  There are also a number of other motivations for using tax credits to intervene 
in energy policy such as overcoming market barriers to energy conservation or reducing negative 
externalities (Metcalf 2008, p.91; Metcalf 2007, p.3).  
Tax credits are also designed to leverage private investment to increase economic output and 
employment (Aldy 2011).  Fiscal stimulus tools like tax credits are designed for this purpose, 
                                                
33!The!environmental!benefit!of!each!technology!is!different.!!Solar!PV!displaces!electricity!that!might!come!from!a!
more!carbon!intensive!source,!solar!thermal!displaces!energy!for!hot!water!(typically!natural!gas),!and!geothermal!
also!displaces!natural!gas!and!propane!with!electricity.!!If!the!policy!objective!is!to!reduce!the!carbon!intensity!of!
electricity!then!solar!PV!can!contribute!to!this!objective,!whereas!the!solar!thermal!and!geothermal!technologies!
simply!reduce!consumption!of!energy.!!!!
34!Tax!credits!may!also!be!used!in!line!with!other!energy!policy!concerns,!such!as!furthering!national!security!
interests!by!limiting!dependence!on!foreign!oil,!but!this!is!primarily!concerned!with!transportation!and!supplanting!
foreign!oil!with!renewable!biofuels.!!See!Metcalf!(2009)!for!a!more!complete!summary!on!tax!policies!and!low!
carbon!technologies.!!!
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and purchasing renewable technologies can have a much greater economic impact than simply 
the initial purchase price (Aldy 2011).  For this reason, ITC are targeted towards investments 
with higher economic multipliers.     
Economic input-output (EIO) models are used to calculate economic multipliers and measure the 
total economic impact across all sectors of the economy resulting from a purchase.  Installing a 
residential solar panel draws on a whole supply chain spanning multiple economic sectors from 
construction and manufacturing to transportation and finance.  The total combined economic 
activity between these supporting sectors of the economy is a more comprehensive indicator for 
evaluating the economic impact associated with adopting a renewable energy technology.   
Estimating the EIO of residential investments in renewable energy technology would require 
detailed information of industry procurement patterns, however, the EIO-LCA 2002 Purchase 
Price tool developed by Carnegie Mellon can be used to illustrate the critical factors determining 
the economic benefits (CMU 2013).  This approach considers and investment in each renewable 
technology as a bundle of services.  The economic benefits are dependent on the bundle of 
services associated with each technology, heavily influenced by supply chain procurement 
decisions.      
To consider the economic impact of residential investment in any technology the installed cost is 
broken down into its various components (i.e., hardware, installation, etc.).   The LCA tool is 
then used to calculate the economic multipliers associated with investments in each sector, taking 
account of the differences in where the technology is manufactured and see how such 
investments contribute to economy-wide benefits.    
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The initial cost of installing GSHP can be broken down into thirds for capital equipment, 
drilling, and installation (Kantrowitz & Tanguay 2011).  This bundle is simulated by assuming 
equal amounts of services and equipment in drilling, air-conditioning and warm air heating 
equipment, and residential maintenance and repair (represented by NAICS Industry Codes 
213111, 333415, 23611, respectively).  Given the supply of goods and services to each of these 
three sectors, a dollar invested in GSHP yields an overall economic activity of $2 (or an 
economic multiplier of 2:1). 
The price of installing solar PV units is increasingly dominated by soft costs, such as overhead, 
permitting, financing, sales, and taxes.  In 2012, the soft costs accounted for approximately 65% 
of total costs, 15% of which was associated with installation.  The remaining 35% of costs were 
the module components, or hard costs (Friedman et al. 2013, p.5).   
To model the economic impact of purchasing residential solar PV, 50% would be spent on 
business support services (to represent miscellaneous soft costs), 15% on residential maintenance 
and repair, and 35% on semiconductor and related device manufacturing (NAICS Industry Codes 
56149, 23611, and 334413, respectively).  A $1 investment in solar PV yields a total economic 
benefit of $1.8, slightly less than geothermal but still almost double the initial invested amount.      
These economic benefits are entirely dependent on the bundle of services assumed, and the 
impact of the investment will change if component parts were not manufactured but imported.   
Consider the hard or module costs of solar PV.  They come with an associated economic 
multiplier of 1.91 ($1 purchased produces $1.91 of economic activity).  This assumes that all of 
the economic activity occurs within the US, including wholesale trade, management, chemical 
manufacturing, mining, scientific research and development services among others.  If the 
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modules are imported, the only economic benefits from the initial purchase of modules are in the 
form of wholesale trade, transport, and perhaps an import duty will be realized (taxes are part of 
the economic benefit).  If $1 worth of solar PV modules were purchased, then the economic 
benefit would only be the $0.267, assuming a 4% import duty.   
Returning to the original solar PV example of investing $1 inclusive of installation, support 
services, and module costs, the economic impact is much lower than if the modules are imported.  
The new multiplier for this bundle of services is only 1.251, with the majority of economic 
benefit from module manufacturing lost.   
The above example illustrates an important consideration when designing policies to maximize 
economic multipliers.  If the technology relies heavily on imports, the economic benefits to the 
economy are lessened.  These factors should be considered when allocating government 
expenditures to renewable energy technologies. 
4.8 Conclusions 
The IRS tax return panel data facilitated a unique opportunity to study residential responses to 
changing incentives for residential renewable energy.  Micro-data is ultimately required to 
confirm these inferences, but this chapter demonstrated how to use technological characteristics 
when interpreting panel data for renewable energy technology.  To interpret the data available 
from IRS Form 5695, the renewable technologies were differentiated based on whether they 
produced renewable thermal energy or electricity, whether they were module or custom built, 
and their average initial cost.  
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The marginal installation is smaller for renewable thermal technologies, which exhibit returns to 
scale and should be more prevalent where systems and loads are larger.  The marginal 
installation for renewable electricity is larger, because the benefit for renewable electricity is not 
capped and additional electricity can be returned to the grid.    
When making inferences on whether a system is (infra)marginal based on prices, the link is 
likely closer to a modular technology than with one custom built.  PV and ST technologies are 
both modular, and their size closely linked to price.  Geothermal is custom built, and a change in 
prices could be indicative of sizing, site characteristics or installers adjusting the rates they 
charge.   
Whether the removing the ITC ceiling changed the incentive structures faced by homeowners 
depends on the initial cost of the technology.  PV and GSHP were limited by the $2,000 ITC 
ceiling, and would benefit from the increased deductible.  The average initial price of ST 
installations was low enough the ceiling was never an impediment to claiming the full 30% 
deduction. 
Investment in PV increased along with the number of installations.  The average initial price also 
increased, likely indicating an increase in larger (marginal) installations.  The net cost to 
homeowners remained flat, with homeowners treating PV as a fixed-investment decision. 
The average initial price, and therefore size, of ST was unaffected.  The total investment and 
number of adoptions nearly doubled, indicating non-economic levers were influencing 
consumers and marketers to pursue ST.  Further, the windfall of investments for ST, the 
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renewable thermal energy control, leads one to wonder if the increase in economic incentives 
would have been necessary for GSHP.   
The total investment increased for GSHP, but the number of adoptions declined following 2009.   
The average initial price reported and net cost to homeowner nearly doubled during this ITC 
sample period.  The increase in average price indicates an increase in inframarginal (larger) 
systems or an increase in prices charged by installers given their discretion over pricing.   
Investments among different income groups were also considered.  The greater capital cost of 
renewable energy led to wealthier households benefitting more from the ITC for renewable 
energy.  The amount claimed on the renewable energy tax credit was greater amongst higher 
income brackets, and wealthier households were also able too sustain investments during the 
protracted recessionary period.  This is not outside the objectives of the tax credit, which sought 
to promote investment to assist with the economic recovery, and higher earning income groups 
contributing more than lower income groups serves this purpose.   
The total economic benefit of residential investment in renewable energy depends on the bundle 
of services associated with its production.  Using Carnegie Mellon’s EIO-LCA model, the 
importance of sourcing services and products nationally was shown.  When considering the 
policy objectives for an ITC, policy makers should consider the trade-off of lower prices for 
imported products against the higher economic multipliers of buying local.   
This natural experiment compared residential investment following the removal of the ITC 
ceiling for PV, ST, and GSHP.  In particular, a challenging policy problem for GSHP emerged.  
Namely, it may be possible to increase investment in geothermal by removing an ITC ceiling, 
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but doing so will likely lead to an increase in free-ridership amongst already profitable 
installations.  
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Chapter 5: Determinants of public sector green investment 
This chapter examines the key factors influencing decision-making by the Delta School Board 
#37 (DSB) in British Columbia, Canada, regarding their space conditioning and water heating 
needs over the period date to date.  The DSB chose to accept a Thermal Energy Services (TES) 
contract, which would be regulated as a public utility by the British Columbia Utilities 
Commission (BCUC).  The thermal plants, consisting of geothermal and high-efficiency natural 
gas equipment, are financed, owned and operated by the TES provider, FortisBC.  During 
decision-making proceedings only minor deviations in regulated alternatives to the contract 
proposed were examined in detail.  Yet the novelty of this approach requires closer examination 
for understanding the costs of such a service to the public sector.  Using standard economic 
criteria I compare the cost of the TES contract to four counterfactuals including: a regulated 
alternative, two public procurement alternatives, and a ‘status quo’ scheme on ongoing energy 
payments. The non-economic factors found to have played a dominant role are: carbon savings, 
the accounting treatment of capital costs, and a preference for regulatory oversight.  The 
additional cost to the public sector for these non-economic factors over the project lifespan is a 
premium of 13% ($1.5M) for third party financing via a TES contract.  The project also received 
provincial and federal contributions equal to 21% (~$3M) of its lifecycle cost, or slightly less 
than half of its capital cost.   I conclude with policy recommendations for public institutions 
prioritizing capital equipment renovations during periods of fiscal constraint while pursuing 
carbon reductions.   
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5.1  Motivation 
Financially constrained Public Sector Organizations (PSO’s) increasingly consider energy 
services from third parties for renovating buildings and replacing worn capital equipment.  This 
affords access to private sector expertise in energy services and project management.  Bundling 
the design, finance, construction, and operation project phases together also aligns investments 
incentives to increase quality (Sutherland & Araujo 2010; Iossa & Martimort 2009).35  
Furthermore, there are other intangible benefits such as freeing up capital for other projects and 
having building improvements sooner rather than later (GAO 2005a).   
In the US between 1999-2003, federal agencies undertook over $2.5Billion worth of Energy 
Performance Contracts (EPC) for capital improvements. Under the intended terms of the EPC, 
the renovations would be financed entirely from energy savings with no upfront costs (GAO 
2005b).36   
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) conducted an audit of the EPC contracts written 
for federal agencies to reveal some disheartening patterns.   Many agencies expected EPC 
contracts to be afforded by energy savings, however, it could not be verified by the GAO.  The 
GAO found the limited competition may have led to costlier EPC contracts, furthermore, a lack 
of expertise in EPC contracting among federal agencies led to unfavorable contract terms and 
conditions, such as markups and interest rates.  The GAO concluded increased scrutiny of 
                                                
35!There!are!also!gains!to!be!had!when!bundling!renovation!projects!together!so!that!capital!equipment!decisions!
are!made!in!light!of!conservation!measures,!such!as!insulation.!!!
36!Some!agencies!contributed!capital!earmarked!for!improvements!to!reduce!the!amount!owed!on!the!EPC!to!
increase!the!return!on!investment.!!Confusion!arose!among!agencies!as!to!whether!these!projects!must!then!also!
offer!additional!financial!gains!to!cover!their!own!capital!contributions.!!
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appropriations with no upfront costs is required, as they led to higher costs in the long run (GAO 
2005b).      
The Government of British Columbia has enacted significant legislation to mitigate climate 
change and foster a low-carbon economy.  In January of 2008, the Greenhouse Gas Reduction 
Targets Act (GGRTA) came into force. The GGRTA set ambitious targets Greenhouse Gas 
(GHG) reductions of 33% below 2007 levels by 2030 and 80% below 2007 levels by 2050 (BC 
L.A. 2007).  In May of 2008, British Columbia became the second province in Canada to 
introduce a revenue neutral carbon tax via the Carbon Tax Act (BC L.A. 2008b).37  The GGRTA 
also provides authority for Carbon Neutral Government Regulation (December 2008), which 
requires all PSOs to reduce, measure, report, and offset all carbon emissions to net zero from 
2010 onwards (BC L.A. 2008a).        
The carbon neutral mandate applies to all PSOs, including schools, hospitals, and crown 
corporations.  Delta School Board #37 (DSB) of Delta British Columbia embraced their mandate 
by actively pursuing building improvements and capital equipment renovations.  Once provincial 
grants for renovations slowed, the DSB sought third-party finance and entered into a 20-year 
contract with FortisBC beginning in 2012.  Under this contractual agreement, DSB received 
extensive upgrades and renovations to their existing mechanical systems.  In all, a dozen 
geothermal systems (11 closed loop, 1 open loop) and seven high-efficiency natural gas (HEGB) 
systems were installed at no upfront cost as part of an ongoing Thermal Energy Service(s) (TES) 
(Fortis 2011c, p.1). 
                                                
37!The!carbon!tax!is!revenue!neutral,!meaning!carbon!taxes!paid!are!returned!by!a!reduction!in!taxes!elsewhere.!!
The!carbon!neutral!attribute!of!the!legislation!does!not!benefit!nonataxable!entities,!such!as!school!districts.!
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In exchange, the DSB is billed by the kilowatt-hour of thermal energy delivered in lieu of 
payments for capital equipment, electricity, and natural gas.  The equipment is financed, owned, 
and operated by the Thermal Energy Service (TES) provider, FortisBC (Fortis 2011c).  The TES 
cost of service (COS) rate was subject to regulatory oversight, in part due to the broad definition 
of a public utility by the British Columbia Utilities Commission (BCUC, Commission) (BCUC 
2012d, p.10).  Setting an important precedent in North America, the COS rate was calculated by 
pooling the relevant costs of the DSB’s 19 geographically dispersed buildings.38    
The DSB district stated their objective was to renovate all 19 buildings, maximizing energy and 
carbon savings within their budget (DSD 2012, p.4).  This renovation assisted the DSB in 
meeting their environmental objectives, including compliance with the provincially imposed 
carbon neutral mandate for all Public Sector Organizations (PSO) in British Columbia (BC L.A. 
2008a).  The renovation was effectively a switch from natural gas to electricity, and this 
renovation promised to reduce carbon emissions by 70% of status quo at the 19 sites (FortisBC 
2011c, p.4).   
The TES method of financing offers a compelling prospect for public institutions facing 
shortfalls in capital contributions from governments.  The DSB was subject to difficult financial 
constraints.  The BC Government had rejected prior funding applications for capital equipment, 
however, through the TES contract the DSB could afford to renovate all 19 buildings at once 
without committing any of their own capital upfront.  The DSB did so without conflicting with 
any of their debt limitations.  The equipment was not recognized upfront on the statement of 
                                                
38!Pooling!the!buildings!under!a!single!rate!is!a!form!crossasubsidization,!not!unlike!how!rural!telecommunications!
were!subsidized!by!urban!ratepayers!.!!This!is!the!only!project!in!BC!where!a!project!was!allowed!to!crossasubsidize!
rates!among!geographically!diverse!projects!using!COS!rate!methodology.!!
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financial position (balance sheet) of the DSB as an asset or liability, but was instead scored 
annually as an operating lease on their statement of operations (income statement).   
How much more was the public sector willing to pay for this new service?  The DSB knew the 
full cost of the TES contract, but the Commission indicated that the range of alternatives 
presented in the original submission were not as detailed as envisioned in a typical Certificate of 
Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) (BCUC 2012d, p.28).  The lack of comparisons 
explored is at least partially due to the difficulty in designing a contract that would meet the 
various constraints faced by the DSB.  The actual targets and constraints of the DSB are only 
vaguely described in the proceedings, and in their final submission FortisBC states that the DSB 
has “specific objectives, specifications and constraints that have to be met to make any project 
viable” (Fortis 2012b, p.4).  As I will illustrate here, the DSB and PSOs can still construct 
meaningful counterfactuals based on information contained in a standard regulatory filing and 
evaluate the cost of the contract.  
Infrastructure investment and investment behavior is poorly predicted by econometric and 
traditional net present value calculations.  Traditional investment theory predicts that investors 
will choose the less costly investment, all else held equal.  However, investment decision-making 
is influenced by preferences for lower upfront costs, the availability of capital, risk aversion, 
preferences for green services, and uncertainty surrounding the volatility of future prices (Fazzari 
et al. 1987; Dixit 1992).  
Here, I use standard economic criteria to compare the TES contract signed to four other scenarios 
created using publicly available information in the Rate Development Agreement (RDA) filed 
with the BCUC (Fortis 2011c Appendix D).  By assessing the reasonable alternatives that DSB 
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did not choose, we can measure their revealed preference for three valued criteria: low carbon, 
least upfront capital, and regulated cost of service rates.   I conclude with policy 
recommendations and best practices to facilitate public procurement decisions balancing pressing 
climate change commitments with other concerns during periods of rising public indebtedness. 
5.2  Background of regulatory proceedings 
In British Columbia, it is increasingly common for regulated utilities to operate downstream of 
the utility meter, offering Thermal Energy Services (TES) for firms, cities, and Public Sector 
Organizations (PSOs) (BCUC 2012a).   
FortisBC is a publicly regulated utility and wholly owned subsidiary of Fortis Inc.  FortisBC is a 
natural monopoly and the largest distributor of natural gas in British Columbia, also offering 
electricity, and infrastructure services (BCUC 2012d, p.5).  In recent years, FortisBC has 
expanded their offerings upstream and downstream of their traditional regulated distribution 
utility services. FortisBC entered markets upstream of their gas distribution service by 
purchasing assets for the production of bio-methane (BCUC 2012a, p.42).  FortisBC entered 
markets downstream of their distribution services by offering Thermal Energy Services (TES), 
potentially owning capital equipment within the buildings themselves, for heating, cooling, and 
hot water services (BCUC 2012a, p.63).  FortisBC introduced their TES services through 
FortisBC Energy Inc., which is the sole distributor of natural gas in the lower mainland of British 
Columbia.    
The delivery of thermal energy through a TES contract qualified this project as a public utility in 
British Columbia.  The broad definition of a utility in British Columbia has resulted in the BCUC 
entertaining applications from real estate developers seeking to develop TES projects for future 
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developments (BCUC 2012d, p.10).  For this reason the DSB project qualifies as a utility as 
defined by the British Columbia Utilities Act, (BC UCA), even though the BCUC found the 
market was competitive not warranting regulatory intervention (BCUC 2012d, p.21). 
The DSB inquiry began on November 28, 2011 when FortisBC filed a Certificate of Public 
Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) for approval by the BCUC, requesting permission to build, 
own, and operate thermal plants for the DSB as part of a regulated utility.  Without an approved 
CPCN, no person or agent can begin construction, extension, or operation of a public utility 
within British Columbia (UCA 1996 Section 45.1).  The CPCN contains information the BCUC 
needs in order to evaluate the application, including information on the rate and Rate 
Development Agreement (RDA) (UCA 1996 Section 46.1).    
On March 9, 2012, the BCUC announced their decision approving the CPCN on the grounds that 
FortisBC and the DSB were two sophisticated parties who entered into a mutually beneficial 
contract, and it was therefore in the public interest (BCUC 2012d, p.116). In short, the DSB was 
able to renovate their aging equipment while advancing their climate objectives, and FortisBC 
benefited by gaining valuable experience offering a new service distinct from their traditional 
natural gas services (BCUC 2012d).     
The approval of the CPCN was subject to a number of conditions, such as the requirement for 
FortisBC to delegate the DSB project from FortisBC Energy Inc. to a separate regulated utility 
affiliate, namely the newly created Fortis Alternative Energy Service (FAES) (BCUC 2012d, 
p.96).  This delegation allowed for greater structural separation between natural gas and TES 
utility affiliates and for more transparent observation of the new business. The novel 'pooling' 
approach to grouping standalone discrete sites under a single postage stamp rate was also 
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approved, but was not permitted to extend their rate beyond the 19 buildings described in the 
CPCN (BCUC 2012d, p.117).  
The proposed rate and rate design were, however, rejected by the BCUC.  The BCUC maintained 
reservations against using the Cost of Service (COS) rate agreed to in the contract, describing the 
COS rate as a heavy-handed form of rate regulation transferring most of the risk onto the 
ratepayer (BCUC 2012d, p.80).  The BCUC requested the two parties to consider another rate 
design that might divide the risk more evenly between the parties, such as a market rate pegged 
to the price of natural gas.  The DSB and FortisBC were asked to return within 30 days having 
reviewed alternatives to the COS rate, and to compare the Net Present Value (NPV) of the 
lifecycle cost of the market rate to the COS rate after adjusting for amortization and the deferral 
account (BCUC 2012d, p.117).39    
In complying with the BCUC’s request, FortisBC and the DSB had their first compliance filing 
for the revised COS rate rejected, but their third compliance filing was approved (BCUC 2012c; 
BCUC 2012c; BCUC 2012b; BCUC 2012b).    The BCUC maintained serious reservations 
against allowing COS rate methodology but were not willing to rule out COS if both the DSB 
and FortisBC desired it.  
The DSB project was subject to intense scrutiny and lengthy inquiry due to the project’s novelty 
and number of registered interveners with vested interests.40  In the end, the CPCN for the 
                                                
39!The!BCUC!found!that!the!costs!would!be!greater!than!indicated!once!necessary!adjustments!changes!
amortization!of!the!DSB!deferral!account!were!considered.!!Furthermore!the!cost!of!debt!would!be!changed!to!
reflect!a!BBB!rating,!and!overhead!costs!would!only!be!assigned!during!years!when!capital!costs!were!incurred.!!!
40!There!was!an!extensive!list!of!registered!interveners!for!this!inquiry,!and!their!arguments!will!not!be!summarized!
here.!!Neither!will!I!list!all!of!the!conditions!for!the!CPCN!approval.!!Intervener!arguments!and!BCUC!summary!
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project was awarded by the BCUC with few material changes.  In the aftermath of the inquiry, 
the record of the regulatory proceedings provide valuable evidence enabling thorough audit of 
the project so as to provide guidance to future public procurement decisions.      
5.3 Case study and counterfactuals 
In British Columbia, Public Service Organizations (PSO) have considerable discretion in 
procuring capital equipment.  They can solicit bids for the contract, choose among technological 
alternatives, or even engage third parties in leasing arrangements for capital equipment (Herman 
2013).   
TES contracting occupies a grey area between third party finance for capital equipment and an 
infrastructure service remunerated with utility-like payments.  How should the PSO evaluate this 
relatively novel method of financing?  I suggest the simplest method is to compare the cost of the 
TES contract to a public sector comparator, or what it would cost the DSB to purchase the 
design-build contract and operate the equipment.     
There could be any number of possible futures with different technologies and financing 
methods employed, but there are at least five scenarios that can be generated on a factually well-
grounded basis using only information contained in the Rate Development Agreement (RDA) 
filed by FortisBC (FortisBC 2011c).  The original RDA offers a snapshot of the DSB believed 
their energy payments were prior to the renovation and subsequent to it.  The annual revenue 
requirements reported in the RDA describe all of the expenses that must be recovered from DSB 
in a given year, including fuel, electricity, and maintenance.   
                                                                                                                                                       
conditions!can!be!found!on!the!BCUC!website.!!A!principlealevel!discussion!of!economic!regulation!and!the!
arguments!contained!in!the!TES!and!AES!inquiries!are!contained!in!the!next!chapter.!
 86 
The first scenario I examine is a TES contract in exchange for a regulated Cost of Service (COS) 
rate.  This was the scenario chosen by the DSB, and approved by the BCUC.  The second 
scenario was also proposed during the inquiry, using a market rate indexed to the price of natural 
gas (FortisBC 2011c).  The third scenario presumes government funding for the design-build 
contract.  This is the public procurement comparator for the green technology package offered by 
FortisBC.  The fourth scenario assumes all 19 buildings were renovated for High-Efficiency 
Natural Gas (HEGB) systems.  This is public procurement of business as usual equipment, 
without the more significant GHG savings available through switching to green technologies.  
The fifth scenario assumes the DSB’s existing payments carry forward into the future without 
any renovation of the building equipment.  The buildings did require renovation in the immediate 
future, however, for tractability of the comparative modeling exercise, a no-renovation scenario 
was the primary benchmark used during the regulatory proceedings for carbon and energy 
savings (Fortis 2011c, p.11).   
The five scenarios differ in their financing, technology, and payment assumptions.  These are 
described below, and summarized in Table 5.1.  Scenarios 1-2 are regulated TES contracts.  
Scenarios 3-4 are public procurement alternatives, and scenario 5 looks at the existing energy 
payments of DSB.  The NPVs of cash outflows paid by the DSB under each scenario are then 
compared. 
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 Technology* Capital Cost Operating Cost** Grants 
Scenario 1 HEGB, GSHP Terminus COS rate, CO2 Yes 
Scenario 2 HEGB, GSHP Terminus Market rate, CO2 Yes 
Scenario 3 HEGB, GSHP Start Gas, electricity, CO2, O&M Yes 
Scenario 4 HEGB Start Gas, electricity, CO2, O&M No 
Scenario 5 GB  Gas, electricity, CO2, O&M No 
*HEGB: High Efficiency Gas Boilers, GSHP: Ground Source Heat Pump, GB: Gas Boilers 
**COS: cost of service, CO2: carbon offset, O&M: operations & maintenance expense 
Table 5.1 Scenario characteristics and payments made by DSB 
5.3.1  Scenario one: TES contract with COS rate design 
This scenario describes a regulated TES contract with rates set using a cost of service 
methodology.  This is the scenario chosen by the DSB, and the scenario to which the other 
counterfactuals are compared when estimating the revealed preference of DSB.   
All expenses, as well as the return on investment for FortisBC, are recovered by charging for the 
thermal energy delivered to the DSB, using cost of service rate setting methodology.  The cost of 
service rate is calculated by totaling the revenue requirements (energy, maintenance, taxes 
payable, earned return) and dividing it by the thermal energy delivered.  The earned return (or 
regulated rate of return) is equal to the cost of equity and debt multiplied by the rate base.  The 
rate base includes capital costs, assigned overhead, and even the feasibility study for the project 
design.41  
The cost of service rate does not cover the cost of carbon emitted, which remains a separate 
liability for the DSB.  This is the only other ongoing cost the DSB is required to pay in this 
                                                
41!Year!one!actually!beings!with!a!market!rate!pegged!to!the!price!of!natural!gas,!which!is!switched!to!cost!of!
service!rate!at!the!requested!by!the!DSB.!!I!assume!this!switchover!occurs!in!2013!(as!do!they),!the!year!when!the!
cost!of!service!rate!is!lower!than!the!market!rate.!
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scenario.   The cost of carbon offsets are estimated based on the fuel forecasts described in the 
annual revenue requirements.    
There remains, however, a contingent liability at contract terminus.  In 20 years time, the school 
district must either sign an extension for ten more years, or buyout the contract at its market 
value (Fortis 2011c, p.46).   I assume buyout, since it presents the lower of the two alternative 
costs for this scenario, and also scenario 2.  If the DSB were unable or unwilling to purchase the 
equipment the cost of the stranded asset would need to be absorbed by the shareholders of 
FortisBC.  
This project used green technology offering significant carbon reductions, and as such was 
eligible for grants from the provincial government.  The provincial government provided capital 
for carbon savings via the Public Sector Energy Conservation Agreement (PSECA) (Fortis 
2011c, p.23).   
The project was also eligible for a federal accelerated depreciations tax credit for investing in 
green technology.  The Class 43.3 Canadian Renewable and Conservation Expense Tax Credit 
allows eligible taxpayers to deduct 50% of eligible capital costs each year against federal taxes 
(NRCAN 2013). This reduces taxes payable by the utility, the cost of which would have been 
recovered from the DSB under the cost of service rate.  The federal incentive can only be applied 
to the first two scenarios.  The DSB is a non-taxpaying entity, so does not have any taxable 
revenues against which to employ this tax credit.   
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5.3.2 Scenario two: TES contract with market rates 
Scenario 2 describes the cash outflows of payments made by the DSB as part of a TES contract, 
which indexes future rates to the market price of natural gas. The difference between the cost of 
service (scenario 1) and the market rate (scenario 2) counterfactual reveals the DSB’s preference 
among different rate designs.  
For scenario 2, the rate charged per unit of thermal energy is indexed to the price of natural gas 
over time.  Beginning with a negotiated rate of $0.089/kWh, the rate would be adjusted monthly 
to the Natural Gas Price Index for BC (CANSIM V41692506) (Fortis 2011c, p.47).  However, 
this price index is not forward looking (Statistics Canada 2014).   
There are two different forward-looking projections for natural gas prices contained in RDA: the 
assumptions on future prices assumed for the market rate from Stats Canada, and those used to 
make projects for the cost of service rate.  The market rate assumptions lead to a greater increase 
in the price of natural gas than the cost of service price assumptions.  While this makes the 
market rate appear more expensive, I use the assumptions on future gas prices from stats Canada 
for the market rate, consistent with the assumptions used during the inquiry. 
All maintenance, tax, and related expenses are contained within this market rate.  The DSB must 
also pay for any associated carbon emissions outside of the thermal energy rate, and for the 
contingent liability for capital equipment in 20 years time.  
The technology and carbon savings delivered by this contract are identical to scenario 1 so I also 
award the PSECA grant to this scenario.  This varies from the assumption of the BCUC inquiry 
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(discussed in the next section).  This technology was also eligible for the federal tax credit, but I 
assume FortisBC accounted for advantage this when negotiating the starting market rate.   
5.3.3 Scenario three: Upfront procurement of green technology 
This scenario considers the total cash outflows paid by the DSB, had they purchased the design-
build contract proposed by FortisBC and operated the equipment.  The difference in cost 
between the COS TES contract (scenario 1) and the procurement of green technology (scenario 
3) indicates how much the DSB was willing to pay for the TES service above the actual cost of 
technology and related expenditures.      
This scenario requires a large one-time payment for the initial cost made in year 1, including the 
feasibility study for the project.  This is financed with a capital grant from the provincial 
government, with no ongoing interest payments charged to the DSB. This is a departure from 
convention in calculating the cost of finance, however it does accurately portray the cash 
payments made by DSB.  Ordinarily, a PSO does not borrow for renovations, but waits for 
annual grants provided by the government for facilities and capital equipment, and the cost of 
financing is paid by the province through bonds or taxation.  
The technology assumptions are identical to the TES contract but the annual payments are 
different.  It is a return to normal billing practices as the DSB is billed directly for the electricity 
and natural gas inputs they use.  These annual payments are lower than assumed under the TES 
contract as an efficient geothermal system can return three units of energy for every unit 
consumed.   
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The ongoing maintenance and carbon expenses are also identical to the TES contract.  This 
assumes the ongoing costs taken in the revenue requirements for the TES contract are reasonable 
estimates of cost for whomever owns the equipment, calculated to be ~4% of capital 
expenditures.   
Given that the technology employed and carbon savings delivered are identical to the TES 
contract, I also deduct the PSECA grant from the initial cost.  I do not award the DSB any 
benefits for the federal accelerated depreciation tax credit considering they are a non-taxable 
entity.  
5.3.4 Scenario four: Turnkey natural gas boiler renovation 
This scenario considers the cost to the DSB for renovating all 19 schools with HEGB.  The 
difference in cost between of the TES contract (or the procurement of green technology) is the 
amount the DSB was willing to pay to go green with TES.   
Like the upfront procurement of green technology, they are financed with an annual facility grant 
from the provincial government.  This involves initial cash expenditure in year one, but no 
ongoing interest charges are paid by the DSB.      
This is the only counterfactual that changes the technology mix beyond what is described in the 
CPCN.  Each of the 19 buildings originally used natural gas boilers, and this scenario simply 
upgrades their boilers with HEGB (Fortis 2011c, p.11).    
The costs of these renovations are equal to the fixed portion of the design-build contract.  The 
fixed portion of the design building contract covers the turnkey installation and renovation work 
required in all 19 buildings, inclusive of fixed project management and margin amounts for 
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equipment (Fortis 2011c, p.31).  While this works out to be only an approximate figure (~$100K 
per school), each of the buildings were already fitted for natural gas systems, so the renovations 
would likely be less than or equal to the projected amount for more involved renovations for 
GSHP.  Furthermore, the DSB has recently upgraded one of the buildings for a new gas boiler, 
and only a meter installation was required at one of the sites (Fortis 2011c, p.24).   
Future energy prices are calculated based on the revenue requirements described in the CPCN, 
and carbon offsets are calculated based on energy demand.  In this scenario, however, the energy 
mix remains the same as before the renovation.  Natural gas remains the primary fuel, although 
less gas is used due to efficiency gains.  The CPCN assumes the buildings were using 60% 
efficient systems, I increase efficiency to 90% for predicting energy use with HEGB (Fortis 
2011c, p.11) 
The ongoing maintenance expenses are calculated using the same percentage (4%) and escalation 
rates as the original TES contract.   
5.3.5 Scenario five: Initial energy payments 
This scenario describes that cash outflows paid by the DSB if none of the schools were 
renovated.   As indicated earlier, a renovation was necessary for these antiquated systems.  
Nevertheless, these payments were the primary benchmark for energy and carbon savings 
considered by the DSB (Fortis 2011c, p.12).    
There are only three ongoing costs to be considered under this scenario: energy, carbon offsets 
and maintenance expenses.  The energy costs are very high due to the poor efficiency of the pre-
existing natural gas boilers  (~60% efficient).  It follows that there is no change in the fuel mix 
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away from natural gas to electricity, so carbon costs are also high.  The operations and 
maintenance expense is assumed to be the same as described in the TES contract. 
5.4 Net present value of discounted cash flows 
In this section I calculate the NPV of all cash outflows paid by the DSB associated with the 
operation of their thermal plants.  In estimating the present value of future cash flows, all future 
payments are discounted at the end of the year by the reported after tax weighted average cost of 
capital of FortisBC (7.1%) described on the Economic Test Summary (Fortis 2011c, p.68).  
There are some eventualities these types of comparisons do not consider.  For example, bundling 
of construction and operation activities may lead the project investor to invest in quality upfront 
if it means lower maintenance costs during the projects life, all else held equal (Iossa & 
Martimort 2009).  Fears over energy price increases or future budgetary shortfalls may lead 
preferences for certain contracts ex ante that become more costly ex-post, such as the 
unanticipated continued decline of natural gas prices.  For these reasons, the stylized 
comparisons used here may differ in practice.   
The NPV of cash outflows for the technologies are illustrated in Table 2.  The price of electricity 
and natural gas are derived from the revenue requirements in the Rate Disclosure Agreement 
(RDA), along with the annual operation and maintenance expenses.  The price of carbon 
emissions is held constant at $25/tCo2e, as set by the Province of British Columbia.  Carbon 
taxes applied to natural gas are not separated as a line item.  They are added onto the price of 
natural gas paid by FortisBC, and passed onto DSB through the rate design.   
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Increases in the cost of energy and other expenses are based on the RDA as well.   The live 
spreadsheet was filed confidentially with the BCUC, but model outputs are available for the 
years 2012-2016, 2021, and 2031.  Gaps between years are filled using straight-line 
interpolation, which are either constant in the case of energy demand or gradually escalating at 
~2% per year for energy and maintenance expenses.  The price of carbon is held constant at 
$25/tCO2e. 
The cost of any interest payments for borrowing (along with all other expenses) is contained 
within the TES rates charged.  However, there is no interest cost for borrowing added to the 
upfront procurement alternatives.  Ordinarily, it is not the DSB who borrows but the province.  It 
is given annual facility grants and an annual operating budget.  These assumptions with zero 
interest payments are in keeping with the actual cash payments made by the DSB.42   
I depart from the assumptions in the CPCN in two material ways.  First, in terms of when the 
project is fully installed.  The project was built out over four years, however, 96% of the capital 
investment was made in the first two.  I assume full build out in year one to simplify 
comparisons with the other scenarios. 
Second, I exclude one cost described under the revenue requirements from scenarios 3-5.  
FortisBC plans for municipal taxes to be applied to their project each year in the range of $7-
15,000 per year.  These costs would not be applied to the DSB had they purchased the equipment 
themselves, as is assumed in scenarios 3-5.  
                                                
42!However,!it!is!easy!to!relax!this!assumption!to!reflect!the!view!of!the!provincial!government,!for!example.!!These!
case!studies!are!still!valid!to!reflect!the!view!of!the!provincial!government!by!adding!on!their!cost!of!borrowing!
(~4%),!or!even!a!higher!utility!rate!(~10%).!!The!province!could!then!evaluate!the!cost!of!the!contract!in!terms!of!its!
total!payments,!and!what!premium!they!would!consider!reasonable.!!!!
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The total NPV of each of the five scenarios is shown in Table 5.2.  The NPV of payments towards 
the capital cost of equipment, energy, carbon, are operating expenses are broken down into their 
relative category.43   
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 
Capital cost 1,044,219 1,044,219 4,572,038 1,774,043  
Carbon 212,674 212,674 212,674 855,664 1,108,653 
Thermal rate 12,430,618 12,224,201    
Electricity   2,791,151 1,173,511 1,173,511 
Natural gas   1,513,153 6,663,705 8,653,782 
O&M   3,001,767 1,160,696 3,001,767 
NPV 13,687,511 13,481,094 12,090,784 11,627,619 13,937,714 
Future cash flows discounted at 7.1%, end of term 
Table 5.2 Net present value of of payments made by the DSB 
Ranking these scenarios based on full lifecycle costs indicates the following order: HEGB 
(scenario 4), upfront procurement of green technology (scenario 3), market rate TES (scenario 
2), COS rate (scenario 1), followed by no renovation at all (scenario 5).  
Ranking the renovated counterfactuals based on the NPV of cash outflows, least initial 
investment for capital costs, and carbon savings reveals inconsistent orderings.  The HEGB 
renovation (scenario 4) had the lowest NPV of cash outflows, followed by purchasing the green 
technology (scenario 3), and then the TES contracts (scenarios 1,2).  The lowest initial cost were 
either of the TES contracts (scenarios 1,2), followed by the HEGB renovation (scenario 4), and 
then upfront procurement of the green technology (scenario 3).  Both the TES contract and the 
                                                
43!My!estimates!are!higher!than!the!present!value!of!payments!described!for!the!cost!of!service!and!marketarate!
examples!in!the!CPCN.!!The!reasons!are!three!fold.!!Firstly,!I!include!the!cost!of!carbon!and!the!contingent!liability.!!
Secondly,!I!assume!fullabuild!out!approximately!two!years!early.!!However,!when!correcting!for!these!additions!my!
estimates!are!still!higher.!!Upon!closer!inspection,!the!difference!is!likely!due!to!discounting.!!My!nonadiscounted!
annual!revenue!estimates!for!FortisBC!(cash!payments!made!by!DSB)!are!almost!identical,!if!not!slightly!lower.!!The!
difference,!therefore,!is!likely!due!to!discounting.!!Comparing!the!present!value!of!their!payments!to!mine!for!
various!years!indicates!that!they!are!using!a!discount!factor!greater!than!the!one!reported!(7.1%).!
!
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upfront procurement of green technology had identical carbon emissions, followed by the HEGB 
renovation and the no renovation scenario.   
Based on these orderings, the DSB did not choose the lowest cost alternative even among the 
regulated TES contracts.   The only way the ordering of these counterfactuals favors the TES 
contract is if the DSB sought to minimize first costs for capital equipment, sought lowest carbon 
emissions, preferred the COS rate design, and then considered the NPV of discounted cash 
outflows.   
There are two measurable, non-economic preferences distinguishing these alternatives: lower 
carbon emissions, and lowest initial payment for the capital cost.  I can measure these 
preferences as the differences between scenario 1 and scenarios 4 and 3, respectively.  Lastly, 
there is a preference for COS over the market rate that can in part be explained by the uneven 
application of grants and concerns regarding rate volatility. 
5.5 Preferences for low carbon technology 
The DSB is subject to a carbon neutral mandate imposed by the province, requiring them to 
offset their carbon emissions.   Even so, the DSB desired to go beyond their mandated 
obligations, and to pursue carbon reductions on a principled ‘global citizen’ basis (DSD 2012, 
p.5).  The NPV analysis reveals they are willing to pay a greater amount now than the cost of 
future carbon offset liabilities.  
The reported advantage of the TES approach for achieving energy and carbon savings was an 
economy of scope achieved by pooling buildings together.  Somehow, it was suggested pooling 
buildings together under a single contract would facilitate a more efficient use and combination 
 97 
of technologies (Fortis 2011c, p.10).  At the very least, pooling might reduce the administrative 
cost of contracting renovations for each of the 19 sites (DSD 2012, p.6).  
Despite the DSB’s emphasis on reducing energy use and carbon emissions, the Commission was 
unable to find any measurable targets or guaranteed carbon savings contained in their contract 
with FortisBC (BCUC 2012d, p.68).  When asked by the BCUC if they knew of any clause 
guaranteeing energy or carbon savings, the DSB responded affirmatively, but did not identify the 
clause (DSD 2012, p.14).  If carbon reductions fail to materialize the DSB would still be 
responsible for the greater cost of offsetting these emissions to maintain their carbon neutrality 
(DSD 2012, p.6). 
While this project will almost certainly reduce emissions it is unlikely the carbon reductions will 
materialize in the magnitude predicted, or at least cost.  I will demonstrate this by comparing the 
projected carbon savings following the renovation to the carbon footprint of the DSB, and by 
comparing the cost of carbon savings in TES contract to the counterfactuals described in the last 
chapter.   
5.5.1 Accounting for carbon 
All Public Sector Organizations (PSOs) and local governments in British Columbia have carbon 
obligations under the Green House Gas Reduction Target Act of 2007 (GGRTA).  The GGRTA 
requires PSOs to pursue actions to reduce their carbon emissions in 2008 and 2009, and to 
purchase carbon offsets beginning in 2010.  Purchasing carbon offsets fulfills the requirement for 
PSOs to be considered carbon neutral, starting in 2010 (BC L.A. 2008a; 2007).   
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While the GGRTA does not set specific targets for the DSB, the GGRTA did set a collective 
target for the province.  The target for emissions reductions is 33% below 2007 levels by 2020, 
and 80% below 2007 levels by 2050 (BC L.A. 2008c).   
In evaluating their progress towards the targets set in the GGRTA, there are two publicly 
available sources by which one can reference the carbon emissions.  The intended or advertised 
potential of the emission reductions described in the CPCN, and the actual emissions as reported 
by the DSB on an annual basis.  Upon closer inspection the two sources cannot hope to be in 
agreement.   
The accelerated reduction potential of the TES contract is shown in Table 5.3.    The project 
indicated it would reduce energy use from 2,913 to 659 tCO2e per year.  This carbon reduction 
methodology differs in two key ways from commonly accepted carbon accounting practices.  It 
does not count the emissions from the natural gas lost due to inefficiencies, which effectively 
removes the incentive of carbon savings from upgrading the system.  Secondly, it assumes the 
geothermal technology is carbon neutral.  Geothermal technology is only carbon neutral if the 
electricity used has zero carbon emissions and the electricity in BC is considered to be 
0.025t/MWh by the Pacific Carbon Trust.   Taking these assumptions into consideration, the 
savings for the project are actually even larger at ~3K tons per year, a boon to the DSBs carbon 
saving ambitions.    
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 Reported in CPCN  Adjusted emissions 
 Pre Post  Pre Post 
Electricity (GJ) 4,684 11,142  4,684 11,142 
Gas (GJ) 58,607 13,255  83,721 14,639 
Renewable (GJ)  15,164    
Waste (GJ) 25,114 1,384    
      
Total demand(GJ) 38,177 38,177    
      
Emissions tCO2e 2,913 659  4,303 1,010 
CO2e emission factors: 0.05 t/GJ gas, 0.025t/MWh electricity 
Table 5.3 CO2e accounting for DSB project 
The carbon savings described by the TES project can be compared to the publicly available 
carbon inventories for PSOs in British Columbia, including the DSB.  As shown in Table 5.3, the 
lions’ share of carbon emissions for the DSB comes from the operation of buildings.  While there 
is some small variation over time, building operations account for 75-85% of total emissions, 
followed by fleet vehicles (~10%) and paper stationary (~5%).44   
Since the GGRTA of 2007, the DSB has been proactive in reducing their GHG emissions 
including hiring an energy manager, replacing fleet vehicles, installing light control sensor 
systems, installing solar hot water systems, and replacing worn out heating and cooling 
equipment.  Table 5.4 shows their carbon emissions for the years 2007-2013.  Even under the 
conservative assumptions in Table 5.4, it appears the DSB was well on their way to meeting the 
province’s carbon objectives.  They had achieved a ~25% reduction of GHG within the first 
three years of the policy.  By their own estimates, the DSB estimated their emissions were 37% 
                                                
44!However,!the!DSB!is!exempt!from!purchasing!offsets!for!school!buses.!!!!!
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below 2007 levels in 2010.   So far, the largest emission reductions resulted from 15 buildings 
being renovated for ASHP systems in 2008 and 2009.45   
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Buildings Electricity    248 244 233 142 
 Gas, Propane    3,049 3,262 2,871 2,520 
 Total 4,715 4,715 4,715 3,297 3,506 3,104 2,662 
Fleet Gas, Propane 360 360 360 360 367 378 452 
 Biodiesel 33 33 33 33 36 31 13 
Office paper  437 437 437 437 167 219 217 
Total  5,544 5,544 5,544 4,127 4,077 3,733 3,344 
% 2007  100% 100% 100% 74% 74% 67% 60% 
Grey font refers to assumed values.  These are assumed the same as 2010, making them conservative 
numbers assuming no actual carbon savings materialized in the first two years. 
Table 5.4 Actual energy use across 42 building sites 
Comparing the carbon savings for the TES project to the level of publicly available building 
emissions for the DSB overall illustrates how far apart these two futures are.  The ~3KtCO2e 
reduction for renovating 19 buildings described in the CPCN (Table 5.3) is greater than the initial 
carbon footprint of 34 buildings in 2010 (Table 5.4).  If the TES project delivers the anticipated 
carbon savings then the carbon emissions for the DSB would be negative, as shown in Table 5.5.  
 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Emissions 34 buildings     
 Electricity 248 244 233 142 
 Gas, propane 3,049 3,262 2,871 2,520 
 Total 3,297 3,506 3,104 2,662 
Projected carbon savings     
 19 buildings   3292 3292 
Emissions following renovation  -188 -630 
Table 5.5 CO2e emissions for buildings only 
The implications of these findings are unfortunate for the DSB.  Either ambitious carbon savings 
were overestimated and will not materialize and the DSB will be responsible for greater than 
                                                
45!Building!related!emissions!fell!31%!between!2009!and!2010.!!!!
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anticipated carbon costs, or the carbon emissions reported by the DSB, calculated based on 
energy purchases, have been improperly accounted for to date.46  These back-of-envelope 
approximate calculations to test the reasonableness of the carbon savings proposed did not 
appear during the proceedings. 
5.5.2 Willingness to pay for green 
FortisBC, various interveners, and the Commission described different principle-based methods 
for evaluating the cost effectiveness of the TES approach to carbon emission reduction. The 
Energy Services Association of Canada (ESAC) emphasized the disproportionately large capital 
cost compared to annual carbon savings achieved (Fortis 2012c, p.2).  The Commission was of 
the view that carbon reductions were maximized when all actions or improvements less than the 
price of an offset ($25) were taken, and that actions costlier than this amount were purchased 
with offsets (BCUC 2012d, p.63).  However, the Commission did not indicate when, during the 
renovation of all 19 buildings, this point would be crossed.   
FortisBC emphasized the full lifecycle cost of the service as the appropriate reference for 
whether offsets were cost effective.  Further to this point, FortisBC reasoned that since the cost 
of service TES contract was less costly than the ‘status quo’ of existing payments, the project 
proposed was therefore cost effective (FortisBC 2012c, p.2).   
Consistent with the principles of carbon reduction employed by FortisBC and the Commission, 
here I compare the full lifecycle cost of the procurement alternatives to identify the price paid for 
carbon reductions.   The counterfactuals proposed here facilitate a straightforward method for 
                                                
46!My!contacts!at!FortisBC!have!yet!to!respond!to!my!inquiries!into!this!discrepancy.!!
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generating measurable estimates for the price of carbon offsets generated via the TES contract.  
The difference in carbon savings between scenarios 1 and 4, divided by the price difference 
indicates the price paid for carbon offsets generated by the green technology.    The HEGB 
renovation (scenario 4) would emit 3,256tCO2e per year, a full 2,447tCo2e per annum more than 
either of the green technology renovations emitting 809tCO2e per year (scenarios 1,2,3).  Over 
20 years, this amounts to almost 50KtCO2 avoided.   
Before offsets are considered, the full lifecycle cost the HEGB renovation and the TES contract 
are ~$10.8M and ~$13.5M respectively.  The value of the offsets generated by the green 
technology over 20 years ($25/tCO2e) are ~$650K.  At this carbon price, the DSB can pay a 
premium of $650K for green technology, and still achieve carbon reductions at or below the 
price of carbon.  The $2.7M premium of the TES contract above the HEGB renovation is an 
action to reduce carbon emissions at a price of $55/ton, or an 18% premium above the lifecycle 
cost of the HEGB renovation.   
The lifecycle cost of the upfront procurement for green technology (scenario 3), is ~$1.5M less 
and still generates identical carbon reductions.  Adopting this technology under upfront 
procurement offsets carbon at $23/tCO2e.  Thus it would be less costly for the DSB to purchase 
the green technology instead of offsetting the emissions associated with the natural gas 
renovation.  This can be described, using the BCUC’s methodology described above, as a cost 
effective strategy for reducing carbon. 
5.6 Preferences for lowest capital cost payment 
From 2008-2014, the DSB employed different technologies and financing methods to renovate 
34 buildings.  The first 15 buildings were renovated with ASHP in two phases.  Phase 1 in 2008 
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installed 101 ASHP units using the annual facility grant for capital equipment from the 
provincial government.  Government funding was not available for Phase 2 in 2009, but the DSB 
installed the remaining 74 ASHP units; presumably financing them out of their operating budget 
(DSD 2008, p.1; DSD 2009, p.1) 
In 2010, there remained 19 buildings with antiquated natural gas boilers requiring replacement 
(DSD 2010, p.4).   Renovating most of these buildings for high efficiency natural gas boilers 
would normally have been the default solution, but the DSB wanted to pursue geothermal 
technology to maximize carbon reductions.  Subsequent proposals for funding of the geothermal 
option were rejected by provincial ministries and funding agencies (DSD 2012, p.4).  
Afterwards, the DSB began discussions with Fortis in 2010 to identify third-party finance for 
replacing the equipment in the remaining 19 buildings.  Fortis and the DSB elected to install a 
combination of high efficiency natural gas and geothermal systems (DSD 2010, p.4).   
There are at least two advantages for the DSB when financing the equipment under the TES 
contract compared to traditional upfront procurement.  One applies to the treatment of debt on 
the statement of financial position (balance sheet), and the other to reducing the risk of making 
up funding shortfalls for capital equipment via their annual operation budget. 
5.6.1 Balance sheet constraints 
During the inquiry it was suggested that the ability for TES contracting to overcome balance 
sheet constraints explained their preferences for regulated alternatives over capital lease or 
upfront procurement alternatives (DSD 2012, p.9).  It was also indicated that the payments might 
be treated as debt, and as such might be prohibited under the Province of BC’s Debt 
Management Program (DSD 2012, p.17).    However, while the DSB is subject to budgetary 
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constraints, they indicated that there were no legal, financial, or budgetary constraints preventing 
them from owning the equipment that they were aware of (DSD 2012, p.9).  Even so, TES 
contracting does have compelling advantages above other methods of financing equipment for a 
PSO.  
The advantage of financing capital equipment improvements via a TES contract stems from its 
nature as an energy service.  The TES contract is not written for the purchase of technology to 
the DSB, but for the delivery of an energy service providing thermal energy through FortisBC 
owned thermal plants. 
Annual payments for utility expenses, like electricity or gas, appear on the statement of 
operations (income statement) of PSOs.  Ordinarily, the capital equipment would also appear on 
the statement of financial position (balance sheet) of PSOs as both an asset and as a liability.  
However, the capital equipment used in delivering the energy services is not recognized on the 
DSB’s balance sheet. It is instead recognized as an operating lease.  Operating lease payments 
are recognized annually as an expense on the income statement, with no obligations recorded on 
the balance sheet for the capital equipment. 
This kind of ‘off-balance sheet’ financing avoids balance sheet constraints often faced by PSOs 
during periods of fiscal constraint.   A balance sheet constraint may arise, for example, when 
governments reduce discretionary spending on items such as capital equipment to reduce deficits 
or balance budgets.  They might do so by deferring capital grants, rejecting applications for 
funding, or even placing a temporary cap on new debt.  
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The treatment of capital equipment on the balance sheet as both an asset and as a liability means 
new equipment cannot be purchased without also increasing liabilities.  Liabilities increase debt, 
and so debt-caps prohibit the acquisition of new equipment by means of upfront procurement.  
By financing the renovations without increasing liabilities, TES financing avoids these types of 
balance sheet constraints.   
A debt-cap can also prevent equipment financed by a third party via a capital lease, the primary 
method of Energy Performance Contracting (EPC) for financing equipment.47  Capital leases are 
paid down over time, and ownership is usually transferred at the end of the contract for a 
nominal fee.  However, the full value of the equipment is recognized upfront as an asset and as a 
liability just as if the equipment had been purchased upfront.  This demonstrates a limit on third 
party finance, which can provide liquidity for public institutions but cannot overcome balance 
sheet constraints. 
5.6.2 Future capital funding shortfalls drawing on operating budget 
The second advantage of TES contracting for financing capital equipment is straightforward.  
The DSB might have presumed they were unlikely to receive annual facility grants for capital 
equipment in a timely manner or in the amount required.  In this event the DSB would need to 
draw on their already relatively inflexible operating budget, which is responsible for financing all 
other non-capital related expenses (DSD 2012, p.17).     
                                                
47!Energy!Saving!Companies!(ESCOs)!write!energy!performance!contracts!through!which!they!agree!to!finance!
energy!saving!capital!equipment!and!building!improvements!for!businesses!and!institutions.!!Typically,!the!ESCO!
will!guarantee!a!level!of!energy!savings!via!an!energy!saving!performance!contract.!In!exchange,!the!ESCO!earns!a!
return!on!their!investment!based!on!difference!between!the!initial!utility!payments!before!and!after!the!
renovation.!!!
!
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The DSB sought an alternative financing method to renovate their remaining buildings rather 
than wait to see when annual facility grants would arrive.  The TES contract is more expensive in 
the long run, but protects the DSB from drawing from their operating budget to purchase capital 
equipment. 
Whether for the off-balance sheet treatment or for security against making up future capital 
contributions out of their operating budget, a public sector comparator provides an easy to 
understand measurement for an otherwise obscure payment plan.  The difference between the 
TES contract (scenario 1) and the procurement of the green technology (scenario 3), is ~$1.5M.  
Effectively, they were willing to pay a premium of ~$1.5M (13%) for to minimize their initial 
capital costs and remove concerns surrounding future capital funding shortfalls.   This is a telling 
indicator of Canadian public sector risk aversion in technology adoption. 
5.7 Preferences for the regulated rate of return 
The DSB and FortisBC consistently emphasized their preference for regulated COS rate design 
over the alternative market-rate design throughout the inquiry and compliance filings.  The 
BCUC remained skeptical of this onerous form of regulation but approved the COS rate design 
following the second compliance filing.   
The DSB believed the COS rate had two primary advantages over the market rate: it was less 
costly, and volatile than the market rate. In the next section I will illustrate how the COS 
advantage depends almost entirely on the application of provincial incentives, and how its 
volatility was a result not of the COS methodology but due to the technology selected.   
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5.7.1 Application of provincial and federal contributions 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the NPV of the four counterfactuals inclusive of subsidies and financing 
costs.  The costs above the $0 are those costs paid by the DSB, whereas the costs below are 
capital contributions by either the provincial and federal government, including financing.  The 
cost of financing is paid by the provincial government in scenarios 3,4 at 4% of the capital cost.  
The overall economic feasibility of the project and perhaps the choice between regulated rates 
was dependent on the application of these capital contributions.   
 
Figure 5.1 Total welfare cost in $CAD for scenarios 1-5 from left to right 
The TES contract was eligible for a federal CRCE tax credit.  The Class 43.3 Canadian 
Renewable and Conservation Expense Tax Credit (CRCE) allows eligible taxpayers to deduct 
50% of the capital costs each year from taxes payable.  An accelerated depreciation tax credit 
permits firms to deduct this expense from taxes sooner, meaning its value is derived from the 
time value of money.   
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Approximately 90% of this credit is extracted within the first five years, worth approximately 
$1.56M in avoided taxes.  The DSB is a non-taxable entity, so it would not have been able to 
claim this credit without assistance from a third party.  Effectively, FortisBC provided indirect 
tax equity financing of federal funds for the DSB.   
It was not the federal but the provincial grant responsible for determining the differences in cost 
between the regulated COS and market rates.  The provincial government provided capital for 
projects attaining ambitious carbon savings via the Public Sector Energy Conservation 
Agreement (PSECA).  Compared to their initial carbon footprint prior to renovation, the green 
technology investment saves 3,409tCO2e annually, which adds to ~70K tCO2e over 20 years.  
The province contributed $1.357M for the GHG savings.  At this level of investment, the 
province was effectively willing to pay $20/tCO2e of future carbon emissions saved by the 
renovation.  
While scenarios 1-3 and their expressed counterfactuals generate identical GHG savings with the 
same technologies, they pass on the benefit of the subsidy to the DSB differently. Applying the 
PSECA is straightforward for upfront procurement (scenario 3).  The upfront cost of the $6.5M 
design-building contract is reduced by $1.357M.  Without this subsidy the NPV of total cash 
outflows by the DSD would be ~$13.5M in scenario 3. 
The PSECA grant was applied to the COS TES contract (scenario 1) as a Contribution In Aid of 
Construction (CIAC).  The CIAC results in two primary benefits.  It reduces the rate base upon 
which the utility calculates its earned return on the capital base (~8%) throughout the projects 
life.  The result is a rate rider of 1.8cents per kWh for every kWh charged, which reduces 
operating costs by ~$188K per year.  It also reduces the contingent liability at contract terminus 
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by $1.357M.  Without the PSECA grant to provide a rate rider or reduce the capital cost at 
project terminus, the NPV would be ~$15M, under these assumptions. 
The market-rate TES scenario employed the same technologies offering identical carbon savings, 
yet during the DSB inquiry, the market rate was treated as if it were ineligible for the PSECA 
grant.  Revenue forecasts for the DSB for the market rate (scenario 3) never considered the 
PSECA grant in the form of a CIAC or as rate rider on future revenues charged.  With the 
PSECA rate rider the market rate is less costly than the COS rate, and without it, more costly.   
The application of incentives during the decision-making may also have influenced the decision 
for choosing between cost of service and market rates. In both the initial and follow-up rate 
reviews the DSB reiterated their preference for the cost of service rate as depicted by scenario 
one because it was less costly, and it was assumed they would choose to switch to cost of service 
from the market rate in the first year it was below the market rate (DSD 2012, p.15).  Assuming 
their preferences among regulated alternatives were based on cost, they might have preferred the 
market rate (scenario 2) had FortisBC offered a rate rider or similar mechanism incentive.  Yet 
since the PSECA grant was not awarded based on a rate design, but on carbon reductions 
materialized, the omissions of a rate rider or similar incentive to the market rate may have 
unduly influenced the DSB towards the COS rate.  
In total, a project with a capital cost of $6.5M received approximately $~3M in provincial and 
federal grants, or 21% of its lifecycle cost. Incentive mechanisms, such as the PSECA rate rider, 
were developed specifically for the cost of service rate.  The DSB should have received this 
PSECA rate rider for identical carbons savings through another rate structure.  The DSB only 
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stood to benefit from exploring their options for applying both provincial and federal incentives 
to alternative rate setting and procurement alternatives. 
5.7.2 Volatility of the market rate compared to COS 
The COS rate was preferred to the market rate because it was deemed less costly, and because it 
was less volatile.  It is perfectly understandable for PSOs with little room for financial 
maneuvering to prefer contracts with greater price stability and known prices.  
In performing a sensitivity analysis FortisBC compared the market and COS rates following 
changes to the price of gas, price of electricity, corporate tax rate, cost of borrowing, and the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) to reflect labour costs among other factors.   
The model used for the sensitivity analysis was filed confidentially but the outputs are publicly 
available. The market rate is more volatile than the COS rate and is very sensitive to the price of 
natural gas.  In contrast, the COS rate is insensitive to the price of gas but sensitive to the CPI 
rate and electricity prices.  Overall, the market rate is expected to be higher following these 
changes, with a greater variance in price following changes to the price of natural gas.48  The 
results of the sensitivity analysis indicate that the COS rate protects the DSB from future 
increases in the price of natural gas. These results are exactly what one should expect, but can be 
achieved whether or not the COS rate design is used. 
                                                
48!In!the!sensitivity!analysis!they!did!not!consider!offering!rate!rider!or!similar!incentive!for!the!market!rate.!
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It is worthwhile to illustrate exactly how the COS rate is calculated.  All of the expenses incurred 
during the year are totaled, including an earned return on capital investment.49  The expenses are 
aggregated and divided by the output (MWh), to reveal the anticipated $/MWh rate.  In Table 
5.6, the COS rate is calculated following a 25% change to the cost of gas, electricity, and 
operations and maintenance expenses.   
 Initial Gas∆ Electricity∆ O&M∆ 
 2015 25% 25% 25% 
Cost of natural gas 124 155 124 124 
Cost of electricity 234 234 293 234 
Operations and maintenance 259 259 259 324 
Property Taxes 8 8 8 8 
Depreciation Expense 216 216 216 216 
Amortization Expense -44 -44 -44 -44 
Income Taxes -140 -140 -140 -140 
Earned Return 393 393 393 393 
Plus amortization 220 220 220 220 
     
Annual Revenue Requirement 1,270 1,301 1,329 1,335 
Annual Energy Demand 10,605 10,605 10,605 10,605 
Thermal COS 0.1198 0.1227 0.1253 0.1259 
     
Less rate rider 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 
     
COS Rate (C/KWh) 0.1018 0.1047 0.1073 0.1079 
% change  2.9% 5.4% 6.0% 
Table 5.6 The effect of a 25% rate increase under a COS rate design 
If, in 2015 the price of gas increases by 25%, then the new rate would be 10.47 cents/KWh.  If 
instead the price of electricity increases by 25% then the price increases by 5.4% to 
10.74cents/kWh, or to 10.79cents/kWh if the cost of O&M were to increase by the same amount.  
The costs are passed on directly, but the COS rate rises by less when gas prices increase than if 
electricity prices increase.   
                                                
49!The!earned!return!the!allowable!profit,!calculated!by!multiplying!the!invested!capital!cost!of!the!equipment!by!
the!allowable!return!on!debt!and!equity!(~7.5a10%).!!!
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The DSB project has transitioned from natural gas to electricity, and adopted an energy efficient 
(but capital intensive) technology that uses less energy, so is less responsive to changes in energy 
prices.  The insulation from changes to the price of gas, or even increases in the price of 
electricity, arise due to the energy shift and technology adopted.  A market rate indexed to a 
bundle of energy services reflecting the technologies actual energy use is a better benchmark for 
a market rate.   
5.8 Best practices 
A CPCN approval and rate review is no substitute for prudent contracting practices.  Contracting 
in regulated markets for TES is still a novel method of procurement, and the best practices 
described here can assist PSOs entering this arena.  Many of the best practices are common to 
municipal and local governments when contracting for alternative infrastructure services 
5.8.1.1 Develop a public sector comparator 
When considering an alternative method of service delivery a public sector comparator is the 
simplest method to calculate the value added of the service provider.  As shown here, a public 
sector comparator is readily constructed using information contained in rate design agreements to 
debunk otherwise obscure payment plans.  Even if public finance appears unlikely in the near 
term a public sector comparator will assist in calculating price premiums and provides the PSO a 
reasonable counterfactual to aid in negotiations.   
5.8.1.2 Specify outputs when contracting 
The DSB contract specified technical and rate design inputs for the building renovations.  There 
were no guarantees regarding energy savings, carbon savings, or quality of service indicators to 
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be found by the Commission.  In fact, the contract was written so that any costs above what was 
anticipated during the construction phase would simply lead to curtailment of aspects of the 
project, thereby reducing carbon and energy savings.   
PSOs should practice contracting for the desired qualities of the contract using measurable 
outputs or targets.  The DSB can clearly describe their objectives and link payments to targets 
reached rewarding service providers.  Specifying a 19 building renovation subject to maximizing 
carbon savings and minimizing cost encourages innovation among service providers and 
encourages them to apply their technical and management expertise.  Furthermore, output 
contracting would have protected the DSB if energy or carbon savings fail to materialize, or 
would have likely encouraged a reevaluation on whether the carbon savings proposed were 
attainable.   
5.8.1.3 Compare lifecycle costs 
Comparing lifecycle costs can lead to economically efficient decision-making.  Different 
interveners emphasized different costs during the DSB inquiry.  The DSB prioritized low 
payments upfront and interveners emphasized the high capital cost of the project.  The DSB went 
so far as to place a hard limit on capital costs FortisBC could incur.  For the DSB, the full 
lifecycle cost is the appropriate measure.  This should also have included other relevant costs 
such as the contingent liability at terminus and anticipated carbon payments.   
5.8.1.4 Consider multiple rate alternatives 
The counterfactuals used during the inquiry led to the DSB anchoring on the cost of service rate 
design.  The unfeasible no-renovation scenario and the market rate pegged to the price of natural 
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gas were almost guaranteed to make the COS rate the most desirable alternative.   No project is 
inimitable, and this chapter has shown using existing information regarding the CPCN that 
multiple comparisons can be constructed.   
Moreover, the BCUC offers many different rate designs including performance-contracting rates 
based on their existing payments.  They could have designed alternative market rates pegged to 
something other than natural gas.  For example, a more accurate market rate following the 
renovation might be a rate pegged to the price of electricity, maintenance costs, and inflation.  
5.8.1.5 Share risks throughout duration of contract 
The party most able to bear the risks during each phase of the contract should do so during each 
stage, from design and construction to operation.   There is clearly room for more equal risk 
sharing between the two parties, and the DSB may not have clearly understood the risks they 
assumed under a COS rate design.  If the carbon savings do not materialize as planned during the 
design phases, then it is the DSB who must pay the higher cost of carbon offsets.   The DSB has 
placed a limit on capital costs during the construction phases, but it is also the DSB who must 
pay for the greater cost of energy if the geothermal systems are scaled back or equipment 
malfunctions requiring excessive downtime.  The DSB bears the risks of cost overruns or 
unplanned maintenance during the operational phases by choosing COS rate regulation.  The 
earned return for Fortis BC will not be affected by these events (see Appendix B). 
5.9 Policy recommendations 
Renovating antiquated, inefficient building energy systems would benefit both the DSB and 
taxpayers alike.  At the heart of this problem is a perceived inability for the DSB to finance their 
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buildings through the ordinary channels.  Rather than continue to operate these deficient systems, 
or risk having to pay for their replacement out of their own pocket, the DSB chose a TES 
contract that could finance the renovation of all of their buildings.  This resulted in the DSB 
paying a substantial premium over an own-operate scenario.     
The DSB was subject to difficult capital constraints limiting their options.  They were unlikely to 
receive capital grants of sufficient magnitude from the provincial government.  If the DSB 
supplemented these funds with third-party finance from an ESCO, the capital lease would still 
appear as debt on the balance sheet and could be prohibited under the province’s long-term debt 
management strategies.   This resulted in the DSB preferring a service sure not to require capital 
contributions from themselves or increase debt levels.  The DSB should instead choose among 
identical projects not based on the type of payments made, but their total lifecycle cost. 
The goal should be to encourage renovations when the lifecycle cost of borrowing for the 
equipment is less than the energy savings, or when the energy efficient equipment surpasses a 
rate of return deemed appropriate rather than non-economic factors, such as accounting 
treatment.  Designing public policy with these objectives in mind helps to protect the interests of 
frustrated PSOs and indebted public governments alike, and increases the number of choices 
available.   
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Chapter 6: The regulation of discrete Thermal Energy Services in British 
Columbia 
FortisBC Energy Utilities (FortisBC, FEI) is the largest distributor of natural gas in British 
Columbia, serving 950,000 customers in 125 communities.  FortisBC is a public utility whose 
activities are regulated by the British Columbia Utilities Commission (BCUC, Commission).  Its 
regional subsidiaries are the only natural gas distributor in their respective service areas 
including the lower mainland, Whistler, Fort Nelson and Victoria.50    
As part of their effort to become an integrated energy service provider, FortisBC has developed a 
series of new businesses involving alternative energy services including: compressed natural gas, 
liquid natural gas, biomethane, and Thermal Energy Services (TES).51  TES includes both district 
and discrete TES utility services, delivering space conditioning and hot water via energy efficient 
and renewable technology, including Ground Source Heat Pumps (GSHP).  The market interest 
in TES has been significant, and in 2011 FortisBC reported over 20 projects in the pipeline with 
a total estimated value of $250M.  
TES can be grouped in district TES and discrete TES categories.52  Discrete TES introduce 
compelling innovations to the energy service market.  Not unlike their district TES cousins, 
                                                
50!Fortis!BC!Energy!Utilities!(FEU)!includes!three!regulated!utility!affiliates!FEI!(lower!mainland),!FEVI!(Vancouver!
Island),!and!FEW!(Whistler).!!!!FortisBC!was!previously!known!as!Terasen!Utilities!until!rebranding!in!2011.!!Fortis!
Inc.!purchased!FortisBC!in!2005.!
51!FortisBC!owns!biomethane!upgrade!facilities!upstream!of!their!natural!gas!meter,!and!downstream!of!the!utility!
meter!by!owning!assets!for!providing!liquid!and!compressed!natural!gas,!and!TES!services.!!!!FortisBC!compresses!
natural!gas!into!compressed!natural!gas,!where!it!can!be!distributed!to!customers!through!a!dispensing!facility.!!
Liquid!natural!gas!is!sold!to!fleet!vehicles!as!a!transport!fuel!and!its!potential!for!peak!electricity!production!is!
being!explored.!!!
52!District!TES!is!also!known!as!district!energy!or!district!heating.!!In!this!chapter!I!maintain!the!district!TES!notation!
used!during!the!BCUC!proceedings.!!
 117 
discrete TES are utilities owned and operated by third parties.  However, their ability to serve 
one or many buildings gives discrete TES a distinctly local characteristic, and they have been 
dubbed on-site utilities.  Furthermore, discrete TES may finance equipment inside of the building 
as part of its regulated asset base (as shown with the Delta School Board renovations in Chapter 
5).   
The scalability of technology used in discrete TES, such as GSHP, blur the line between leasing 
or purchasing mechanical equipment and infrastructure investments undertaken by utility 
providers.  There are no market barriers among discrete TES common to other regulated 
infrastructures, such as extreme economies of scale.  The offering of discrete TES as a regulated 
service is contentious with respect to whether economic regulation is appropriate to begin with 
and what form of economic regulation should be used.   
These and other issues were addressed by the BCUC during the Alternative Energy Services 
(AES) and Thermal Energy Service (TES) Inquiries. The AES and TES inquiries spanned from 
2011-2014, and concluded with the creation of a scaled regulatory framework for TES in British 
Columbia.  
This chapter is divided into three interrelated parts.  I begin by arguing the characteristics of TES 
offer several advantages over other energy services available by emphasizing the differences 
between discrete TES, district TES, and Energy Performance Contracting (EPC).  I then describe 
intervener arguments presented during the AES and TES Inquiries focusing on the implications 
of market structure and the need for regulation and pricing of outputs (rate design).  I conclude 
by summarizing the resultant scaled regulatory framework for TES and offer policy 
recommendations to improve the efficiency and transparency of TES in British Columbia.  
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Appendix C contains a brief chronological summary of relevant BCUC orders and decisions to 
the TES market.   
6.1 Competitive advantages of discrete Thermal Energy Services (TES) 
Discrete TES provide thermal energy in exchange for ongoing utility payments.  Low carbon or 
renewable technologies are typically used in conjunction with natural gas to supply green 
thermal energy.  In British Columbia, discrete TES are considered public utilities and are subject 
to regulation upon complaint (BCUC%2014e).  
Using a utility model of ownership offers advantages over incumbent methods for providing 
energy services.  In this section I list the factors that led to the emergence of discrete TES.  I then 
discuss some of the competitive advantages discrete TES offers by comparing it to district TES 
and Energy Performance Contracting (EPC).      
6.1.1 The emergence of TES 
There are at least five factors leading to the emergence of discrete TES.  They are the 
introduction of environmental regulations, declining natural gas throughput rates of FortisBC, 
advent of new technologies (Jaccard%2011), a willingness to pay for green services, and an 
ability to overcome capital constraints by potential adopters. 
British Columbia enacted a series of environmental regulations to further their green objectives, 
which have raised the price of carbon intensive energy sources, altered public perception 
surrounding fossil fuels, and helped create a market for green energy services (BC%Leg%Ass.%2008a;%2008b;%2007;%2010). 
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FortisBC is experiencing declining throughput with declining demand in the residential and 
industrial sectors, and flat demand in the commercial market.  FortisBC has identified two trends 
affecting throughput of natural gas, a decline in usage amongst existing customers, and a decline 
in the market share of new construction choosing natural gas as the primary source of thermal 
energy (FortisBC%2011b). 
FortisBC indicated the ongoing development of new renewable technologies as one of the 
reasons TES was emerging. The technologies and fuels used in TES range from mature 
technologies, such as GSHP, to newer waste heat recapture and biomass facilities.  The offering 
of these renewable technologies is part of FortisBC’s strategy to maintain natural gas as part of 
the renewable energy mix (FortisBC%2011b).  
Consumers are increasingly aware of other attributes surrounding their consumption of energy, 
and price is considered alongside the carbon intensity of the fuel source (ibid, p.17).  This market 
includes carbon offsets, biogas, and renewable electricity.  This market based on consumer’s 
willingness to pay more for green energy services has aided the development of TES in British 
Columbia.   
The fifth factor would be the ability for discrete TES to overcome capital shortages faced by 
potential adopters of renewable technology.  As shown in Chapter 5, the appetite for discrete 
TES is partly fueled by its ability to navigate capital cost constraints faced by public sector 
organizations and developers. 
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It is worth mentioning none of the reasons for the emergence of TES is due to high-energy prices 
or falling costs of renewable energy technologies.  FortisBC offers a premium service, and the 
customer is choosing what may be a  
(a) “…higher cost, more complex design in order to better meet[s] their needs and objectives 
for a renewable, low carbon energy system (ibid, p.137).”   
FortisBC does not offer lower operating costs than conventional technologies, a strategy 
commonly employed by vendors of renewable thermal systems like solar thermal and 
geoexhange.  Further, there is no requirement or guarantee for a level of carbon savings or 
renewable energy quota met when providing the service.   
6.1.2 Strategies to overcome development risks by district TES 
District TES provide metered renewable heat in several municipalities and communities in 
British Columbia (PICS%2012).  District TES entails a large capital investment with significant 
start up risks.  When developing district TES, utilities have employed various strategies to 
protect their investment. 
The first is an exclusive right to operate in an area as a regulated public utility.  Once a 
Certificate of Public Convenience (CPCN) is granted, the utility has monopoly rights to operate 
in an area.  The utility is given exclusive domain and the right to earn a reasonable rate of return, 
improving the risk-reward profile for the investors of the utility.   There remain, however, several 
eventualities that may prevent the utility investor from recovering their capital investment. 
If there is a downturn in the real estate market and developers are unable to sell their units, then 
there are no ratepayers from which the utility can recover their infrastructure investment.  The 
utility may need to adjust their rates upwards, fail to recover their invested capital, or negotiate 
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loss sharing with the local government.  This threat is known as occupancy risk (load risk), 
which was described as a high-risk factor by all of the district TES operators during the GCOC 
Phase 2 proceeding (described in Chapter-section 6.3.2).  
District TES adopt three primary strategies insulating themselves from occupancy risk, namely, 
bringing thermal plants online in phases, rate smoothing techniques, and municipal power.  
The economics of renewable energy technology may require TES providers to bring renewable 
thermal plants online in phases.  A district TES may wait until full build out before switching to 
a renewable fuel source, which may not be economic at small scales.   Biomass may be the 
desired thermal energy technology, for example, but natural gas will be used until full-occupancy 
and build out are reached.  Marine Gateway in Victoria (waste wood) and UniverCity in Burnaby 
(biomass) have adopted this phased strategy (FAES%2012).53  They will continue to use natural 
gas until the load is large enough to enable fuel switching. 
District TES use levelized rates and deferral accounts to bridge early and late ratepayers.  This 
spreads early costs over the life of the project that would otherwise result in punitive rates 
charged to early connectors.  The utility draws from deferral accounts until revenues are 
sufficient and the deferral account can be replenished.   This acts as a cushion until ratepayers 
arrive in greater numbers, and utilities must report whether loads are expected to hit forecasts to 
the BCUC. 
                                                
53!The!price!of!fuel!will!be!a!consideration.!!The!Lonsdale!District!Energy!System!in!North!Vancouver!uses!
disaggregated!natural!gas!heating!stations.!!The!thermal!plants!were!intended!to!use!hydrogen,!but!the!fuel!source!
is!unlikely!to!materialize.!!It!is!a!hot!loop!and!does!not!supply!air!conditioning,!a!tenuous!item!amongst!developers!
in!the!area.!!!!
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Lastly, district TES almost always work in concert with the municipality to set bylaws requiring 
buildings in the area to connect to the district TES.  Without municipal power, it can be difficult 
to persuade developers to connect given the greater capital costs they must incur to ensure 
system compatibility.  Heating systems compatible with district heating tend to be costlier to 
install compared to electric baseboard.54  
Capital costs are of paramount concern for developers.  Absent a market where developers are 
rewarded for investing in the sustainability of the development, increasing first costs reduce the 
developer’s profits.  In British Columbia where electricity is perceived as clean and low carbon, 
it can be difficult to persuade developers to voluntarily bear the extra cost for connecting to a 
district TES.    
6.1.3 Comparative advantage of discrete TES 
Similar to district TES, discrete TES pursue a utility model of ownership.  While discrete TES 
use similar rate smoothing techniques of levelized costs and deferral accounts, these are not the 
primary sources of their advantage compared to district TES.  Discrete TES use different 
technologies and marketing strategies for overcoming capital constraints faced by developers.  
Discrete TES use technologies economic at smaller scales (such as geoexchange), and work 
backwards from heating loads when deploying disaggregated TES plants (FAES 2014b).  Over 
                                                
54!Established!district!energy!systems!can!compete!for!new!customers!without!mandatory!connection!rights.!!
Occupancy!risk!is!lower!when!growing!than!when!establishing!a!rate!base.!!An!easy!example!is!Central!Heat!Ltd.!in!
downtown!Vancouver.!!Initially!a!joint!venture!by!several!downtown!buildings!looking!to!save!space!in!their!
buildings,!Central!Heat!Ltd/Creative!Energy,!is!now!growing!and!markets!their!services!to!new!customers.!
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time the disaggregated TES plants from multiple buildings can be connected for load balancing, 
not because the project economics require it, because doing so is economically advantageous.55     
Technologies economic at smaller scales include geoexchange, solar thermal, and in-building 
waste heat recapture.  When working together, these technologies usually employ an ambient 
temperature ground loop to provide both heating and air conditioning.  Air conditioning is 
required in the lower mainland whenever glass covers a high fraction of the exposed surface (in 
Richmond air conditioning is required by code for noise concerns near the airport).  Hot loops 
employed by district heating systems using natural gas or biomass technology only supply 
heating.  The utility of which is questionable with Vancouver’s mild climate, and few biomass 
district heating systems are actively contributing to electricity production. 
Discrete TES use a market pull approach by offering renovations to existing buildings and 
financing additional capital costs for developers.  They do so by not only financing the thermal 
plant, but they may also finance the in-building distribution equipment.56  This removes the first 
cost faced by developers, and assists with the developer attaining an eco-certification label or 
higher energy-efficiency rating.   
A development with large heating loads and access to nearby sources of waste heat, for example, 
will allow the discrete TES provider to finance more of the marginal projects by the developer – 
from insulation, to boilers, to distribution piping and ducts.  These additional capital costs paid 
for by the utility are added onto their rate base, from which the rate of return for the utility is 
                                                
55!Load!balancing!occurs!when!a!smaller!ground!loop!can!serve!multiple!buildings!with!diversified!loads.!!This!
network!benefit!is!described!and!modeled!in!Appendix!B.!
56!TerraSource!is!the!separate!utility!arm!of!GeoTility.!!They!finance!the!ground!loop!based!on!fixed!payments,!but!
do!not!consider!pumps!or!use!the!utility!rate!designs.!!GeoTility!is!an!industry!leader!for!geoexchange!in!BC,!and!
they!install!the!loops!for!FortisBC.!
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calculated.  This creates a clear alignment of interests between a utility looking to offer a 
competitive price for tenants while still increasing capital costs to maximize their own rate of 
return, while developers are looking for a way to decrease their capital costs to increase their 
return.  This is a compelling approach for overcoming the agency problem between developers 
and tenants.  
Lastly, discrete TES have demonstrated their suitability for renovations.  Renovations have 
known heating loads and build out profiles, making them ideal candidates for discrete TES with 
little to no occupancy risk.   
6.1.4 Advantages of discrete TES over Energy Performance Contracting 
Energy Performance Contracts (EPC) are designed to renovate buildings owned by commercial 
and institutional clients.  An EPC company uses its expertise in energy services and technologies 
to extract a rent on the difference between the initial prices paid for energy and the energy 
payments following the renovation.  The revenues are based on the financial savings of the 
project, but a level of energy or carbon savings may be guaranteed.  The amount invested 
depends on a variety of factors, such as total cost paid for energy.  In lower British Columbia, 
where the climate is mild and the price of energy low, the ceiling on affordable renovations is 
lower than in regions with harsher climates or more expensive energy. 
During the AES Inquiry, the Energy Services Association of Canada (ESAC) expressed their 
concerns over the advantages of discrete TES over EPC (Smith%2012).  The utility rate designs 
of discrete TES systems allow them to earn a regulated return in an unregulated market.   The 
discrete TES contract begins with negotiated rate designed to be competitive, but there are no 
guarantees behind it.  Whereas for an EPC the price is set based on previous usage.  The return 
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on investment for an EPC rises and falls with the energy savings, increasing the risk involved in 
an EPC contract should equipment fail to perform as expected or if capital costs overrun.57   
Given identical payments from a third party, the utility method of financing equipment can 
afford a greater capital cost compared to an EPC contract.  With an EPC, the capital lease must 
eventually cover the total cost of the capital equipment and renovations provided.  A utility rate 
design charges the carrying cost of the capital equipment (inclusive of earned return) over a 
longer time period.  The contract duration for a utility is generally longer than an EPC.  A utility 
is intended to contract on an ongoing basis, with an initial term of 20 years, and hopefully with 
renewals every decade afterwards.  This spreads out the costs over a greater period than an EPC, 
which must recover its capital costs in a shorter period of time.  The treatment of costs and the 
investment duration result in lower capital carrying costs.  EPC companies have expressed 
interest in offering capital intensive technology, such as GSHP, for public sector renovations but 
indicated the financial incentives for energy efficiency must increase before this can be realized (Smith%2012).   In short, if both an EPC and a utility are offered the same stream of payments, 
the discrete TES model can afford to invest a greater amount in a renovation or provision of 
capital equipment. 58  
Furthermore, utility services have preferential treatment on the balance sheet of a Public Sector 
Organization(PSO).  PSOs  are subject to capital constraints, prohibiting the accumulation of 
                                                
57!This!is!not!to!suggest!that!EPCs!do!not!immunize!themselves!from!certain!risks.!!An!EPC!is!not!responsible!for!
changes!outside!of!their!controls,!including!changes!of!use!to!the!building!and!increases!in!energy!costs.!!It!can!
even!insure!the!financial!savings,!or!bear!this!liability!on!the!balance!sheet!if!cheaper.!!The!mechanical!equipment!
also!comes!with!a!manufacturers!warranty!if!it!does!not!perform!as!expected.!
58!This!does!not!mean!indefinite!ownership!or!EPC!financing!is!less!costly!than!upfront!procurement.!!See!Chapter!5!
for!the!Delta!School!Board!Case!Study.!
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debt during periods of fiscal stringency.  Capital leases, the go-to financing mechanism of EPC 
are treated as both an asset and a liability on the balance sheet, can be prohibited by balance 
sheet constraints.  Utility bills are an operating expense appearing on the income statement, so 
capital equipment financed as a utility bill can avoid a balance sheet constraint.  
These advantages were not lost on the interveners, and the BC Sustainable Energy Association 
and Sierra Club of British Columbia asked the Commission to maintain regulation of single 
customers as a way to preserve these advantages for overcoming debt limitations imposed on 
public sector organizations (BCSEA%2013).  The Commission rejected considerations for the 
balance sheet treatment of capital costs, or any advantages it might confer to PSOs as out of 
scope for the proceedings (BCUC%2013c). 
6.1.5 Conclusions 
The emergence of discrete TES in BC is driven not by rising energy costs, or falling renewable 
energy prices, but the willingness to pay for green services.  The environmental benefits are 
based on the technology adopted, and not on any guaranteed energy savings or calculated carbon 
intensity of the services over its lifetime operation.       
Part of the reason discrete TES offers premium services is due to the mild climate and low cost 
of energy in British Columbia.  These conditions can make solar thermal and geothermal 
technologies costlier over their lifespan than natural gas alternatives.  It can also be inferred the 
technologies used by TES may not be premium services in other regions.  A region with higher 
energy prices or a harsher climate could supply discrete TES with geoexchange technology and 
operate at a discount to natural gas or electricity.   
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In emphasizing the competitive advantages of discrete TES, I endeavored to highlight their 
qualities beyond being mini-district energy systems.  Discrete TES follows a market pull strategy 
by financing construction costs for developers and renovations for institutional clients.  
Furthermore, discrete TES works backwards from loads using technologies economic at smaller 
scales than district energy substantially lowering occupancy risk in the case of renovations.  
With respect to the market for energy performance contracting, the introduction of utility tools 
into the renovation market poses a direct threat to EPC companies.  At current energy prices, the 
utility can invest more in capital costs that with an EPC, and with preferable balance sheet 
treatment (Smith%2012). 
6.2 Intervener interests and arguments presented before the Commission 
Regulation is inherently political, and the regulator will consider intervener arguments when 
interpreting and applying their legislative mandate.  This allows for different actors to advocate 
for their vested interests when arguing which benefits (and costs) should be given priority in 
determining the need and form of regulation.  Economic efficiency is also a concern, testing 
neoclassical theory of regulation against actual industry outputs described by price and quality.  
Thus, the regulation has real distributive implications for the industry, with the dispersal of 
benefits and costs (Joskow%et%al.%1989).  
In British Columbia, Thermal Energy Services (TES) are considered public utilities and subject 
to regulatory oversight by the British Columbia Utilities Commission (BCUC, Commission). 
The Commission derives its mandate from the Utilities Commission Act (UCA), and is required 
to provide regulatory oversight to all public utilities in British Columbia.  The UCA defines a 
public utility as: 
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“a person, or the person's lessee, trustee, receiver or liquidator, who owns or operates in 
British Columbia, equipment or facilities for 
(a) the production, generation, storage, transmission, sale, delivery or provision of electricity, 
natural gas, steam or any other agent for the production of light, heat, cold or power to or 
for the public or a corporation for compensation…(UCA 1996).” 
The inclusion of any other agent for the production of heat or cold as a public utility requires 
TES to be subject to regulatory oversight in British Columbia.59  This permitted FortisBC to file 
for regulatory oversight from the Commission for TES projects (FortisBC%2011b). 
The BCUC indicated a review of FortisBC’s new business activities was in order, so regulatory 
proceedings were initiated when the Energy Services Association of Canada (ESAC) and Corix 
Utilities (Corix) filed a complaint with the BCUC (See Appendix C).1  Both ESAC and Corix 
were concerned FortisBC might use revenues from their regulated natural gas business to 
subsidize their new activities resulting in an unfair advantage.  They claimed unless structural 
regulation was used to separate the new business activities FortisBC could distort the 
competitive landscape and hinder the development of the emerging TES market.   
The BCUC acts to protect ratepayers entitled to safe and reliable service while also affording 
utilities a fair return on prudently made investments.  The BCUC was faced with two regulatory 
challenges when interpreting their mandate.  To reconcile the interests of the captive natural gas 
ratepayer with that of the development of TES in general (Jaccard%2011).  Secondly, whether 
and, how, the BCUC ought to regulate the TES service.  
                                                
59!FortisBC!argued!the!performance!nature!of!the!ESCO!contract!was!not!relevant;!they!were!still!selling!thermal!
energy!and!should!be!regulated.!!FortisBC!details!the!6!ways!TES!can!be!offered,!and!which!ones!should!be!
regulated!according!to!their!interpretation!of!the!definition!of!a!public!utility!in!British!Columbia.!!!See!Exhibit!Ba2!
Section!6.4.1.1!on!application!of!the!definition!of!public!utilities.!
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Here I highlight key tensions revealed during the Alternative Energy Services (AES) and 
Thermal Energy Services (TES) Inquiry, and the arguments found most persuasive by the BCUC 
in developing the TES regulatory framework.  
6.2.1 Role of competition and regulation 
Before discussing the purpose of structural separation, it is worthwhile to describe the role of 
competition and the purpose of economic regulation, given the centrality of whether the entry of 
FortisBC into the TES market was anti-competitive or an additional competitive presence. 
Competition reduces the risk of monopoly rent extraction and promotes innovation within an 
industry.60  Competition also increases consumer choice, offers consumer protection, and signals 
policy makers about the kinds of products and attributes consumers prefer (Viscusi%et%al.%2005). 
It is still possible to have an economically efficient industry without perfectly competitive 
markets.  Under certain conditions a single firm can supply services to a region at least cost, 
known as monopoly.61  For practical reasons, some parts of an industry may only support one or 
very few firms supplying the service.  As is often the case with utilities, the sheer size of the 
investment required to launch services limits the firms able to undertake such an enterprise to all 
but the largest firms or governments.  
                                                
60!The!textbook!scenario!for!optimal!economic!performance!is!a!perfectly!competitive!market!where:!consumers!
have!perfect!information,!there!are!no!increasing!returns!to!scale,!consumers!and!producers!maximize!their!
benefit!using!their!relative!budget!constraints!and!production!functions,!all!agents!are!price!takers,!where!price!
equals!marginal!cost,!and!externalities!are!ruled!out!and!markets!are!at!a!competitive!equilibrium.!!The!resulting!
market!equilibrium!is!a!Pareto'optimal!equilibrium.!!A!market!is!at!Pareto'optimal!equilibrium!when!the!
equilibrium!cannot!increase!the!welfare!of!some!consumers!without!making!other!consumers!worse!off.!!!
61!A!clearest!test!for!monopoly!is!subadditivity,!or!the!range!over!which!all!outputs!can!be!produced!by!a!single!
firm!at!lowest!costs!is!best!served!by!a!monopoly.!!Other!tests!include!extreme!economies!of!scale,!significant!
barriers!to!entry,!decreasing!internal!costs,!or!when!duplicating!assets!increases!costs!for!consumer.!!
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Regulators oversee the economic activities of firms in monopoly conditions, often granting 
utilities exclusive rights to operate within an area. The ratepayers served by a single provider 
with exclusive rights in an area are captive, so  regulators oversee the rates charged by the utility.   
In British Columbia, the Utilities Commission Act (UCA) attempts to balance the benefits of 
competition and monopoly, regulating monopoly when necessary but deferring to markets for 
consumer protection where competition is sufficient (BCUC%2012a).    
The BCUC does not regulate competition, which is the domain of the competition bureau (ibid, 
p.10).  The BCUC can indirectly affect competition by controlling the investments of the utility 
(through CPCN approval), prohibiting a utility from entering a market outside their traditional 
business subject to certain safeguards, and deferring to competitive market forces by refraining 
from regulation through the use of exemptions (ibid, p.10).  
Whenever a monopoly provider offers a new business outside of its traditional activities, the 
regulator must be vigilant to prevent potential abuses of monopoly power.  The risk is the 
potential for monopoly to shift some of the costs and risks of entering into the new market onto 
its captive, traditional ratepayers.  This is a form of cross-subsidization where the captive 
ratepayers of the existing business pay for costs unrelated to their usage.62  This may also distort 
the unregulated market, if the cross-subsidization results in a price offering low enough to drive 
potential competitors away.  The entry of a monopoly provider to a competitive market can also 
                                                
62!Crossasubsidization!can!also!be!beneficial,!such!as!when!urban!ratepayers!subsidize!the!costs!of!rural!services.!!
Without!this!form!of!crossasubsidization!rural!electrification!would!not!have!been!possible.!
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be a valuable competitive presence subject to certain safeguards, such as structural regulation.63  
The degree of structural separation required for FortisBC to offer TES was one of the primary 
outcomes of the AES Inquiry, which I detail in the next section.   
6.2.2 Guidelines on structural separation 
The BCUC can prohibit or restrict the entry of a regulated business into a new business activity 
if it finds doing so is necessary to protect ratepayers.  The BCUC can do so by requiring greater 
separation amongst utility businesses.  There are five classes of separation offered by the BCUC.  
Listed in order from complete integration to full separation within a utility: a single class of 
customer, separate class of customer, separate class of service, affiliate regulated business, and 
affiliated non-regulated business.    
The degree of integration or separation required is related to the market structure, with greater 
integration permissible in regulated markets and greater separation warranted between regulated 
and unregulated markets.  The degree of integration or separation also determines what resources 
can be shared: financial, information, employees, sunk costs.  The sharing of costs and the 
potential for cross-subsidization was of paramount concern, considering the advantage FortisBC 
may have as a natural monopoly offering both natural gas and TES under a single entity as a 
regulated class of service.   
 
There were three potential degrees of separation applicable to TES:  
                                                
63!An!alternative!is!behavioral!regulation,!which!requires!considerably!more!effort!by!the!regulatory!agency!given!
problems!of!information!asymmetry.!!The!advantage!of!structural!separation!is!it!reduces!the!need!for!regulatory!
oversight.!!!
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• TES as a separate class of service  
• TES as a regulated utility affiliate  
• TES as an unregulated utility affiliate.   
When two businesses are offered as different classes of service, accounting rules are used to 
assign the costs to the class of service responsible for incurring them.64  Employees can use time 
sheets to record hours worked on each class of service, and formulaic calculations (observed by 
the BCUC) can assign certain costs to each class of customer, such as overhead.   
Utility affiliates are considered structurally separate, and only share the minimum of resources.  
Any costs shared between regulated or unregulated affiliates must be disclosed to the regulator, 
and when purchasing materials or services the utility must pay the higher of their internal or the 
external market price.  The potential for economies of scope is greater amongst classes of service 
than between utility affiliates, but the threat of cross-subsidization is lower.   
The decision to offer TES through structurally separate regulated and unregulated affiliates was 
reached through the application of the Retail Markets Downstream of the utility Meter (RMDM) 
guidelines (BCUC 2007).  When the BCUC developed the RMDM guidelines to govern the 
interactions between regulated and unregulated businesses.  Figure 6.1 contains the three primary 
objectives of the RMDM guidelines.  These objectives are not ordered, and the BCUC has some 
discretion concerning the weighting for each objective. 
                                                
64!Known!as!the!principle!of!cost!causation.!!!
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Figure 6.1 Objectives of the RMDM Guidelines 
FortisBC sought to prevent the adoption of the RMDM guidelines at the outset of the inquiry, 
arguing the application of guidelines governing the interactions between regulated and 
unregulated businesses were inapplicable to current circumstances.  In their view their activities 
were properly regulated by definition.   The Commission adopted the guidelines stating they 
could be adapted to the present circumstances of interactions between regulated businesses, a 
view echoed by Corix and ESAC. 
In arguing the merit of offering TES as a separate class of service within the natural gas business, 
FortisBC indicated the third objective (most economically efficient allocation of resources 
should be sought) provided justification for offering TES as a separate class of service.65  
Economies of scope resulting from offering both TES and natural gas would lead to FortisBC 
                                                
65!Using!existing!sunk!assets!for!another!service,!such!as!service!vehicles!already!is!not!tantamount!to!crossa
subsidization!as!long!as!the!cost!of!using!the!vehicles!is!recorded.!!
RMDM%Guidelines%
• There must be no subsidy of unregulated business activities, whether undertaken 
by the utility or its NRB, by utility ratepayers. 
• The risks associated with participation in the unregulated market must be borne 
entirely by the unregulated business activity; that is the risks must have no impact 
on utility ratepayers. 
• The most economically efficient allocation of goods and resources for ratepayers 
should be sought. 
Text from Figure 6, Commission Objectives RMDM Guidelines (BCUC 2007. p.23) 
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being the lowest cost producer, and customers would ultimately benefit from the lower prices.  
Furthermore, the sharing of costs (such as overhead) between natural gas and TES would also 
benefit natural gas ratepayers.  FortisBC also indicated how accounting rules could correctly 
assign costs to either natural gas or TES classes of service, and would be adequate to prevent 
cross-subsidization.66   
FortisBC was seeking an ability to capture economies of scope, similar to other producers 
offering multiple utility services through a single entity, such as Corix Utilities.  There remains a 
key distinction between economies of scope realized by offering multiple services through a 
group like Corix, and economies of scope captured between natural gas and TES by FortisBC.  
With Corix, any cost overruns on a project are borne by the shareholders.   With FortisBC (FEI), 
any costs not adequately captured by the accounting formula or timesheets should be borne by 
shareholders, but could also be recovered from natural gas ratepayers.  Only FortisBC has a large 
group of captive ratepayers making cross-subsidization a possibility (BCUC%2012a). 
Structural separation completely alleviates the risk of cross-subsidization, and reduces the need 
for regulatory oversight.  Even when accounting rules are in place, there exists information 
asymmetry between the regulator and the firm, and the tracking and recording of all costs can be 
difficult.  The RMDM guidelines operate on the principle that the preferred method of separation 
is structural (cf. accounting rules), and onus is on the utility to prove the advantages of greater 
integration outweigh the potential risks of cross-subsidization.   
                                                
66!There!are!two!tests!for!crossasubsidization:!the!test!of!standaalone!costs!and!incremental!costs.!!The!standaalone!
test!states!if!revenues!from!a!service!are!greater!than!the!standaalone!costs!of!that!project,!it!can!be!said!to!be!
subsidy!free.!!The!incremental!cost!test!is!similar,!if!Fortis!is!operating!a!natural!gas!business,!and!TES!imposes!an!
additional!incremental!cost,!as!long!as!the!revenues!from!TES!are!greater!than!the!incremental!cost!it!is!subsidy!
free!(See!FortisBC!2012a,!p.9).!
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The BCUC did not dispute the economic advantages of offering natural gas and TES as two 
separate classes of service, but found them inappropriate considering the potential for cross-
subsidization between regulated and unregulated businesses. Neither was the BCUC willing to 
accept at face value economies of scope would have greater benefits than potential costs of 
cross-subsidization on existing ratepayers or distortion of the competitive market.   
The argument of FortisBC begged the question of whether TES was a regulated service.  The 
definition of a public utility must be read with the intention of the act, which implies the BCUC 
to consider the market conditions and also to apply for exemptions when warranted.   
6.2.3 Alternative Energy Services Inquiry 
The AES Inquiry sought to provide guidance for future BCUC panels when dealing with 
applications for new business activities, for utilities entering new lines of business, and clarify 
the BCUC’s view on what activities were outside of the regulatory umbrella (BCUC%2012a). 
In arriving at their decision, the BCUC distinguished district from discrete TES.  The market for 
district TES was characterized as competition for the market, with the winning bid offering a 
regulated service.  The BCUC found the market for discrete TES sufficiently competitive, and 
properly exempt from regulation.  FortisBC was not permitted to offer TES as a class of service, 
but was permitted to offer district and discrete TES projects subject to the following conditions: 
• FortisBC could compete for district TES through a structurally separate regulated 
utility.  Any costs shared between utility affiliates must be disclosed, and recorded 
at the higher of internal or market prices.  
• FortisBC could offer discrete TES, but through a structurally separate unregulated 
utility affiliate.  Any and all sharing of costs must be disclosed and recorded at the 
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higher cost of internal or market prices, but should be limited to upper level 
executives and emergency response services. 
The AES Inquiry concluded by recommending that the UCA be amended to allow the BCUC to 
exempt markets where there were no natural monopoly characteristics, and tasked the BCUC 
with developing a scaled regulatory framework for the regulation of TES (BCUC 2012a).67   
6.2.4 Thermal Energy Services Inquiry and the need for regulation 
In developing the scaled regulatory framework for TES, the BCUC saw a grey area separating 
discrete and district TES, and their need for different regulations.  The need for regulation is 
ultimately determined by market structure, and/or legislative requirement.  The BCUC 
considered a number of factors differentiating the regulatory requirements of discrete from 
district TES, shown in Figure%6.2. 
                                                
67!Several!other!items!required!decision!including:!FortisBC!would!be!permitted!to!use!the!Fortis!brand!name.!!
Customer!information!would!be!treated!as!valuable!market!information,!and!only!accessed!with!written!
permission!from!the!customer.!!FortisBC’s!ability!to!borrow!at!a!lower!cost!was!an!advantage,!but!not!harmful!to!
competition.!!!
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Figure 6.2 Characteristics of TES and need for regulatory oversight 
The ability for a future ratepayer to choose their TES provider reduces the need for regulatory 
protection (based on measure of need and customer acceptance) and a regulatory exemption for a 
TES contracted for single customer was proposed.  The single customer exemption was 
introduced by the AES, maintained for two regulatory drafts, and then removed.   
There were two very different descriptions of the single-customer offered in support of the need 
for regulation.  Those seeking exemption from regulation described single customer clients as 
sophisticated parties willfully entering into a contract capable of contracting for future 
unforeseen events.  Those opposing the exemption in favor of recourse with the regulator 
described single customers as a vulnerable group of customers most in need of regulatory 
oversight (BCUC%2013c).   
Perhaps the greatest fault line rests on the single customer exemption and its application to the 
market for renovating institutional or commercial clients, including Municipalities, Universities, 
• On-site description: A stand-alone system, usually sized for a single site with no common 
facilities beyond that site, and limited use of public rights of way. 
• Measure of need: TES results from a contract for an existing building or single building permit, 
or the unit owners/tenants have selected the TES. 
• Measure of technical viability: Uses commercially available equipment 
• Measure of cost: the TES utility has a capital cost of $15M or less 
• Measure of customer acceptance: Unit owners and ratepayers have accepted or will accept terms 
of the TES through real-estate purchase disclosure documents, long-term supply contracts, or 
service agreements, prior to purchasing the unit or initiating the service. From%Table%1%OnTsite%TES%with%Certain%Characteristics%(BCUC%2014e%p.%6)%
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Schools, and Hospitals (MUSH).  The MUSH market is a major component of business for 
companies offering energy performance contracts, such as the group represented by the Energy 
Services Association of Canada (ESAC).  ESAC represents a consortium of eight EPC 
companies operating in Canada, including groups such as Johnson Controls, Honeywell, and 
AMERESCO.  ESAC received enough votes to intervene collectively as a group during the AES 
Inquiry, but not for the TES Inquiry.   
AMERESCO was the primary EPC intervener with regards to the regulation of discrete TES.  
Other ESAC members Johnson Controls and Honeywell did not participate, likely due to their 
ability to play both the discrete and performance contracting sides of the MUSH market.  
Johnson Controls and Honeywell can offer performance contracts, and they can also sell 
equipment, assist with installation, or supply controls.  AMERESCO does not sell technology 
services, meaning they were more threatened by the entry of discrete TES into the MUSH market 
than the other two.68   
AMERESCO supported the single customer exemption along with the other interveners with 
different market perspectives, namely the Independent Contractors and Businesses Association 
(ICBA), the Heating, Refrigerating and Air Conditioning Institute of Canada (HRAI), and the 
Mechanical Contractors Association of British Columbia (MCABC).69  These intervening parties 
                                                
68!Johnson!Controls!worked!with!ForisBC!on!the!Delta!School!Board!project!for!both!the!feasibility!study!and!
controls.!!
69!Corix!were!more!concerned!with!the!proceedings!involving!Stream!B!utilities,!and!based!on!conversations!they!
seem!to!think!there!is!more!than!enough!work!out!there!without!creating!a!new!market!visaàavis!the!market!for!
discrete!TES.!!They!preferred!a!regulatory!framework!granting!exemptions!wherever!competition!was!found,!and!
regulate!only!if!the!resulting!situation!required,!which!could!reasonably!be!inferred!to!lead!to!a!single!customer!
exemption.!!In!contrast,!AMERESCO!was!not!actively!lobbying!for!changes!to!stream!B!utilities,!and!did!not!take!
issue!with!certain!items!such!as!the!Stream!B!extension!test.!
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saw regulation as a last resort and poor substitute for competition, and recourse with the 
regulator could lead to a moral hazard if used as a backstop (BCUC%2014g).   The ICBA even 
suggested independent contractors could be required to work with FortisBC in order to win 
contracts failing the preservation of the single customer exemption (ibid, p.14 Appendix A).  
FortisBC preferred recourse with the regulator, and this view was echoed by B.C. Sustainable 
Energy Association (BCSEA) and the Sierra Club British Columbia (SCBC), and British 
Columbia Pensioners’ and Seniors’ Organization (BCPSO).  For FortisBC, regulation by 
complaint meant full recourse with the regulator, and the ability to offer discrete TES to single 
customers, including the MUSH market.  They argued a blanket exemption for single customers 
“takes the regulatory protection of the Act away from the customers who are likely the most in 
need of it (ibid, p.11 Appendix A).”   
The BCSEA and SCBC argued maintaining the single customer regulatory exemption might 
frustrate the implementation of TES in British Columbia. Both supported the BCUC regulation 
of TES to advance BC’s environmental objectives.  They argued the utility model maintains 
certain competitive advantages over performance contracting, and removing the regulatory 
option would remove a choice from the market (ibid, pp.16-17 Appendix A).    
The BCPSO argued the TES market was insufficiently competitive, and given the duration of 
TES contracts having recourse with the regulator in the event of unforeseen events would be 
preferable, particularly should rates rise significantly over time.  Furthermore, they were 
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unwilling to accept that the presence of a contract as evidence that both parties were equal in 
bargaining power or equipped to deal with the terms of the contract (ibid, p.18 Appendix A).70   
When the BCUC removed the single customer exemption, granting recourse upon complaint, 
they did not do so for the reasons put forth by the intervening parties.  The BCUC did not agree 
that regulation in and of itself was a means to achieve environmental objectives, or that 
regulation provided superior protection than a contract in a competitive market.  The BCUC 
maintained regulation by complaint because it was light-handed and would not impose 
significant costs on the market, 71 and because the BCUC could be a more efficient arbiter than 
the courts concerning disputes (BCUC%2013c,%p.26).  
6.2.5 Conclusions 
Wherever the potential for abuse by monopoly power exists, it can be treated through 
socialization (government ownership) or regulation.  In British Columbia, a lack of public funds 
led to privatization and regulation by the BCUC.   
The need to regulate arises from both market characteristics and legislative mandate.  The AES 
Inquiry addressed a novel case governing interactions between two regulated businesses and 
demonstrated the flexibility of the BCUC in overriding its legislative mandate to further 
economic principles believed to serve the public interest.   
                                                
70!BCPSO!did!not!support!the!strata!exemption!either,!saying!that!while!initial!parties!signing!the!contract!were!
privy!to!its!conditions!later!tenants!may!not!be.!!!!!
71!The!BCUC!would!use!a!microaTES!exemption!preventing!regulation!of!smaller!contracts,!addressing!the!concerns!
of!the!Independent!Business!and!Contractors!Association.!!!
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The TES Inquiry took off where the AES Inquiry left off, developing a scaled regulatory 
framework to balance the need for regulation with the benefits of recourse with the regulator.  
The most contentious item was the single customer exemption, and interveners asking for the 
preservation or removal of the single customer exemption did so based on the perceived 
advantages of the resulting service.  The BCUC maintained recourse with the regulator by 
complaint not based on a need to protect end-users, but based on the limited cost of light-handed 
oversight, and the BCUC’s potential efficiency in arbitration should unforeseen circumstances 
arise.   
There were two incidental findings from the TES Inquiry running counter to the initial findings 
of the AES Inquiry.  FortisBC can offer both discrete and district TES within the same regulated 
utility affiliate (known as FAES).  Regulation by complaint is light-handed regulation, but still 
allows for discrete and district services to be operated within the same affiliate.  Secondly, 
despite the BCUC insisting regulation was not a choice (BCUC%2012a,%p.15), but determined by 
legislative mandate or market conditions, a choice of regulation was preserved in the energy 
service market.  In the upper-end of the renovation market for systems costing more than $500K, 
a client could chose between a performance contract and regulation by complaint.  The 
determining factor in this case is ownership, with a capital lease leading to eventual ownership 
and a utility contract leading to indefinite ownership.    
Lastly, maintaining recourse with the regulator for single customers allows discrete TES offer 
renovations for PSOs, altering the competitive landscape for EPC companies.   
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6.3 Regulatory Framework and Rate Design for Thermal Energy Services 
Here I describe the scaled TES regulatory framework for district and discrete TES systems in 
British Columbia, including which sections of the Utilities Commission Act (UCA) apply.  
Examples are used to illustrate the critical characteristics of a utility that determine the form of 
regulation applied, as identified by the BCUC.  
I draw attention to the importance of rate design, which affect a firm’s investment decisions, 
alter the financial risk of the utility, and allocate risks among the utility and it’s ratepayers 
(Brennan & Schwartz 1982; Averch & Johnson 1962).  The regulatory proceedings led to the 
creation of a long-term contract similar to a regulated cost of service rates for Stream A utilities.  
I show how the long-term contract was able to maintain an endogenous rate of return in an 
unregulated market, and discuss what regulation by complaint entails.   
6.3.1 Scaled regulatory framework for TES in British Columbia 
There are four Streams of regulation for TES utilities in British Columbia, depending on the 
project’s capital cost and characteristics shown in Table%6.1.   
Micro All TES with a capital cost of less than $500K are 
considered unregulated. 
Strata Any TES owned or operated by a Strata Corporation for 
its Strata Members is considered unregulated.  
Stream A Stream A TES utilities are considered public utilities, but 
will only be regulated upon complaint 
Stream B Full regulatory review for all TES with a capital cost 
greater than $15M, or any TES not fitting the description 
of a Stream A utility, or meeting the requirements for a 
Strata exception.   
Table 6.1 Streams of TES regulation in BC 
The intensity of regulation increases with the size and complexity of the project.  Whether the 
utility identifies as a Stream B utility is dependent on whether it meets the definitions of Micro, 
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Strata or stream A TES.  The micro and strata exemptions are straightforward, defined by the 
cost and ownership structure of the project.  The micro-TES exemption applies to any system 
with a capital cost below $500K.  A TES system owned and operated by a strata corporation on 
behalf of its members is exempt from BCUC regulation, no matter what the capital cost.  The 
definition of Stream A utilities is more nuanced, and Table 6.2 groups the characteristics based on 
whether they pertain to issues of scale or coordination.   
Scale  
Total Cost Capital cost estimate equal to or greater than $500k but less 
than $15M 
System size is known Designed to meet energy demands of one or more 
customers/buildings 
Coordination/Complexity  
On-site Serves one or more customers/buildings on a single site, 
and there are no shared thermal generation or distribution 
facilities beyond the site.  
Limited transmission No or very limited use of public rights of way or streets 
Single permit Approved for new/existing building under a single 
municipal permitting process 
Source: Table 1, Stream A Characteristics TES Regulatory Guide P. 7 
Table 6.2 Characteristics of Stream A TES 
The Utilities Commission Act contains explicit exemptions from some parts or all of regulatory 
oversight, such as public utilities owned by municipal governments,72 a person engaged in the 
production or extraction of oil, or a person engaged in the production of a geothermal resource (UCA%1996).73  Exemptions allow the BCUC to exercise discretion with the application of their 
regulatory mandate, in particular when considering exemptions to some or all of the sections 
contained in Part 3 of the UCA titled: The Regulation of Public Utilities.   
                                                
72!Examples!of!municipally!owned!TES!in!BC:!Lonsdale!Energy!Corporation!in!North!Vancouver,!Southeast!False!
Creek!Neighborhood!Energy!Utility!in!Vancouver,!Cheakamus!Crossing!in!Whistler,!and!Revelstoke!Community!
Energy!Corporation!in!Revelstoke.!
73!The!Geothermal!Resource!Act!defines!geothermal!resources!as!hot!water!or!steam!with!temperatures!no!less!
than!80C!at!the!surface!level.!!!
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It is the application of exemptions that allow for a scaled regulatory framework for TES, with the 
exemptions shown in Table 6.3.  Micro, Strata, and Stream A TES are exempt from all but 
sections 42, 43,and 44 of Part 3 of the UCA.  Stream A utilities could have these exemptions 
from regulation removed if a complaint leads to an inquiry finding the exemptions unjustified. 
UCA Regulations TES Project Classification 
 Micro Strata Stream A Stream B 
Section 42:  Obey BCUC orders √ √ √ √ 
Section 43: Provide information upon 
request  
√ √ √ √ 
Section 44: Keep records √ √ √ √ 
Section 44.1: Long-term planning   √ √ 
Sections 45-46: Obtain Certificate of 
Public Convenience and Necessity 
   √ 
Sections 59-61: BCUC oversight on rate 
design 
  √ √ 
*Upon complaint, Stream A utilities could be eligible for regulatory oversight including Sections 
44.1 and 59-61 
Table 6.3 TES compliance requirements 
Micro and Strata TES providers need only comply with the most basic of public utility 
requirements. Sections 42, 43, and 44 of Part 3 of the UCA require the public utility to obey 
BCUC orders (42), provide information when requested (43), and to keep records (44) (UCA 
1996).  They are effectively exempt from regulation, and even in the event of a complaint with 
not have recourse with the Commission.  
Stream A utilities must comply with all of Part 3 of the UCA excluding sections 44.1, 45-46, and 
59-61.  Section 44.1 requires the utility to engage in long-term resource planning with the 
Commission.  Sections 45-46 require the utility to apply for a Certificate of Public Convenience 
and Necessity (CPCN).  For a CPCN to be granted the Commission must find that the public 
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utility serves the public interest.74  Generally, a CPCN is required for a public utility to operate in 
BC, and also to purchase or create an extension to a public utility.  Exemptions from sections 59-
61 remove BCUC oversight of the rate design, and this absence of regulatory oversight must be 
communicated to the end-user.   
The points below describe instances where an increase in oversight will be required, overruling 
considerations of cost and ownership.   
• Stream B TES with a capital cost less than $15M: Consider two buildings, one 
or both having a capital cost greater than 500K, but less than $15M.  If one 
building is dependent on the other buildings thermal plant, such that disconnecting 
would require constructing a new thermal plant, the project has failed the on-site 
description due to the interdependency of the two projects.   This project qualifies 
as a Stream B utility requiring full regulatory oversight.    
• Stream A TES with a capital cost less than 500K: The capital cost requirement 
is decided based on the site, and pooling projects together under a single contract 
does not affect this.  However, a series of projects can be filed all at once for 
administrative efficiency, such as the case of a School District.  If one or a few of 
the sites have a capital cost greater than $500K, they may all be filed together as a 
Stream A.  This example mirrors the Delta School Board Decision, which would 
qualify as a stream A under the current regulatory framework even though only 
two buildings would have renovations exceeding the micro-TES threshold.  
• Stream A TES serving a Strata’s members but owned by a third party: Here 
the critical distinction is ownership.  If the Strata owns or operates the TES, then it 
is exempt regardless of the capital cost.   
• Any TES awarded a CPCN prior to TES Decision as a Stream A: This applies 
to any utility that underwent regulatory review prior to the conclusion of a TES 
                                                
74!This!requirement!need!not!be!onerous.!!In!the!case!of!the!Delta!School!Board!Decision,!the!CPCN!was!granted!as!
it!was!what!both!parties!wanted,!and!each!could!derive!some!benefit!from!the!relationship.!
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Inquiry.  This includes TES with capital costs lower than 500K, and regulated 
utilities now regulated by complaint.  They must reapply for their status as either 
Stream A or Stream B based on the new guidelines. 
The clearest indicator for what stream of regulation the TES falls under is capital cost, however, 
the above issues of dependency, bundling, or ownership overrule cost in determining regulatory 
oversight.   
6.3.2 Stream B TES and regulated rate of return 
District TES are usually regulated using a regulated cost of service rate (COS).  The COS rate 
design passes through all costs onto the end-user.  The only way the utility earns a return on its 
investment is by multiplying the rate base by its allowable earned return.  The earned return is by 
multiplying the rate base (eligible costs include: thermal plant, equipment upgrades, distribution 
equipment, feasibility studies) the fraction of debt and equity components by their respective 
regulated cost of capital and allowable return on equity. 
The BCUC regulates common equity ratio and the rate of return utilities can earn when charging 
COS rates.  The most recent decision on the allowed rate of return was the Generic Cost of 
Capital (GCOC) on March 25, 2014 (BCUC%2014c).  Part of the proceeding was focused on 
Stream B TES providers, including Corix Utilities, Central Distribution Limited, River District 
Energy Limited Partnership, and FortisBC Alternative Energy Services Inc. (FAES).   
The BCUC assigns a rate of return to indicate a fair return on investment considering the risks 
involved in offering the service.  The most commonly mentioned risks and associated level of 
risk are described in Figure%6.3. 
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Figure 6.3 Business risks associated with developing Stream B TES 
Stream B utility providers were granted a premium above the benchmark return on equity to 
compensate for the greater risks of TES.  The benchmark was FortisBC (FEI lower mainland), 
with an allowable return on common equity of 8.75.  Stream B TES utilities were allowed a 
75bps premium above this (9.50%) based on yardstick comparisons with other utilities, and to 
reflect their small size and business risks.  A higher risk premium does not ensure a greater 
return on investment, it is indicative of greater risks taken in the long run that utilities may 
require compensation for in order to offer the service.  
The BCUC also set a higher common equity ratio limiting the amount of debt.  Greater leverage 
increases returns for the utility, but may pass on greater costs to the end user and confers 
bargaining power to the utility.  Ordinarily, the common equity share is 40-45%, and debt 55-
Business%Risks%with%TES%
• Customer load risk/occupancy risk (high): If occupant base is smaller or customers 
fail to connect to the system as projected following investment in capital assets.  This 
risk is vulnerable to cyclical real estate market fluctuations. 
• Development cost risk (high): New technologies with greater risks than benchmark 
• Operating cost risk (medium): smaller district energy system has greater risks than 
larger utilities that can absorb operating cost overruns 
• Regulatory risk (medium): evolving regulatory market 
• Rate design risk (low): similar to benchmark 
• Competition risk (low): If buildings in area are required to connect Condensed%summary%of%risk%ratings%reported%by%Dockside%Green,%UniverCity%in%Burnaby,%and%River%District%Energy%Limited%Partnership.%GCOC%Phase%2%p.132T144%
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60% (equity thickness).  Stream B TES have their common equity ratio set higher (45% equity 
55% debt) to reflect greater risk (BCUC 2014c).75   
6.3.3 Stream A performance ratio rate design  
The BCUC was careful to exclude the extension of any Stream A utilities from the GCOC Phase 
2 proceedings.  Stream A utilities are not subject to rate overview, and the BCUC will no longer 
determine their allowed return on equity, capital structures and cost of debt (BCUC%2014c).  The 
BCUC went so far as to try and prohibit the use of COS rate design for stream A utilities, 
however this was outside of their jurisdiction once they had exempted Stream A utilities from 
rate design oversight (BCUC%2013c). 
Under the TES scaled regulatory framework, Stream A utilities are not required to file a CPCN 
or undergo rate review, meaning only limited information on the rate design and investments of 
FortisBC is available.  Fortunately, prior to the publication of the TES regulatory framework 
FortisBC presented the SOLO, Artemesia, and Sovereign developments for BCUC review (FAES%2014a;%FAES%2014c;%BCUC%2014d).  Under the new framework all three would have qualified 
as Stream A so FortisBC intended these applications as templates.  Here I use the SOLO 
development to observe the rate design of a Stream A utility as offered by FortisBC. 
The SOLO development involved the purchase of a thermal plant for $4.4M plus an additional 
$0.2M in capital development costs (upgrades, repairs, or renovations).  The SOLO development 
contains residential and commercial tenants, and it is expected in the future more condominium 
                                                
75!Due!to!the!small!size!the!cost!of!debt!for!these!utilities!were!set!at!the!spread!between!a!(riskless)!10yr!Canadian!
bond!and!a!BBB!rating.!!This!is!a!deemed!cost!of!debt,!as!due!to!their!small!size!it!is!unlikely!a!utility!would!actually!
raise!bonds!on!the!open!market.!!!!
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towers will be built.  These will require additional TES systems that will be reviewed when they 
are built. The contract was written for 20 years anticipating further renewal every 20 years for 
the life of the development (BCUC%2014d).  
The project was found to be in the public interest, and the CPCN was granted.  The contract had 
to be adjusted to better inform customers about the rates, which were found to be just and 
reasonable (FAES%2014b).  
The contract begins with a negotiated initial rate FortisBC finds competitive (~10.5c/kWh), 
which then increases at 2% per year (BCUC%2014d).  However, this is the forecast rate is not 
binding.  The actual rate is called a performance ratio, but is calculated by dividing all relevant 
costs by the thermal energy delivered.       
The performance ratio duplicates the cost recovery principles of a cost of service rate.  The rate 
charged is the total energy delivered in kWh, divided by the sum of the natural gas, electricity, 
operation and maintenance expenses, property taxes, depreciation expenses, amortization 
expenses, income taxes and capital carrying costs.  The natural gas and electricity rates are 
drawn from an annual deferral account, that is adjusted higher or lower using a rate-rider pegged 
to the actual price of electricity and gas.   
Every four years the forecast rates are divided by the actual rates charged, and a high 
performance ratio would indicate the costs of FortisBC to be lower than anticipated, a low ratio 
the opposite.  FortisBC believes this provides an incentive for them to achieve efficiencies, and 
while it sets a benchmark target it is unclear whether there is any reduction in profitability for not 
reaching targets.  Rates continue to flow through to customers, who benefit when costs are lower 
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than anticipated, conversely the consumer pays more if costs rise.  The earned return of the 
utility is independent of these movements. 
Cost of service, or a long-term rate agreement for this performance ratio, limits the profitability 
of the utility provider to their benchmark rate. 76  However, these ceilings on profitability also act 
as floors, which is why the BCUC has been hesitant to allow their application.  There is little 
incentive for economic efficiency, and the end-user still pays the costs (high or low) plus the 
capital carrying cost inclusive of the earned return of the utility.  
6.3.4 Regulation by complaint 
Persons served by a TES subject to complaint-based regulation, or considering contracting for 
such a service, should be aware of the limited scope of regulatory oversight applicable to any 
dispute with their provider.  The BCUC was not interested in overseeing contracts written 
between sophisticated parties.   
Short of complete exemption from regulatory oversight, regulation by complaint is the lightest 
form of regulation.  There are no CPCN requirements to grant exclusive rights to operate and the 
rates charged are not subject BCUC review.  The BCUC does set minimum requirements with 
respect to the communication of the rates being charged and terms the long-term contract must 
contain, including: clearly describing fee schedules, disclose any front or back end fees, payment 
due upon contract termination and early exit, and how to file a complaint (BCUC%2014e). The 
                                                
76%Identical!to!a!COS!rate!design,!the!carrying!cost!of!the!capital!equipment!(inclusive!of!the!renovation!costs,!
thermal!plants!etc.)!changes!to!reflect!book!value!of!the!asset!and!the!benchmark!rate!assuming!a!45%!equity!55%!
debt!mix!plus!a!75bps!risk!premium.!!This!75bps!premium!(and!presumably!benchmark!rate)!are!identical!to!the!
earned!return!calculated!on!the!rate!base!of!under!cost!of!service!regulation!described!in!the!GCOC!Phase!2!
Proceeding!for!Stream!B!utilities.!!!%
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contract must also state that while this service qualifies as a utility, and must provide safe, 
reliable service; it has been granted certain exemptions including oversight for any rates charged.  
Prior to contacting the BCUC, plaintiffs are directed to attempt to resolve their disputes with the 
utility provider.  Failing this, any one or group of end users can trigger a complaint.  The BCUC 
can launch a full review, in which the plaintiffs and the utility would be directed to file their 
arguments with supporting evidence.  If the BCUC deems it necessary, the utility may be ordered 
to improve its services, adjust the rates, or have its exemption from regulation removed (among 
other items) (BCUC%2014e).   
The BCUC will not accept complaints on the rate design unless it can be shown the utility has 
violated the terms of the long-term contract.  The BCUC has made this position clear and 
requires it to be written into the long term contracting, stating that no oversight of the rates was 
conducted (BCUC%2014e).     
If the ratepayers agree to a rate design that later results in higher rates or greater risks than they 
had anticipated, the BCUC will not consider the propriety of the rates.  The BCUC will first act 
to enforce the terms of the contract between the two parties, meaning it is the contract that will 
be enforced, and only once the terms of the contract have been violated, the BCUC will consider 
intervening.  If the two parties agree to a rate design that later results in a higher cost of service 
than intended or an unequal partitioning of risk for the ratepayers, the ratepayers cannot ask the 
Commission to revise this.  The propriety of rate design is outside the scope of regulatory 
oversight by the Commission.   
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The BCUC cannot approve any rate not found to be just and reasonable, but the language of the 
UCA Act can lead to a flattering interpretation of the rate design among prospective ratepayers.  
The language of the UCA should not automatically be interpreted as a ringing endorsement, but 
as a necessary requirement for the application to be approved. Just and reasonable does not imply 
any consideration for the best rate, does not follow any optimization principle identifying the 
best rate, and never acts as a guarantee for lowest cost. 
Ratepayers should further temper their expectations for complaints taken before the BCUC 
concerning capital costs incurred.   The Commission acts to protect ratepayers entitled to safe 
and reliable service while also affording utilities a fair return on prudently made investments. 
Under cost of service regulation (simulated by the performance ratio), the utility is entitled to a 
regulated rate of return on its invested capital.  This can include all reasonable costs prudently 
incurred, such as thermal plants, feasibility studies, improvement or renovation upgrades, and the 
carrying cost of the asset.  
Whether the invested capital is just and reasonable is linked to the notion of prudently incurred 
costs.  A prudency test may simply require that the previous expenditure schedule or CPCN be 
approved by the Commission.  A utility may fail in the execution of delivering their services, but 
an approved CPCN can be cited as evidence that the initially invested capital was prudent.  In 
other words, the project might not operate correctly and the utility could be held before the 
Commission for poor execution, but their choice of capital inputs or technologies, and how they 
actually earn their rate of return is not.  FortisBC sought the same standards for their new TES 
businesses. 
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“A cornerstone of just and reasonable rates is the recovery of prudently incurred 
costs. A prior finding that expenditures are in the public interest (or public interest 
and necessity) generally means that the decision to undertake the expenditure was 
prudent, although the execution of the project is still subject to review for 
prudence. Provided the execution was prudent, the expenditure is a legitimate 
utility cost of service and is recoverable from customers. This would be true in the 
case of each of the New Initiatives (FortisBC%2011b).”  
In a sense, BCUC proceedings and decisions are similar to legal precedents.  Past decision can be 
cited as evidence for appropriate behavior guiding current and future decisions.  The utility may 
appeal to similar cases and decisions when arguing their activities to be in agreement with the 
normal activities of a utility subject to the UCA.  There is no such prudency test in a competitive 
market where a firm could seek a reasonable rate of return based on prudently incurred costs, 
citing prior decisions in support of their claim.  Whereas utilities charging regulated cost of 
service rates are entitled to earn and fair and reasonable return on the invested asset, so long as 
the investment is found reasonable and prudent (UCA 1996 Section 60(2)).77   
ESAC took issue during the AES Inquiry with TES services offering regulated services in an 
otherwise competitive market stating:  
“It appears that the only risk that the FEU [FortisBC] would undertake in owning and 
operating a thermal asset is the risk of prudency and all other risks would be absorbed by the 
thermal customer. This is irrespective of the initial tariff agreed to by the customer (or the 
initial capital and operating cost estimates it was based on) (FortisBC%2012a).” 
This is not entirely accurate portrayal of the risks facing a utility, which may fail to earn a return 
on its investment if occupants do not connect to the system as planned when the capital was 
invested, or if the utility fails to contain cost overruns (BCUC 2014c).  The issue of costs and 
technology decisions made upfront, however, are unlikely to be revisited once deemed prudent. 
                                                
77!A!utility!may!fail!to!earn!an!adequate!return!on!their!investment,!if!loads!fail!to!materialize!as!planned,!or!if!they!
are!unable!to!control!cost!overruns.!
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If upon complaint the Commission decides the initial contract signed for the discrete TES 
qualifies as a CPCN, then the contractually agreed costs are unlikely be revisited. 
6.3.5 Conclusions 
If regulation can be described as a long-term contract with periodic renegotiation, then this 
chapter has illustrated how a long-term contract can mirror regulation.  The performance ratio 
maintains the heavy-handed elements from cost of service rate designs in a lightly regulated 
market, maintaining the flow through of costs to ratepayers, substantially lowering the financial 
risk of utility investors.  The performance ratio makes the rate of return endogenous to the capital 
invested, creating both a ceiling and floor on the return on investment for the utility.  The 
performance ratio appears as though it can maintain the advantages of regulatory services in an 
unregulated market.    
The BCUC has maintained regulation upon complaint for Stream A utilities, but only accepting 
to intervene on a limited number of issues.  The BCUC will first enforce the terms agreed to in 
the initial contract.  Rate design and prices charged are off the table, unless it can be shown that 
utility has breached the terms of the long-term contract.  If the BCUC revisits the utility-
ratepayer arrangements, it will be within the confines of a COS regulatory framework.  Decisions 
concerning investments are settled upfront, and the Commission cannot act as a safety net for 
poor contracting.  
6.4 Policy recommendations 
It is early days in the discrete TES market, but I can recommend three policy items that can 
improve the decision-making of the parties involved. I recommend: a) additional information to 
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be provided to future ratepayers concerning the rates charged, b) education for ratepayers on the 
limits of regulation by complaint, and c) suggest altering the rate design in order to encourage 
higher economic efficiencies.      
The long-term contract for Stream A utilities has minimum informational requirements, such as 
the rate charged, and how it was calculated. The contract terms are likely negotiated prior to the 
arrival of ratepayers.  To protect future ratepayers I suggest the following augmentations to 
increase the usefulness and value of information contained in rate disclosure agreements. 
Supplement the $/kWh rate with projected monthly and annual cost estimates.  The same energy 
forecasts used to calculate the rate can be used for projected monthly and annual costs, based on 
predicted average use (non-binding estimate of course).  Thermal energy is invisible, and 
guidance as to what the new thermal energy service will cost is beneficial.    This makes the cost 
concrete in real estate disclosure agreements as separate from electricity and other utility bills, 
and makes it easy to compare with the tenants previous experience with energy bills.  Even in 
mild seasons when little energy is used, ratepayers will be required to pay for the carrying cost 
(inclusive of the utility’s rate of return), overhead, and maintenance cost.   
TES providers should include information on either the energy intensity of the building or the 
carbon content of the energy used.  The willingness to pay for TES has priority over previous 
sales techniques promising lower costs in the long run for technologies, such as GSHP.  If 
tenants are paying a premium for green, they should know what they are paying for, including 
how often back-up energy sources are relied upon.  This will provide transparency for the 
ratepayers and future tenants.   
 156 
The minimum contract requirements for Stream A utilities require ratepayers be informed that 
the BCUC has not reviewed the rate design, and are instructed on the proper procedures for filing 
a complaint.  Future ratepayers should also be instructed on the limits of recourse they can 
expect from the BCUC in the event they issue the complaint.   
The regulator will first enforce the terms of the contract.  They will not consider the propriety of 
the rates charged, unless the utility has breached the terms of the contract.  If the regulators could 
lower the price of utility services there would not be such disparity in energy prices across North 
America, as we observe due to different fuel and technology choices.  Even if the utility were to 
breach the terms of the contract and rates revisited, the regulator cannot control rate increases per 
se, simply the method through which rates are calculated based on commonly accepted utility 
practices.   
The terms of arbitration for complaints filed with the regulatory are generally not favorable to 
ratepayers unless the contract has been breached.  Regulatory hearings follow processes and 
standards of evidence with which the utility is well acquainted.    Ratepayers can challenge the 
utility’s execution of the project over time, but it is unlikely they can challenge prudency of the 
initial capital investment.  The earned return of the utility is dependent on the capital investment, 
and the prudency test is decided once the contract is written.   If upon complaint the BCUC treats 
the agreed to contract as a CPCN, the initial capital costs will likely be found reasonable and 
prudent. This places the onus on the initial parties signing the contract to consider the technology 
chosen, and how the utility earns its rate of return.   
The performance ratio closely resembles a regulated cost of service rate, where all costs flow 
through to the end-user.  The prices charged are endogenous, and the rate of the return for the 
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utility fixed.  Cost of service rate designs reduce the financial risk of the investor, affect capital 
and technology inputs, and may also encourage X-inefficiency (Joskow%et%al.%1989).  The 
BCUC sought to prohibit COS because of the risk transfer, and partly because there were so few 
incentives for economic efficiency.  However, by denying regulatory oversight of rates charged 
the BCUC cannot intervene as arbiter. 
Small amendments to the existing contract to incorporate revenue sharing can reward both end 
users and utilities.  For example, revenue sharing occurs when the utility is rewarded for meeting 
performance targets by reducing costs.  The utility is then allowed to split the financial savings 
with ratepayers.  The opposite is also true, and if the utility were unable beat the benchmark the 
utility would not redeem all of their earned return.  This amendment is found among regulated 
utilities but could easily be adapted for a discrete TES contract. 
There is always some form of regulation, even in ‘unregulated’ markets.  Regulation can be in 
the form of contract law, competition policy, energy efficiency standards, property law, 
environmental regulation, and even income tax.  The competitive environment will ultimately 
determine the shape of discrete TES, either through the education of end users learning to 
demand better terms or by new market entrants offering more attractive energy services.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
In Canada, and in other industrialized nations, space heating and hot water dominate secondary 
energy use among buildings.  The combustion of fossil fuels to provide these services makes 
them the largest sources of carbon emissions from the built environment (NRCAN 2011a).  
Public policy designed to promote the adoption of renewable and energy efficient technology is a 
growing priority.  
GSHP provides a technological solution for realizing energy and carbon savings by using less 
than one-third of the energy used by traditional space heating technologies (DOE 2012).  Further, 
GSHP offers both climate change mitigation and adaptation capabilities by reducing carbon 
emissions, and maintaining resiliency against heat waves through active air conditioning.   
GSHP is technologically mature, and has been commercially available for decades, yet serves 
only a small fraction of the market for space conditioning in North America.  It is even less 
common among larger buildings, such as hotels, condominiums, and building clusters, where 
economies of scale ought to make it more compelling for end users.   
In exploring the barriers and bridges to adopting GSHP, I asked two key questions:   
1. GSHP has been adopted in the residential sector, but can we be more specific about by 
whom and under what conditions?  What has been the impact of the enabling policies? 
2. There is a dearth of GSHP at higher scales, despite economies of scale; could there be 
other barriers and enablers at higher scales? 
To answer these questions I compiled and analyzed disparate sources of data at multiple scales.  
Chapter 2 demonstrated quantitatively the financial benefits of pursuing GSHP at higher scales.    
 159 
Chapters 3 and 4 answer the first question, using econometric techniques to explore detailed site 
and panel data at the residential scale.  Chapters 5 and 6 answer the second question with 
evidence submitted during regulatory proceedings to analyze the offering of Thermal Energy 
Services (TES); one method for financing GSHP among institutional, commercial, and 
community clients.  The appendix contains technical specifics for GSHP, and an engineering-
economic model for demonstrating the economics of large, interdependent, GSHP systems.  
In Chapter 3, the CGC database was used to analyze the adoption of residential GSHP in Canada. 
The dataset overlapped with various incentives, permitting an examination of the effect of 
incentives on the adoption of GSHP.  This database is the largest and most detailed repository of 
GSHP installations in North America, providing descriptions of the homes adopting GSHP.  
Comparing the CGC dataset to the general population of detached housing in Canada reveals that 
homeowners adopting GSHP did so most often when switching away from costly, inconvenient 
fuel types. Homeowners rarely switched from centralized heating units, such as furnaces, when 
they had access to natural gas or electricity.  Of homeowners adopting GSHP who had 
previously heated their homes with electricity, most were free riders replacing heat pumps.  
Homeowners who had relied on electrical plinth space heating (the second most common heating 
system using electricity) switched to GSHP to also benefit from air conditioning.  
Most studies on GSHP lack access to reliable information on prices.  The CGC dataset reveals 
the capital cost of GSHP systems installed in Canada is significantly higher than similar systems 
in the US.  Given Canadian-specific system costs, the lifecycle cost savings argument for GSHP 
in Canada can be firmly rejected in most circumstance.  The low adoption rate is not a 
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consequence of inadequate information, but a consequence of high capital costs and much lower 
cost and technically proven conventional alternatives.  
The CGC dataset reflects systems installed during a period of generous provincial and federal 
incentives, up to $10,000 in certain regions.  Considerations for the potential of GSHP should be 
tempered by the inability of incentives to create lasting momentum during or after the period of 
subsidy, with the rate of adoption peaking two years before the subsidy expired.  Further, GSHP 
is unable to make inroads into the most common fuel types for heating in Canada, except where 
auxiliary benefits, such as air conditioning, are provided.  Hence, one can demonstrate the 
benefits of incentives for GSHP go to those with the means and desire for premium space 
conditioning services.    
Chapter 4 provided the opportunity to examine whether GSHP responded differently to financial 
stimulus when compared to other renewable technologies: Solar Photovoltaic (PV), Solar 
Thermal (ST).  Panel data from US tax returns facilitated a unique opportunity to study 
residential responses to changing incentives.  The Investment Tax Credit for renewable energy 
leveraged private investment to stimulate spending and assist with the development of industry.  
However, findings from the CGC dataset suggest that it was vulnerable to free ridership by 
homeowners and rent extraction where suppliers have captive markets.  
Where homeowners had a competitive market supplied using standard modular systems, the 
subsidy led to larger system installations where the excess energy could be sold.  Where the 
system had to be sized to the needs of the homeowner, the subsidy level did not impact the size 
or cost of the system installed.  Where suppliers had to customize their product to the needs of 
the customer, higher tax credits led to much higher system costs – hence supplier rent collection.  
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The economic benefits of the ITC depend on the objectives considered, and one objective of the 
credit was to increase household investments and spur on the economic recovery.  Unlike energy 
conservation investments, renewable energy requires substantial capital investment and is a 
benefit to those with high incomes.  As such, the beneficiaries of the ITC align well with the 
objectives of the ITC to stimulate spending.  
Economy-wide benefits are dependent on the bundle of services used to produce and install the 
technology.  Using the EIO-LCA model from Carnegie Mellon, I calculated the economy-wide 
benefits assuming products were sourced locally and compared these benefits to a setting where 
key technology components are imported.  The benefits are much higher if goods are 
manufactured within the US, so procurement decisions should be considered when allocating 
government expenditures for renewable energy.   
By comparing the subsidy programs in the US and Canada, we can design more targeted 
incentives.  In the US, when the ITC ceiling was removed more expensive systems were 
installed.  In Canada, the incentive was capped and systems installed during the period of 
subsidy were smaller on average, when comparing area, design heat load, and cost.  Capped 
incentives appear to lead to marginal installations for GSHP.    
In comparison to the renewable ITC in the US, the financial incentives likely had lower 
economic multipliers.  Canadians rarely manufacture the renewable technologies being promoted 
via investment credits. Thus, capital subsidies and similar supportive policies only deliver 
marginal economic stimulus when applied. 
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Both datasets showed declining numbers prior to incentive terminus, and the Canadian sample 
provides clues as to why.  One hypothesis explaining the limited appetite for GSHP is the limited 
number of households with characteristics to make GSHP compelling.  The CGC dataset showed 
they tended to be homes converting away from costly fuel types, or towards central heating with 
air conditioning.  A significant fraction were also replacing heat pumps.  The incentive leads to 
homeowners who would likely have made the conversion at some point in the future to do so 
now.  Once this pool of adopters has diminished, GSHP is unable to attract homeowners away 
from the conventional technologies dominant in the market.  
The analysis of the IRS dataset also provided an explanation for why the capital cost of GSHP is 
higher in Canada. The custom-built nature of GSHP makes comparison of pricing difficult and 
subject to site conditions.  This makes the pricing for GSHP somewhat discretionary, with 
installers able to charge higher prices depending on what the market will bear.  The site-specific 
and customized aspects of GSHP also make it resistant to downward price movements over time, 
compared to modular technologies, such as PV, where installers can become more efficient and 
manufacturing learning curves can drive down costs.  
 Awareness is often cited as one of the most challenging barriers to the adoption of GSHP.  The 
available data did not support any direct analysis of the role of awareness.  However, the 
incentive programs did raise awareness about the technology.  One would expect that this 
increased awareness would also lead to more investment in GSHP where there was no incentive 
being offered.  In the US and Canada, no such spillover leading to an increase in GSHP adoption 
was observed.  This provides some evidence that awareness is not a key barrier to the adoption of 
GSHP. 
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In Chapters 5-6, I moved beyond detached housing to examine GSHP installations at higher 
scales.  The common element was the provision of Thermal Energy Service (TES) by FortisBC 
in financing, owning, and operating GSHP in conjunction with other technologies.  TES provides 
green, thermal energy to one or more buildings in exchange for utility payments.  The market 
interest in TES has been significant, and in 2011 FortisBC reported over 20 projects in progress 
with a total estimated value of $250M.       
At higher scales, there are two primary methods for a third party to finance GSHP: Energy 
Performance Contracting (EPC), and TES.  Financing GSHP as part of an EPC is rare in Canada, 
and based on industry interviews, unknown to the author in Western Canada.  The mild climate 
and low energy prices makes earning a sufficient Return-on-Investment (ROI) with GSHP within 
the duration of a standard EPC contract difficult.  In the US, EPC contracts for GSHP are 
exclusive to regions for very cold and hot climates or where energy prices are high  
TES emerged as a means to bridge barriers to the adoption of GSHP at higher scales.  The TES 
method of financing offers several advantages over incumbent EPC providers.  The equipment is 
financed off-balance sheet, avoiding balance sheet restrictions often imposed on public sector 
organizations (PSO).  For developers, financing the thermal plant and inner mechanics reduces 
capital costs, making it easier for developers to reach their ROI targets when units are sold.   
When transitioning from selling systems to energy services, the emphasis on GSHP as an energy 
savings investment dissipates.   At higher scales, TES is sold on its merits as a premium, green 
technology, offering superior comfort space conditioning services to affluent households.  No 
promises are made that it will ever be less costly than conventional heating system types. 
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TES is a compelling prospect for institutions and developers alike, but there are pitfalls to this 
method of contracting.  Namely, severe fiscal constraint can lead to institutions accepting 
contracts that are generous in the near term, but more costly in the long-term.  While developers 
can be easily persuaded to offer green services if doing so lowers their own costs, future tenants 
are being saddled with undesirable contracts.  I addressed these and other key issues by 
reviewing the regulatory proceedings and contracts filed with the British Columbia Utilities 
Commission (BCUC). 
The Delta School Board (DSB) was the first TES contract written for a PSO in North America, 
and is regulated by the BCUC as a public utility.  My first objective in examining the DSB 
project was to provide a template for evaluating this novel method of project finance.  The DSB 
effectively contracted out their heating plants to a third party, and the procurement process had 
much in common with privatization experiments with public infrastructures.  Lessons learned 
from privatization and public-private partnerships for service delivery provide valuable insights 
for how to advise PSOs considering TES, including the importance: of maintaining a public 
sector comparator, PSOs agreeing on carbon accounting standards, sharing risks throughout the 
contracts lifecycle, and specifying outputs when contracting. 
I found three non-economic factors to have played a dominant role in the adoption of a TES 
contract: carbon savings, the accounting treatment of capital costs, and a preference for 
regulatory oversight.  The additional cost to the public sector was a 13% premium ($1.5M) for 
third party financing via a TES contract even though the project received ~$3M in provincial and 
federal contributions (slightly less than half of its capital cost). 
 165 
In Chapter 6, I reviewed the BCUC scaled regulatory framework, which encompassed TES 
systems serving larger, interconnected loads.  In general, as the system grows in size and 
complexity, so does Commission oversight, although exceptions increase regulatory 
requirements, such as system interdependency. 78  The framework was scaled to limit the 
regulatory burden on small utilities.  The BCUC maintained light-handed regulation to be in the 
best interests of certain segments of the TES market.   
For Stream A TES, the BCUC set contractual stipulations to protect future ratepayers, including 
notifying ratepayers the contract had not been subject to BCUC rate review.  In addition to the 
required terms set by the BCUC, I recommended further additions to increase the value of 
information contained in rate disclosure agreements for Stream A TES including: replace kWh 
rates with monthly or annual estimates, include the information on the carbon intensity of 
service, and reiterate how the regulator is not a suitable replacement for due diligence when 
contracting.  
In exploring the barriers and bridges to adopting GSHP the objective of this thesis was to answer 
two questions:   
1. GSHP has been adopted in the residential sector, but can we be more specific about by 
whom and under what conditions?  What has been the impact of the enabling policies? 
                                                
78!The!capital!cost!hurdle!for!regulation!was!somewhat!arbitrary,!and!subject!to!future!revision.!!Any!system!
costing!greater!than!$14M!is!regulated!(Stream!B),!and!subject!to!full!BCUC!oversight,!whereas!anything!below!is!
only!regulated!upon!complaint!(Stream!A).!!The!two!primary!exemptions!are!the!micro!and!strata!exemptions,!
which!are!not!eligible!for!any!BCUC!oversight,!even!upon!complaint.!!The!micro!and!strata!exemptions!exclude!
from!regulatory!oversight!systems!with!a!capital!cost!below!$500k,!or!any!system!owned!by!a!building’s!strata,!
respectively.!
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2. There is a dearth of GSHP at higher scales, despite economies of scale; could there be 
other barriers and enablers at higher scales? 
In conclusion, GSHP is a stranded technology.  Even when generous incentives are available, it 
is unable to gain momentum against natural gas and conventional heating systems.  In both 
Canada and the US, the incentives failed to maintain adoption rates throughout the incentive 
period, let alone afterwards.  Once the pool of households most likely to benefit from (or already 
considering) adopting GSHP dried up installations plummeted.  While the design of incentives 
can be improved, expectations for the long-run potential of GSHP for realizing sizeable gains 
within the residential heating market in North America should be tempered.  
TES arose as a means to finance GSHP at higher-scales, opening the door for economies of 
scale, scope, and network benefits.  TES was able to bridge capital cost barriers between PSO’s 
and developers by lowering first costs, although closer analysis reveals the lifecycle cost of 
GSHP makes it a premium service and TES is a high cost option unsuited for a financially 
constrained public sector.   
Challenges to cooperation were addressed through the BCUC’s scaled regulatory framework 
increasing oversight with project scale and interdependency.  The reliance on heavy-handed 
regulation, even among negotiated contracts, remains the norm despite the BCUC’s hesitation in 
its application.  Whether the low risk-reward characteristics of the COS rate design is essential to 
the offering of TES is as of yet uncertain, considering the novelty of TES and the limited number 
of service providers.  I endeavored to offer insight on how to compare TES contracts to other 
methods of public procurement, and to increase transparency of the emerging TES service.   
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Research at both residential and higher scales is ongoing.  At the residential scale, further study 
is required with respect to the response of installers to incentives and the importance of 
household characteristics when adopting GSHP.   
The CGC dataset indicates which companies were responsible for each installation.  There are at 
least two hypotheses to test.  Firstly, does competition lead to lower prices among installers?  If 
prices charged in areas with more companies are lower than in areas with multiple providers, it 
could be that competition is transforming the industry, but unevenly.  A second approach is to 
test the prices charged by incumbents compared to newer entrants.  Do new entrants arrive to 
benefit from higher prices until incumbents price them out?  
Furthermore, factors such as age, income and education are related to the adoption of renewable 
energy.  Information of household characteristics from the Canadian Census can be compared to 
the fraction of households adopting GSHP from the CGC dataset.  Ordering and ranking of these 
factors through statistical analysis can indicate whether income, real estate prices, fuel type or 
the share of air conditioning are most important when marketing GSHP. 
The market for TES is rapidly evolving, providing compelling service innovations to the energy 
services market.  The utility’s meter is typically the stopping point for utilities, but TES crosses 
this barrier to finance equipment inside the building, lowering first costs of developers and 
ensuring compatibility the thermal plant and the building’s distribution system.  The stopping 
point for TES in providing heating and cooling is somewhat arbitrary considering these energy 
services already occupy the lion’s share of energy use among residential buildings. 
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TES can be adapted to include lighting and appliance loads for net zero or energy positive 
buildings by combining the lowest cost portfolio of energy efficiency, renewable energy, 
electricity, energy storage (battery and thermal), with procurement contracts for renewable 
energy or carbon offsets.  The combination of technologies and services to achieve carbon 
neutrality can offer lower prices than any one approach.  Such an energy service replaces ‘either 
or’ strategies for lowering emissions with a bundle of technologies and energy services tailored 
to local circumstances and resources. 
TES is a compelling means for bridging capital cost barriers faced by renewable and energy 
efficient technologies among developers and municipalities.  However, this thesis has shown 
how fiscal constraints can lead actors accepting unfavorable contract terms.  The long-term 
potential of TES may be dependent on its continued development.  Providing information to 
actors considering TES and exploration into alternative market or pooled rate designs will help 
advance TES and the means for providing energy services.  
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Appendices 
Three appendices accompany the main thesis text.  Appendix A is a technical overview of 
Ground Source Heat Pumps (GSHP).  Appendix B describes an engineering-economic model 
used to calculate the lifecycle cost of GSHP.  It also contains a sensitivity analysis of costs, with 
a profitability analysis for a utility.  Appendix C is a chronological overview of the orders and 
decisions relevant to the Thermal Energy Services Inquiry.   
Appendix A  Review of GSHP components and operation 
The earth provides a stable source of geothermal energy year-round, being warmer than the 
ambient air during winter months and cooler in the summer (Yang et al. 2010). The amplitude of 
soil temperature variation decreases with the depth, holding nearly constant year round below 
8m.  Near surface low-grade geothermal energy is abundant, renewable, and readily available 
throughout North America (RETScreen 2005).   
In heating mode, GSHP systems extract energy from the ground or a body of water and transfer 
it to a heat sink, normally a home. Transferring thermal energy is much more efficient than 
creating it, enabling GSHP’s to produce three or more units of heating energy for every unit 
consumed (Mustafa Omer 2008).   The GSHP system requires three main components to operate: 
a ground loop, a heat pump, and a distribution system within the building.  
The performance of the GSHP system will diminish if any of the three components are 
improperly installed or if site characteristics are outside of normal design parameters.  The 
complexity of GSHP, and concerns over the reliability of system performance, has led to a 
checkered reputation for the industry (CGC 2013).   The Canadian GeoExchange Coalition has 
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made great strides with respect to this issue by developing a rigorous network of training, 
standards, and accreditation.  The following sections detail GSHP system operation.   
A.1 Heat pump 
Heat pumps are a mature technology, available for residential and commercial heating 
applications for decades (Chua et al. 2010).  Shallow geothermal energy is low-grade heat 
(~10°C in most urban areas of Canada), and must be raised to the heating system temperature.  
When in heating mode, the heat pump uses electricity to power a vapour compression cycle to 
upgrade the heat. In cooling mode, heat from inside the building is ejected into the ground 
(Rawlings & Sykulski 1999).   
A simple heat pump operates with an evaporator, condenser, compressor and expansion valve.  
The evaporator and condenser are essentially heat exchangers; one connected to the homes heat 
distribution system and the other to the ground loop.  A simplified vapour compression cycle in 
heating mode is described below.  See Chua (2010) for a technical description of heat pump 
operation, including multi-stage cycles. 
• Thermal energy from the ground warms a water glycol mixture circulated in the ground 
loop.   The warmed liquid comes into contact with the heat pump’s first heat exchanger, 
known as the evaporator. The fluid in the evaporator is colder than the ground, so heat 
flows into the evaporator causing the liquid to evaporate. 
• The low temperature gas in the evaporator passes through the compressor. The 
compressor uses electricity to increase the pressure, further increasing its temperature. 
• The high temperature, pressurized vapor then enters a second heat exchanger inside the 
home, known as the condenser. At this point the vapour is hotter than the home’s interior, 
so thermal energy flows into the home’s distribution system. This causes the temperature 
of the refrigerant to drop and for the gas to condense back into a liquid. 
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• The now liquid refrigerant passes through an expansion valve, returning to the 
evaporator. As the pressure is released, the temperature continues to drop. The cycle 
begins again as it comes in contact with the ground loop warmed by the earth.  
The heat pump repeats this cycle to provide continuous heating and/or hot water.  The cycle 
operates in reverse for cooling, with the two heat exchangers swapping their roles as condenser 
and evaporator.  In cooling mode, the home’s hot water tank can also be used as a heat sink.  A 
desuperheater, an auxiliary heat exchanger connecting the compressor and hot water tank, sheds 
thermal energy into the hot water tank (Self et al. 2012).  
The Coefficient of Performance (COP) describes the energy efficiency of GSHP.  The COP is 
the thermal output of the heat pump divided by the energy used in the system (RETScreen 2005).  
If a heat pump provides three units of heat for every unit of electricity consumed it has a COP of 
3 (or is 300% efficient).  The COP for GSHP normally ranges from 3-5 for heating, depending 
on site characteristics (CGC 2009).  
The difference in temperature between the source of energy and the system temperature drives 
system performance (CGC 2009; Sanner et al. 2004).  Staffell et al. (2012, p.9299) estimate a 
10°C temperature difference between the source and sink in the system the will reduce 
performance by 0.6 -1 COP.  This explains the higher efficiencies of GSHP in colder climates 
compared to ASHP, given the greater variation in ambient air temperatures.  
A.2 Distribution system 
The distribution system transfers thermal energy within the building, either through water-to-air 
or water-to-water systems (Self et al. 2012).  In Canada, the most common distribution system 
for GSHP is water to air (CGC 2012b).   
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With a forced air system, an air coil is heated (cooled) by the condenser (evaporator) of the heat 
pump.  The warm (cold) air is then circulated using ducts or vents throughout the home.   The 
advantage of combining GSHP with forced air is the ability to provide year round heating and air 
conditioning through a centralized unit (Self et al. 2012).   
With water to water, or hydronic distribution systems, water is heated by the pump and passed 
through the building in piping where it connects to radiant heaters or distributed air coils (Self et 
al. 2012).  Radiant heaters can be wall mounted, such as radiators, or they can be hidden beneath 
the floor.  In-floor hydronic heating is a premium system, with a lower water temperature 
providing invisible and comfortable space heating, but does not offer cooling.   
As indicated earlier, the efficiency of heat pumps is highest when the thermal lift is minimized.  
Heat pumps are better suited to heating systems operating at low temperatures, relying instead on 
circulating greater volumes of air or passively radiating heat upwards through the floor (Staffell 
et al. 2012).    
Among new buildings, the capital cost of distribution systems can range from 1-6% of total 
building construction, and 15-25% of GSHP system costs (CGC 2009).  Table A.1 shows some 
of the capital cost components for different distribution systems.  Electric baseboard heating is 
much less expensive than forced air or in-floor hydronic heating.  However, the capital cost of 
GSHP inside the building may be less than a traditional system if the cost of cooling towers may 
be avoided.  
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Electric baseboard Wall-mounted hydronic heat In-floor hydronic heat 
Electric baseboard  Wall-mounted radiators In-floor piping 
Programmable thermostat Programmable thermostat Programmable thermostat 
  Project installation is more time 
consuming and increases cost of 
labor 
Project installation is more time 
consuming and increases cost of 
labor 
  Project involves more material 
costs 
Project involves more material 
costs 
  The longer, more expensive project 
will incur higher cost of capital 
The longer, more expensive project 
will incur higher cost of capital 
    Increase floor topping depth 
Table A.1 In-building capital cost components based on distribution system 
In renovation projects, compatibility of GSHP with the previous heating system will affect 
system performance and cost.  Table A.2 lists heating system types, whether renovating for 
GSHP would be an invasive procedure, and if the technology change would result in air 
conditioning.  Heat pumps can connect directly to central heating systems that use forced-air 
ventilation or in-floor hydronic heating with minimal adjustment. Renovating a home with 
electric baseboards would require installing vents or laying pipes beneath the floor to connect to 
the heat pump, substantially increasing costs.  Boilers are also a form of central heating system, 
but usually connect to radiators, which operate at a much higher system temperature than GSHP.  
This would also require additional work within the home, and the same is true for wood stoves 
and electric radiant heating.  
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Heating System Air conditioning Invasive Renovation 
Forced air Yes No 
Hydronic w/ distributed air coil Yes No 
In-floor hydronic No No 
Wall-mounted radiator No No 
Electric plinth (convection) No Yes 
Electric baseboard No Yes 
Table A.2 Renovation requirements based on system type 
A.3 Ground loop 
The ground loop (earth heat exchanger, ground coupled heat exchanger) is the point of exchange 
between the thermal energy source and the building. The thermal energy source can be the earth, 
a pond, underground aquifer or even heat ejected from the mechanical load.  The choice depends 
on the availability of water, space constraints, and soil conditions.  Some common types of loops 
are shown are described below. 
• Vertical ground loops are installed using drilling, and can be installed compactly in a small 
area or even beneath buildings.  Vertical GCHE are placed in vertical boreholes at depths 
of 80-150 meters deep (Staffell et al. 2012).  Vertical GCHE are the most expensive 
system to install, but require less piping and may perform better for thermodynamic 
reasons, given the constant temperature of the earth at greater depths.   
• Horizontal ground loops are installed through excavation, and laid in trenches 4-6m deep 
over a wider area.  Excavation is less costly than drilling, but requires access to a large 
area and amenable surface conditions.  Landscaping, nearby buildings or roads can all 
frustrate horizontal ground loops.  Diagonal loops are a special case of horizontal loops, 
installed through horizontal drilling without disrupting surface features.   
• Closed water or pond loops are sunk or floated into a water source for a water-to-water 
connection.  The pond loop is closed meaning there is no contact between the refrigerant 
and the water source.  This requires no drilling or excavation, making it less costly than 
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vertical or horizontal loops.  Ponds are cooler than the ground in winter, making these 
systems less efficient. 
• Open loops do not use piping to extract geothermal energy, but extract groundwater from a 
well nearby the building.  The water is circulated past the heat pump before being 
discharged into a second well.  This type of well is the simplest, and least costly to install, 
making it a popular early approach.  However, rising concerns about adverse 
environmental impacts are leading to increasingly restrictive regulations governing their 
use (CGC 2009).   
Among closed loops, the ground loop consists of durable high-density polyethylene piping, 
which can have a lifespan greater than 50 years.   It has traditionally contained a water-glycol 
mixture to prevent freezing, although environmentally benign fluids are now available (Rawlings 
& Sykulski 1999).  The flow inside the pipe is maintained using a fluid pump, which also uses 
electricity to operate.  Improperly functioning fluid pumps are considered parasitic loads and can 
reduce overall efficiencies (CANMET Energy 2002).  In well-designed systems, flow rates 
through the geo-exchange field are automatically adjusted to meet the demand on the system. 
Soil conditions affect the ability of the ground loop to extract and eject thermal energy, and poor 
conditions will require a large loop to extract the same amount of energy.  Tightly packed 
conductive soil types, such as clay and rock, are superior to closely packed dry soils, such as 
sand (Staffell et al. 2012).   Water significantly improves soil conductivity, and can improve 
conductivity from 0.25 WmK to 2.5 WmK.  Laying backfill or grouting around the pipe can 
improve soil contact to increase system performance (Rawlings & Sykulski 1999). 
The ground loop is an additional feature that no other HVAC systems need factor in during 
installation.  Boulders, expensive landscaping, availability of water features or drilling conditions 
determine what type of loop can be installed, or even prevent installation (CGC 2009).  Drilling 
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conditions vary widely, and one study of the lower mainland in British Columbia estimated cost 
of installing a ground loop to span a range from $600-$2500/kW(CRM 2005).   
The ground loop is a kind of battery for the heat pump, and a larger heating load requires a larger 
ground loop.  For example, a 150sq-m home in Vancouver might only require 4kW of peak 
heating due to the temperate climate.  A similar home located in Toronto might require a ground 
loop sized to meet 6kW to compensate for the hotter and colder temperatures.      
Unused capacity is costly, which is why GSHP systems are often designed to meet less than 
100% of total demand.  The heat pump’s auxiliary electric unit is inexpensive to spec at full-
demand capacity and is the emergency backup should the heat pump fail (Staffell et al. 2012; 
CGC 2012b).  For an example of a system sized with an auxiliary unit to meet peak demand see 
appendix B. 
A.4 Conclusion 
This appendix provides a technical description of GSHP to use as a reference for the remainder 
of the thesis.  After reviewing the main components of GSHP technology, I identified two 
technical issues that place GSHP at a disadvantage compared to natural gas or electric baseboard 
systems.  Firstly, it is more complex than traditional heating units and, if systems are improperly 
installed performance will suffer.  Secondly, compatibility constraints inside the building 
(previous heating system among renovations) and outside of the building (soil conditions) can 
increase costs or inhibit the adoption of GSHP.        
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Appendix B  Engineering-economic model 
The engineering-economic model described here is built using inputs from RETScreen® 
International, engineering-economic studies within the Greater Vancouver Area, and interviews 
with industry stakeholders.  It is designed to model the effects of network economies on the 
lifecycle costs of GSHP, offering high-level insight accurate within a magnitude of order.  For 
more precise estimates tailored to local circumstances there are more accurate design tools and 
software tailored to GSHP (see CANMET Energy 2002; CANMET Energy Technology Centre - 
Varennes 2005). 
This model consists of a building description, a technology comparison, and a cost estimate.  
First, I create a building archetype in the Vancouver area to calculate the power and energy 
demand requirements for heating, cooling, and hot water.  The load factor is estimated using a 
demand duration curve.  I then use this information to design a rudimentary GSHP system with 
projected operating and capital costs 
B.1 Building archetype 
The purpose of the building archetype is to calculate peak power requirements and energy 
demand.79   Peak power is measured in Watts, and is the maximum amount of work that must be 
performed to provide space conditioning and hot water.  Energy demand is the duration over 
which the power must be applied, and is measured in kilowatt-hours (kWh). 
                                                
79!This!is!a!coarse!description!treating!the!entire!building!as!a!block!load.!!For!more!precise!estimates,!binamethod!
or!hourabyahour!methods!are!recommended.!
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Peak power requirements are calculated by multiplying the building area (m2) by the peak 
heating or cooling requirements, measured in W/m2 (CANMET Energy 2002).80    The peak 
power requirements for heating increase (decrease) linearly with size as the design temperature 
drops (increases). The design temperature is the maximum or minimum temperature reached 
once every twenty years, or 1% of the time (CANMET Energy 2002).   For a residential 
building, the peak power requirement for heating may range between 30-120W/m2, and 50-
200W/m2 for cooling (Arkay & Blais 1996).   
The demand for heating and cooling is estimated using monthly heating and cooling degree-days 
(HDD, CDD), or the number of hours when the temperature drops below or above 18°C.  
Ranking degree-days in descending hours creates a load duration curve.  It calculates the actual 
number of hours heating is required out of the year.  As shown in Figure B.1 Demand duration 
curve for Vancouver, there are 8,760hrs in a year but Vancouver only requires 2,216hrs of 
heating. 
                                                
80!This!W/m
2
!figure!treats!the!entire!building!as!a!single!zone!or!block!load,!and!does!not!consider!differences!
between!North!and!South!facing!sides!or!differences!in!building!use. 
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Figure B.1 Demand duration curve for Vancouver 
Multiplying the number of peak hours (2,216) by the peak power requirements for heating 
(37,500) calculates the annual heating demand.  Air conditioning loads are calculated in much 
the same way by multiplying the insulation factor (40W/m2) by the number of full load hours for 
cooling (1,016).   
The peak power requirements for hot water are dependent on the difference between the system 
temperature and the initial temperature (from the ground) and occupant behavior (number of 
occupants, hot water for clothes washing).  For simplicity hot water demand is assumed to be 
30% of demand and added onto the demand duration curves.  This fraction is largely consistent 
year round, but will decline slightly in months when heating demand drops (CANMET Energy 
2005). Table B.3 shows the peak power and demand requirements for a 500m2 building in the 
Vancouver area. 
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  Heating Air Conditioning 
Peak power (W) 37,5 20 
Full load (hours) 2,216 1,016 
Demand (kWh) 83,1 20,32 
Table B.3 Energy demand for 500m2  building in Vancouver area 
B.2 Technology description 
The buildings energy demand and peak power requirements from the last section remain 
constant, but the amount of energy supplied will vary based on the efficiency of the technology.  
The technology is described by its fuel type and energy efficiency.   
Here I assume a GSHP system sized to meet 70% of peak power requirements is sufficient to 
meet 90% of demand (Rawlings & Sykulski 1999; Canadian GeoExchange Coalition 2012b).   
The last 10% of demand is met with a 100% efficient electric auxiliary unit, and the other 90% is 
met with a 400% efficient GSHP system.  I assume this efficiency is constant in heating and 
cooling mode.     
The alternative to GSHP presented here is a combination of electric air conditioning and natural 
gas heating.  The rooftop cooling units are electric, and assumed to be 200% efficient, whereas 
the electric heating and gas alternatives are assumed to be 100% and 80% efficient, respectively. 
The GHG emissions or Carbon Dioxide Equivalents (CO2e) are calculated using an emission 
factor for each fuel type.  These are generally similar for common fossil fuels and vary 
dramatically by region for electricity.  To calculate the carbon emissions associated with the 
energy used an emission factor 50Kg CO2e/GJ for natural gas and 85 tCO2e/GWh for electricity 
consumed in British Columbia (Dowlatabadi et al. 2011). 
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Table B.4 contains the energy requirements and GHG emissions based on four different 
technology combinations: all electric, natural gas with electric air conditioning, electric space 
conditioning with natural gas heating for hot water, and GSHP with electric backup. 
Units in KWh unless specified Electric cooling & gas heating GSHP with electric auxiliary 
Heating 83,1 18,698 
Auxiliary unit   8,31 
Cooling 10,16 5,08 
Energy Input 93,26 32,088 
Tons CO2e** 16 3 
**50kgCO2e/GJ of gas and .085tCO2e/MWh of electricity 
Table B.4 Energy inputs for each technology to produce 100kWh of thermal energy 
B.3 Cost estimate 
The outputs from the building and technology characteristics are used to create a cost estimate.  
Capital costs for GSHP are based on the peak power requirements of the building, and operating 
costs are dependent on the energy efficiency of the technology used.   
Capital costs include costs both inside and outside of the building.  The out-of building cost is 
the ground loop heat exchanger, and applies only to GSHP.   The ground loop is usually between 
one to two-thirds of total capital costs for GSHP (Kantrowitz & Tanguay 2011; CGC 2012b).  
The capital cost of the ground loop is dependent on drilling conditions and the size of the heat 
load.   In these illustrations, the cost for drilling vertical boreholes is assumed to be $1,500/kW 
under normal drilling conditions and soil conductivity, taken from a survey of the Vancouver 
area (CRM 2005). 
To reduce capital costs the ground loop is not sized to cover 100% of demand.   The ground loop 
is sized using the demand duration curve and here I assume a 26kW is sufficient to meet 70% of 
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peak power, or 90% of total heating and hot water demand.81   The cost of installing a ground 
loop exchanger size for 26kW at $1,500/kW is $52,000. 
In-building costs includes the technology for distributing the heat, cooling towers, pumps and 
furnaces, and will amount to $50,000, or approximately half the total capital cost of the GSHP 
system.   Here I assume in-building costs are identical among technology choices.  The capital 
equipment is financed over a 10-year period, with an initial rate of 5%.  This amounts to ten 
annual payments of $13,109 for GSHP and 6.475$ for the reference system.   
Multiplying the energy requirements by the price of energy calculates the annual operating cost.  
Energy demand held constant throughout the projects lifespan however, the price will escalate 
2% per year.  The price of electricity is $0.08/KWh for electricity, and $5/GJ for natural gas.  
The other ongoing charges are for operations and maintenance, calculated to be ~2.5% of capital 
costs (also escalating 2% per year).  Table B.5 Energy payments over 10 years shows the net present 
value of payments made over 10 years for a 500m2 building located in the greater Vancouver 
area. 
                                                
81 This building is heating dominant and so this capacity is also sufficient to cover all of the summer cooling loads. 
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  GSHP Gas & AC 
CAPEX PMT 109,723 53,786 
Electricity 23,362 7,397 
Natural gas 0 17,016 
O&M 23,207 11,376 
NPV 156,292 89,575 
      
Total Energy 798,582 798,582 
$/KWh 0.196 0.1122 
 t/CO2e 30 21 
Table B.5 Energy payments over 10 years 
B.4 Sensitivity analysis 
A sensitivity analysis is used to determine which parameters have the greatest effect on levelized 
costs.  The inputs for the analysis are generated using an engineering-economic model in the 
appendix, which consists of a building archetype to calculate demand, a technology description 
to compare energy requirements, and a cost estimate consisting of capital and operating costs.     
Table B.6 shows the starting point for each parameter, and the range over which it is tested.  It 
should be noted that energy prices increase 2% annually, with the sensitivity analysis only 
manipulating the price during year one. 
Parameter Initial rate Range tested 
Electricity 0.08c/KWh $.05 to $.15 c/KWH 
Gas $5/GJ $3/GJ to $10/GJ 
O&M 2.5% CAPEX 0 to 5% CAPEX 
Interest 5% annual 0-10% per year 
Capital cost 102000 CAD 75%-125% of cost 
Discounting 5% annual 0-10% per year 
Heating 83,100 KWh 75%-125% 
Cooling 20,320 KWh 75%-125% 
Table B.6 Parameters in sensitivity analysis 
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The tornado charts shown Figure B.2 and Figure B.3 demonstrate the parameters having the 
greatest impact are increases in capital costs, interest rates, and energy prices. Increasing heating 
demand decreases levelized costs by increasing system output.  Similar to other engineering-
economics studies comparing GSHP to natural gas and electric alternatives, the outlook for 
GSHP is best where capital costs are low, heating loads are high, and the price of electricity is 
low compared to other fuel alternatives.  Furthermore, the economics of GSHP is largely 
dependent on heating loads, substantially improving with load size.   
 
Figure B.2 Change in levelized cost of GSHP 
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Figure B.3 Change in levelized cost of gas heating and electric cooling 
The levelized cost of GSHP is higher than that of the conventional heating system for all single 
parametric manipulations.  For GSHP to be less costly than the conventional system multiple 
favorable circumstances must align, such as a higher heating load, a lower installation cost, or a 
higher price of natural gas, for example.  The building is located in the Greater Vancouver Area 
(GVA), which has qualities unfavorable for GSHP, such as a mild climate and low energy prices.   
B.5 Divergent loads and networking GSHP with waste heat rejection 
To model the economics of collective GSHP, two similar buildings are collocated.  Pairing the 
two systems together as part of a single GSHP system will reduce levelized costs if the loads are 
divergent or if waste heat can be captured.  The network economies are unavailable to the 
alternative electric and natural gas system, so the levelized cost remains constant.   
The economic advantages of divergent loads and waste heat rejection are demonstrated as 
follows.  I assume two buildings, identical to the ones examined in the prior sensitivity analysis, 
are situated next to one another.   For the collective system, I double capital costs and energy 
demand.  The economic benefit of divergent loads assumes the high heating and cooling load 
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from the previous section (25% increase), while holding capital costs constant.  This 
demonstrates an increase in system utilization without increasing capital costs.  The benefits of 
waste heat rejection are illustrated by enabling a smaller ground loop to offer the same energy 
services.82  The demand doubles by combining the two buildings but the capital costs increase by 
a factor of 1.5x.  Lastly I apply both economies at the same time.  
  Capital cost ($000)  kWh $/kWh 
Independent 2x Regular   
Gas & Elec. 204 207 0.1203 
GSHP 100 207 0.221 
Divergent Loads 2x High   
GSHP 204 259 0.188 
Network benefit 1.5x Regular   
GSHP 153 207 0.166 
Combined 1.5x High   
GSHP 153 259 0.155 
Table B.7 Application of network economies to GSHP 
The network economies lower levelized costs significantly, but GSHP remains at a premium to 
the building heated by natural gas and electricity.  Higher assumed heating demand, or 
alternative energy prices, would be required for GSHP to be cheaper.  These economies remain, 
however, substantial sources of cost savings reducing lifecycle costs by $0.07/kWh.  
The application of network economies affect those parameters previously demonstrated to have 
the greatest impact on levelized costs.  Divergent loads increase heating load, and network 
externalities lower capital costs (and any associated interests payments).  Compared to factors 
such as energy prices and climate, which are difficult or impossible to manipulate, the economies 
                                                
82!Another!advantage!might!arise!if!the!ground!loop!was!recharged!by!waste!heat.!!This!would!reduce!thermal!lift!
and!improve!efficiency.!!I!exclude!this!economy!from!the!analysis.!
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arising by pairing interconnected systems can be created wherever divergent loads are 
collocated.  
B.6 Return on investment for a GSHP utility 
The engineering-economic model described earlier was primarily concerned with the 
comparisons of costs.  The model I will now examine is concerned with the return on investment 
over 20 years for an investor in the utility using incentive regulation.  Initially, the rate is set at 
$0.15/kWh with an annual fixed fee of $500.  
The utility model is similar to the engineering-economic model increased in scale by a factor of 
10, with the following exceptions.  Where before there were only costs now there are revenues 
allowing the utility earn a rate of return on their investment.  The rate of return will depend on a 
variety of parameters subject to sensitivity analysis, along with the rate design. The revenues are 
for the delivery of thermal energy to the building independent of the fuel consumed in its 
production.  For example, if the building requires 1M kWh of thermal energy but the GSHP 
system may be able to supply this for 0.4M kWh, then the former will be used to calculate 
revenues and the latter costs.  In calculating revenues the rate design includes a variable ($/kWh) 
and fixed ($/building unit) component.    
There are a few other additional factors that to consider in the sensitivity analysis.  A mix of debt 
and equity finances the capital equipment.  Increasing the level of debt without increasing the 
cost of borrowing should improve the return on investment.  The construction and occupancy of 
the building is now staggered.  Taxes are also applied to net cash flows after operating costs and 
debt servicing.  Table B.8 below contains the group of parameters used in the sensitivity 
analysis.   
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Costs   
Electricity $0.08/KWh .05 to .15 
O&M 2.5% CAPEX .0 to 0.05 
Demand 1,000,000KWH 75% to 125% 
Capital cost $1,000,000 in 2015-2016 75% to 125% 
Interest 5% 0% to 10% 
Debt 60% 50% to 70% 
Revenues     
Variable rate $0.15/KWh From .12 to .18 
Fixed rate $500/unit From 250 to 750 
Taxes 25% From 10-40% 
Occupancy 50% in 2016 -2017 100% 2015 or 2017-2019 
Discounted 5% annually 
Table B.8 Parameters for sensitivity analysis 
The tornado charts below show how changes to these parameters affect the rate of return over 20 
years.  Unlike with the levelized cost tornado charts where bars to the right meant higher costs, 
here bars to the right are indicators improvement, or a greater return on investment.  Figure C.4 
shows how changes affect the return on investment. 
 
Figure B.4 Return on investment for a GSHP utility  
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The most critical factor for profitability is the variable rate.  A low variable rate could rapidly 
reduce the profitability to almost zero, along with demand.  High capital costs were also 
detrimental to the profitability of the project along with interest rates.  Changes in the tax rate 
were less important the overall profitability of the project, partly due to the losses incurred early 
on reduce the tax liability of the utility.83  Furthermore, changes in the ratio of debt to equity also 
only had a minor effect compared to the interest rate charged on the debt.84   
The effect of changes in occupancy was also muted compared to changes in demand over the full 
life of the project.  This was partially due to the fixed-component of the rate design, for so long 
as the buildings are sold, the fixed-component supplies revenue to the utility. In the next section I 
illustrate how slight changes to rate design can affect who bears what risks, and what factors 
affect profitability.   
B.7 Rate design 
Rate designs can broadly be categorized as rate-of-return or incentive regulation.  Rate-of-return 
regulation is intended to limits the profitability of a firm to zero economic profit, where revenue 
is equal to cost, often known as Cost of Service (COS) regulation.  The base rate is normally set 
on the original investment cost less depreciation, but can also be the replacement value or the 
market value.  In practice, the debate is usually settled by agreeing upon a reasonable rate of 
return on the base rate, and then adjustments to the future pricing scheme of the firm follow 
(Viscusi et al. 2005). COS rate setting is the most common rate design in British Columbia 
(PICS 2012). 
                                                
83!This!may!actually!over!represent!the!effect!of!taxes!on!profitability.!!For!simplicity,!I!did!not!carry!forward!losses!
to!later!years!or!apply!a!tax!credit!based!on!equipment!invested.!
84!The!effect!would!be!even!greater!if!I!assume!the!cost!of!equity!was!higher!than!the!discount!rate!of!5%!of!year. 
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With incentive regulation, the regulator sets the price, and the firm can increase their profits by 
reducing costs. This lowers the regulatory burden and occasionally allows a firm to earn above 
average profits for superior performance.   The six most common types of incentive regulations 
are price caps, rate moratoria, profit sharing schemes, banded rate-of-return regulation, yardstick 
regulation, and menus.  Price caps are typically pegged to an index of commodities or services, 
and are used to some extent in all OECD countries (Curien et al. 1998).  Having a fixed fee 
attached to the service responsible for covering capital costs, and a variable rate covering energy 
costs (and perhaps indexed to energy prices) is one way to share risks between tenants and utility 
owners.  
In the last section, the rate charged for thermal energy was an incentive rate containing both a 
fixed component ($500/unit) and a variable rate component ($0.15KWh).  The fixed rate is 
applied to each unit as long as it has been sold. The variable rate only comes into affect when the 
units are occupied and energy is used.  However, it is not uncommon for condominiums to be 
purchased as investment properties left uninhabited for extended periods of time.  If a significant 
fraction of the buildings are uninhabited sales may be insufficient to cover the capital cost.85   
Table B.9 shows the ROI and NPV under four different scenarios.  In the first scenario 
construction is completed within three years and occupied within four.  The second case assumes 
buildings are built within three years, but occupied gradually with one quarter of units occupied 
each per year from 2017 to 2020.  The first two rows maintain the rate of $0.15/kWh and 
$500/unit each year, and the second two emphasize an increased reliance on either the fixed or 
variable cost. 
                                                
85!Occupancy!risk!is!one!of!the!key!risks!identified!in!chapter!6!by!providers!of!thermal!utilities.!
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Occupancy Fixed/Variable Rate IRR NPV 
Regular $0.15/KWh, $500/unit 14% $359,757 
Delayed $0.15/KWh, $500/unit 11% $276,505 
Delayed $0.21/KWh, $0/unit 10% $269,312 
Delayed $0.09/KWh, $1000/unit 12% $283,699 
Table B.9 Internal rate of return by rate design 
While the bottom two rows of Table B.9 offered the same rate of return during normal 
occupancy (14%), the rate with the greater fixed charged offered more protection during periods 
of low occupancy.  The rate relying on variable costs ($0.21/KWh) can only cover the sunk cost 
of the infrastructure if buildings are occupied as planned.  Maintaining a fixed-component in the 
incentive rate design clearly insulates the utility from occupancy risk.   
What if, instead of incentive regulation, rate-of-return or COS regulation were used?  With COS 
the earned return (return on investment) of the utility is calculated by multiplying the regulated 
rate of return by the invested capital or original investment value less depreciation.  COS allows 
the utility to claim a rate of return based on the capital invested, so only changes to the capital 
cost or the regulated rate of return affect the net present value of cash flows (resulting in a 
rectangular tornado chart). All costs flow through to the ratepayer, which is why COS has a 
reputation for being heavy-handed compared to other rate designs. 
The COS rate design cannot, however, insulate the project from occupancy risk.  If the units are 
not sold then there are no tenants from which the investment can be recovered.  For this reason 
occupancy risk remains a high-priority item for utilities no matter the rate design.        
B.8 Conclusion 
Similar to other engineering-economic studies of residential GSHP, the sensitivity analysis 
indicated the factors most advantages to GSHP are low capital costs, and high demand. The 
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network economies of divergent loads and network externalities increase demand and decrease 
capital costs for significant savings.  Unlike other difficult to manipulate parameters, such as 
energy prices, these economies can be created anywhere.   
The immediate conclusion of this appendix is that the economies of GSHP improve as the 
overall system load increases with scale and diversity of demand.  From an engineering-
economic perspective, GSHP is most compelling among larger or multi-unit buildings than 
among detached housing, its primary group of adopters.   
The lifecycle cost of GSHP was higher than the reference building heated with natural gas and 
electricity for all single parameter manipulations.  Even where economies of scale or waste heat 
are available, GSHP may be a premium service in British Columbia.  
Under utility ownership, assumptions changes to the variable rate were the primary factor 
affecting profitability.  I used occupancy risk as an example for how rate design can insulate or 
exacerbate exposure to unexpected outcomes.  Even when the utility is able to earn a regulated 
rate of return, occupancy risk remains a threat to project profitability.    
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Appendix C  BCUC orders and decisions  
In 1997, the BCUC developed and published the Retail Markets Downstream of the utility Meter 
(RMDM) guidelines following FortisBC’s entry into competitive retail markets. 86  These 
guidelines govern the interactions amongst utility affiliates when regulated entities own or 
compete for projects downstream of the utility meter (BCUC%2007). 
In the 2010 Long Term Resource Plan (LTRP), FortisBC announced its intention to offer a 
number of alternative energy services, implying ownership of assets upstream and downstream 
of the utility meter.  This included compressed natural gas, liquid natural gas, biogas, and 
Thermal Energy Services (TES) (Terasen%Gas%Inc.%2011a).  These new offerings were described 
as part of FortisBC’s long-term transformation into an integrated energy service provider. The 
BCUC approved their LTRP, indicating a more thorough review of the new business activities 
would be required at some point in the future (Terasen%Gas%Inc.%2011b).  
The BCUC came to a decision on a series of applications for TES projects, including the Delta 
School District and Kelowna District Energy System by FortisBC, and the Marine Gateway and 
Sun River Decisions by Corix.   In the case of TES projects offered by FortisBC, the BCUC 
instructed that these new assets be transferred to a financially dependent but structurally separate 
utility affiliate, FortisBC Alternative Energy Services (FAES) (BCUC%2012d).   
                                                
86!The!LTRP!was!filed!by!Terasen!Gas,!and!I!have!kept!the!FortisBC!brand!name!for!simplicity!throughout!the!
document!to!refer!the!BC!monopoly!provider!of!natural!gas.!!They!were!rebranded!FortisBC!in!2011,!following!the!
sale!of!Terasen!to!FortisInc!in!2005.!!
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In April and May of 2011, the Energy Services Association of Canada (ESAC) and Corix 
Utilities Incorporated (Corix), asked the BCUC to exercise their general supervisory powers over 
FortisBC’s offerings in the TES market, issuing separate letters of complaint.  The BCUC agreed 
and issued Order G-95-11 to establish a regulatory timetable of the Alternative Energy Services 
Inquiry (AES Inquiry) (FortisBC%2011a). 
In December of 2012, the BCUC came to a decision on the AES Inquiry and issued Order G-1-
12.  With respect to FortisBC’s TES offerings of district and discrete TES, FortisBC would be 
permitted to enter the TES market subject to certain conditions.  FortisBC was permitted to offer 
district TES projects through a structurally separate regulated utility.  The AES inquiry 
recommended exemptions from regulation when warranted, and an initial CPCN value was set at 
$0 until a scaled regulatory framework could be established (BCUC%2012a).87 
In August of 2013, the BCUC published a proposed regulatory framework for TES (BCUC%2013a).  It included proposed regulatory exemptions for Micro, Strata, and single customer TES 
systems.  Interveners were directed to submit recommendations on the exemptions through Order 
G-143-13, and Order G-143-13A (BCUC%2013b;%BCUC%2013c).    
 Following a review of the intervener arguments the Commission passed Order G-231-13, 
preserving the micro and strata exemptions, but removing the single customer exemption.  All 
TES with capital costs between the micro-TES threshold and $15M, and not eligible for Micro or 
Strata exemptions, are Stream A utilities (BCUC%2014g).  Interveners were asked to submit their 
                                                
87!In!the!long!term!resource!plan!for!FEI!(lower!mainland),!FortisBC!identifies!they!no!longer!pursue!TES!as!decided!
by!the!BCUC.!!These!projects!are!now!undertaken!by!FAES,!a!regulated!utility!affiliate.!
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opinions on appropriate limits of the micro-TES threshold and also a Stream B extensions test 
determining when a Stream B undergoing an extension should have to apply for a CPCN.  
The micro-TES exemption limit was set at $500k.  Stream B utilities undergoing extensions were 
found to require CPCN approval when the renovation might lead to rate shock, or a ~10% 
increase in rates (BCUC%2014a;%BCUC%2014b). 
Before the TES Inquiry concluded, FortisBC’s structurally separate regulated utility affiliate 
Fortis Alternative Energy Services (FAES) brought forth the SOLO District Development for 
BCUC approval in February of 2014, with the intention of practicing a streamlined Stream A 
regulatory procedure (BCUC%2014d).   The BCUC agreed and the SOLO project was approved, 
however not as a Stream A, which would have been prospective.  In the SOLO CPCN, FortisBC 
describes a performance-based rate setting methodology found to be just and reasonable by the 
BCUC. The BCUC maintains this decision is unique, and it will not in the future be considering 
the propriety of rates for Stream A applications (FAES%2014b).   FortisBC has three other 
Stream A applications approved by the BCUC, using the same rate-setting methodology as the 
SOLO project (FAES%2014a;%FAES%2014c). 
On March 24, 2014 Phase 2 of the Generic Cost of Capital Proceedings concluded.  The BCUC 
determined a reasonable rate of return for Stream B TES to be 75bps above the benchmark return 
on equity (FEI’s 8.5%).  This ruling is inapplicable to Stream A TES, as these projects are not 
subject to regulatory oversight (BCUC%2014c). 
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In August 2014, BCUC found their proposed regulatory exemptions for micro and strata TES to 
be in the public interest, and upon receiving permission from the Lieutenant Governor in Council 
issued orders G-119-14, G-120-14 and G-121-14 (BCUC 2014f). 
The TES Regulatory Guide was published August 28, 2014, maintaining regulatory exemptions 
for Micro and Strata TES, complaint-based regulation for stream A TES, and full regulatory 
review for Stream B utilities (BCUC%2014e).   
In concluding the proceedings, the BCUC reiterates that while the AES and TES Inquiries were 
designed to provide stability for the TES market in British Columbia, it reserves the right to 
revisit capital cost limits as the TES market evolves. 
